' RANA BHAGWANDAS, ACTG. C.J.--- Petitioner-Bank and its Executives are aggrieved by Sindh High Court, Sukkur Bench judgment, dated 28-2-2007 allowing constitutional petition filed by the respondent seeking the following reliefs:-- "(a) To declare that the office memorandum dated 5-12-2006 (Annexure "D") issued by respondents Nos.1 and 2 is illegal, mala fide and without lawful authority and does not affect the rights of the petitioner as regular employee as Extra-Assistant Director/M. C.O. Of the respondent- Bank.
(b) To say the operation of the impugned office memorandum dated 5-12-2006 (Annexure "D")."
2. Precise facts appear to be that the respondent was employed in the petitioner-Bank with effect from 13-8-1986. His services were terminated by the petitioner-Bank with effect from 20-9-1995. He challenged his dismissal from service before the Federal Service Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal), which was accepted on 15-5-1999 and he was directed to be reinstated in service with back-benefits, while the penalty of reduction of salary by two stages was restricted to five years. Petitioners-Bank did not assail the correctness and vires of this judgment and vide office memorandum, dated 8-6-1999, in compliance with the judgment of the Tribunal, reinstated the respondent in service with all back-benefits, with retrospective effect from 20-9-1995.
3. After the judgment of this Court by a Larger Bench in Muhammad Mubeen-us-Salam v.
Federation of Pakistan PLD 2006 SC 602, declaring the provisions of section 2-A inserted in Service Tribunals Act, 1973 with effect from 10-6-1997, as repugnant to the provisions of Article 212 and other provisions of the Constitution, petitioner bank vide office order, dated 5-12-2006 withdrew the reinstatement order of the respondent, in view of the aforesaid judgment. Respondent challenged the vires and legality of this order through a constitution petition before the Sindh High Court, Sukkur Bench, which, after serious contest, has been allowed. Operative part of the impugned judgment reads as under:-- "In view of the above, present petition also attracts the doctrine of de facto being a past and closedd transaction would not fall within the ambit of conditions set forth at sub-paragraphs (a) to
(e) of paragraph No,109 of the judgment in Muhammad Mubeen-us-Salam, case, as no case is pending between the parties. We would allow the petition to the extent that the impugned office memorandum dated 5-12-2006 issued by respondent No,1 is declared to be unlawful and is set aside."
4. It is contended on behalf of the petitioners that case of the respondent would fall under clause
(d) of paragraph 109 of the judgment in Muhammad Mubeen-us-Salam (supra). Paragraph 109 of the judgment may be reproduced for the sake of reference and proper understanding of the issue raised before the High Court as well as this Court:-- "109. Now the question is as to what would be the effect of this judgment on the cases pending before this Court and Federal Service Tribunal. In this behalf it may be noted that following the rule of past and closed transactions, laid down in the case of Muhram Ali v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1998 SC 1445, it is directed as follows:--
(a) The cases which have been decided finally by this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 212(3) of the Constitution shall not be opened and if any Review Petition, Misc. Application or Contempt Application, filed against the judgment is pending, it shall be heard independently and shall not be affected by the ratio of this judgment.
(b) The proceedings instituted either by an employee or by an employer, pending before this Court, against the judgment of the Service Tribunal, not covered by category (a) before this Court or the Service Tribunal shall stand abated, leaving the parties to avail remedy prevailing prior to promulgation of section 2-A of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973.
(c) The cases or proceedings which are not protected or covered by this judgment shall be deemed to have abated and the aggrieved person may approach the competent forums for redressal of their ' grievances within a period of 90 days and the bar of limitation provided by the respective laws, shall not operate against them till the expiry of stipulated period.
(d) The cases in which the order of Service Tribunal has been implemented shall remain intact for a period of 90 days or till the filing of appropriate proceedings, whichever is earlier.
(e) The Service Tribunal shall decide pending cases under section 2-A of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 in view of the above observations. However, if any of the cases is covered by clause 'c' (ibid), a period of 90 days shall be allowed to aggrieved party to approach the competent forum for the redressal of its grievance."
5. Main thrust of the submission of the learned counsel is that in view of clear and unequivocal language employed in clause (d) of the aforesaid dictum, judgment in favour of the respondent stood intact for a period of 90 days from the date of judgment of this Court, which period having expired, petitioner-Bank and its Executives were legally justified in withdrawing and recalling the order of reinstatement in compliance with the judgment of the Tribunal.
6. We have given our careful consideration to the submission of the learned counsel and examined the reasons and grounds which found favour with the High Court for declaring the case of the respondent as past and closed chapter, covered by the dictum laid down in Mehram Ali v.
Federation of Pakistan PLD 1998 SC 1445. It is admitted that no proceedings against the judgment of the Tribunal reinstating the respondent, were pending before this Court among a large number of petitions, appeals, review petitions, contempt applications etc. In Mubeen-us-Salam's case. The petitioner-Bank indeed had raised no grievance against judgment of the Tribunal for a period of seven years. For all intents and purposes, petitioners had accepted and acknowledged the finality, of the judgment passed by the Tribunal in favour of the respondent and, in law, there was no legal or moral justification to reopen the case of the respondent, which had attained finality and was a past and closed transaction for all purposes. We do not find any illegality, impropriety or arbitrariness on the part of the High Court when it says that clause(d) must be read and interpreted in the light of opening part of paragraph 109 attaching finality to the doctrine of past and closed transaction, as by any stretch of reasoning, it cannot be said that all cases acted upon and implemented in entirety would be open for review by the employer. In all probability, the cases mentioned in clause (d) (supra) refer only to those cases against the judgment of the Tribunal which were pending before the Court or were filed in office or were in the pipeline i,e, to be filed before this Court by way of petitions under Article 212(3) of the Constitution. Indeed, the interpretation placed by the High Court follows the golden rule of harmonious interpretation of instruments and cannot be said to be against the law or justice, good conscience and fair play.
Clause (d) (supra) essentially refers to the relevant cases included in the lengthy list thereof, heard by the Court in Mubeenus Salam's case. It cannot and it does not refer to or reopen past and closed transactions, already acted upon. If interpreted to the contrary, it will open a pandora's box of litigation since June, 1997, when section 2-A was inserted in the Service Tribunals Act of 1973.
7. Since the view taken by the High Court, in our opinion, has done complete justice to the lis, we are not inclined to take a different view and to grant leave in this case.
8. Petition is, thus, found to be without any merit and substance. It is accordingly dismissed.