The instant petition as also CR No, 12-D of 1992/BWP, are being disposed of together, as both involve common questions of law and facts and the fate of CR No, 12-D of 1992/BWP, is dependent upon the decision of the noted petition.
2. The brief facts of the case are that the land measuring 312440 Acres was the "Shakargah" owned by the state of Bahawalpur; out of the above, it is allegedly claimed by the petitioners that Nawab of Bahawalpur, vide instrument dated 5.5.1885, (Ex.P-1), gifted 41959 Beghas and 3 Kanals of land in favour of one Channi Muhammad Khan; the possession is also claimed to have been delivered to the donee by the order of his Highness Nawab of Bahawalpur vide documents Ex. P-2 dated 5.5.1885, Khasra Pamaish (Ex.P-3), envisages the description of the property; Yadashat of the delivery of possession dated 2.4.1886 is Ex.P-4; the acknowledgement of the possession by the donee dated 29.9.1886 is Ex.P-6, thus on the basis of the above, it is asserted by the plaintiffs that the gift in favour of Channi Muhammad Khan, was complete; however, due to lack of the revenue record in Bahawalpur State, the transaction obviously does not find mention in any other public/official record. Channi Muhammad Khan has died since long (exact date and year of his death is not given), but when questioned, the counsel for the petitioners stated it to be in 19th century; however, the plaintiffs assert that Mr. Channi was survived by Jan Muhammad, his paternal cousin, and on his death, the aforesaid property devolved upon Muhammad Sharif, his son. Muhammad Sharif through various agreements of sales, sold the aforesaid land in favour of the Plaintiffs/Petitioners No, 1 to 67 and 69; they brought suits for the specific performance against Muhammad Sharif, which were decreed on 2.5.1974 (Ex.P-22), 14.5.1974 (Ex.P-23), 23.5.1974 (Ex.P-24) .1.8.1974 (Ex.P-25) and 2.9.1974 (Ex.P-26). However, when asked in the Court, the learned' counsel concedes that the decrees were not got executed through the process of the Court.
3. Anyhow, the aforesaid land alongwith the other part of the "Shakargah" was resumed under MLR 1964 on 6.5.68 and considering it to be the part of the Bahawalpur State, it was allotted in favour of Respondent No, 8 to 22 on 18.2.1982 as landless cultivators from some other area. Without prejudice to any one's case, I may refer, on the information provided by the counsel for the parties, that such resumption was challenged by the LRs of his Highness and has been annulled at the level of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan. Be that as it may, the petitioners, avowing to be the owners of the property on account of having purchased the same from Muhammad Sharif brought the suit for the declaration on 14.2.19715, impleading the Province of Punjab (Respondent No, 1), the rival claimants, who are the legal heirs of Channi Muhammad Khan (Respondents No, 2 to 17) the allottees under the Land Reforms (Respondents No, 18 to 22) the Cholishtan Development Authority (Respondent No, 23) and The Pakistan Agricultural;' Research Cottatil (Respondent No,-- 24); the written statements were filed by all the respondents/defendants and it was controverted that any gift was validly made in favour of Channi Muhammad Khan. It may be pertinent to mention here that Respondents No, 2 to 17, also brought a suit for the declaration alleging that they also are the legal heirs of Channi Muhammad Khan and thus have inherited the suit property, and that Muhammad Sharif could not have solely sold the same to the plaintiffs; both the suits were consolidated; issues were framed accordingly; parties .were put to trail and as has been pointed out by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs, Issues No, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 are the important issues, upon which the learned Civil Judge, returned its findings against the petitioners and dismissed the suit vide judgment and decree dated-23.7.1984; the appeal of the petitioners has also failed on 30.9.1991. Hence these petitions.
4. It is argued by Mr. Ijaz Ahmed Chaudhry, learned counsel for the petitioners that both the Courts below have misread the evidence on the record; the finding of the two Courts that there-is an interpolation in Ex.P-7,is totally misconceived and is not based upon proper reading of the document. It is-also stated that the view set out by the learned ADJ that the exact description of the gifted property cannot be ascertained, is also incorrect rather it is so proved on the basis of Ex.P-3, as to which specific property was gifted; moreover the findings that the possession which was necessary for the purpose of the validity of the gift, is not shown to have, been delivered to the donee, are absolutely wrong, as the: delivery of possession is established from Ex.P-2, the order o'` his Highness dated 5.5.1885; Yadashat of delivery of possession Ex.P-4 dafea 2.4.186and acknowledgement of possession Ex.P-6 by the donee dated' 29.9.1886, therefore, the gift for all intents and Purpose was complete` and valid. The learned counsel also argued that the suit land could never be resumed under the MLR, as being the property of the Bahawalpur State or that of his Highness and allotted to Respondent No, 18 to 22; he further states that both 'the Courts below have mis-conastrued ELP71EMD-4 'to hold that the -document has been interpolated whereas from the original, it is very clear that the word " has been used instead of this view is fortified by Ex.D.130, which was meant for the implementation of the gift and in this document; it stands clearly mentioned that the condition was waived a the word mentioned. Learned counsel has for the view of the courts that the View of the Courts that the property is not identifiable- is falsified by Ex.P-3 which establishes that the identification was made from Chak Suleh Wala taking it to be a Center; he also submits that his Highness during his life time, has never exercised the condition, canceling the gift even if it is assumed to be there, by making any revocation of the gift and therefore Channi Muhammad Khan his become the absolute owner of the property, which had devolved upon his legal heir from whom, the petitioners have purchased the same; it is lastly submitted that even the authority of his Highness to revoke the gift was circumvented by the condition laid down in the Ex.P- 1, and that is or non payment of and it is not the case of the respondents that any such condition was violated by Channi Muhammad Khan and therefore, the gift stood revoked.
5. I have heard' learned counsel for the parties. From the document Ex.P-1, it is clear that the land was not given to Channi Muhammad Khan in the nature of a gift as permissible under the Muhammadan Law, but it was a gift with a condition of being such in fact was not such in fact was not an absolute gift but in the nature of exclusively a usufruct to Channi Muhammad Khan for the purpose of his services rendered to the late Nawab he in no manner on the basis of Ex. P- 1 has ever become the exclusive owner of the property which could devolve upon any of his legal heirs the two Courts have rightly construed Ex.P-1 and my own reading of the document also shows that eh condition of was never waived by Nawab at any point of time the original record has been perused which fortify the above view. The argument that the exercise of the condition was never made by late Nawab because there is no instrument of revocation. The submission falsifies on the reasons firstly as mentioned above or to Channi Muhammad Khan in my view was only for his life time and the moment he had died the property could not devolve upon any of his legal heirs therefore in such circumstances on express revocation was needed the other reason that the property had been resumed under the land reforms proves that no gift existed at that time and any other legal heir of Channi had not challenged the resumption through the mechanism provided by the law pad before the forum having exclusive jurisdiction in this behalf. As regards the argument that the petitioners have procured the decrees for the specific performance against Muhammad Sharif, sole heir of Channi Muhammad Khan, it may be mentioned that the decrees for the specific performance by itself do not mean the transfer of any right in the property on account of which, the petitioners could seek the declaration of the ownership of the property, until and unless the -decrees were got executed. It is admitted position and even conceded by the petitioners' counsel that such decrees have never been got executed by the petitioners till to-date. In support of the above, reliance in this behalf has been placed on Muhammad Ishaq. Vs. Muhammad Siddique (PLD 1975 Lahore 909), therefore, I do not find any illegality or error in the judgments and decrees of the two Courts below calling for interference in my revisional jurisdiction; these petitions thus have no merits and the same are hereby dismissed.