ANWAR ZAHEER JAMALI, J.-This Full Bench has been constituted to answer the questions proposed in the Reference dated 17-5-1999 made by our learned brother Ata-ur-Rehman, J. (as he then was),, which reads as under:-- "These are three suits bearing Nos. Nil of 1998 filed by Muhammad Hussain & 55 others, Chakar Khan and 25 others and Umed Ali and 12 others whereon the office inter alia, raised, following objection:-- "(1) The plaintiffs have been allotted 'separate leases hence separate court fees for each plaintiff to be filed or separate suit of each plaintiff to be filed."
2. On this office objection, the counsel for the plaintiffs and defendants have made their respective submissions. The learned counsel for the plaintiffs has contended that the controversy with regard to payment of Court-fee has arisen m view of an order dated 26-1-1998 passed by Mr. Abul Inam, J., as he then was in Suit No.1553 of 1997; the learned Judge has observed that where more than one plaintiffs file a suit then in terms of section 17 of the Court Fees Act, 1870, each plaintiff tas a different cause of action and as such the Court Fees On all the causes of action accruing to each plaintiff distinctly is to be added up together and so affixed. This order of Mr. Abul Inam, j., was confirmed in High Court Appeal No.15 'of 1998 through order dated 3-4-1998 passed by a Division Bench comprising Mr. Wajihuddin Ahmed, CJ., as he then was, and Mr M. Roshan Essani, J. The learned counsel for the plaintiff states that both the orders of the Single Judge as also the Division Bench are not correct, as they have been delivered without taking into account the operative statute as also the authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court on the point i.e.
(a) Court Fee (Sindh Amendment) Ordinance, 1977, reported in PLD 1977 Sindh Statutes 98; and
(b) Aslam Industries Ltd., Khanpur v. Pakistan Edible Corporation and others (1993 SCMR 683).
Stating succinctly, the contention of the learned counsel for the plaintiff are as follows:--
(i) Under section 17 of the Court Fees Act, which deals with multifarious suits, the Court has to see as to whether a plaint embraces two or more "distinct subjects". The term "distinct subjects" according to the preponderant view from the Indianjurisdiction means "distinct causes of action."
Accordingly, the Court does not have to look into the number of parties but the number of causes of action;
(ii) under the said section 17 the court fee has to be calculated in a manner that the court fee of every individual cause of action is to be then added up to together into an "aggregate amount" and then affixed with the plaint;
(iii) however, the above is subject to the rider that the maximum court fee in any event cannot exceed Rs.15,000, since such is the maximum ceiling prescribed by section 2 of the Court Fees (Sindh Amendment) Ordinance, 1977 (cited supra). Furthermore, the Supreme Court in the case of Aslam Industries (also cited supra) categorically holds that no doubt the exercise of calculating the aggregate court fee in terms of different causes of action is to be undertaken u/s. 17, however, in no case such aggregate court fee could exceed the maximum statutory ceiling i.e. Rs.15,000.
(iv) the decision of this Court authored by a Single Judge i.e. K.A. Ghani, J., as he then was in Ava A.
Cowasjee v. Nizam Shah, 1984 CLC 2705, which contains conclusions similar io the order of Mr. Abdul Inam, J., in suit No.1553 of 1997 has been disapproved or even tacitly overruled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Aslam Industries.
(v) the court can examine the plaint and can determine as to whether the plaintiffs can jointly maintain a suit under Order I rule 1 of the CPC, however, once it is decided that under such provision of law a single suit is maintainable, the maximum court fee cannot go beyond the statutory ceiling by Rs.15,000.
4. The learned counsel for the defendants contended that the order passed by the learned Single Judge was later on confirmed in High Court Appeal by a Division Bench of this Court. According to them, the two Courts considered the provisions of section 17 and thereafter adjudicated upon the similar objection. They contended that there is no room left for not upholding the office objection.
They, however, admitted that the two Courts have not considered the provisions of Court Fees (Sindh Amendment) Ordinance, 1977 and the case of Aslam Industries which has not cited with approval the view of the Single Judge of this Court in case of Ava A. Cowasjee.
5. I considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs and defendants and heard both the parties at length on a number of dates. Prima facie, it is correct that none of the orders of the learned Single Judge in Suit No.1553 of 1997 and of the Division Bench in H.C.A.
No.15 of 1998 have considered the Court Fees (Sindh Amendment) Ordinance, 1977, prescribing the maximum ceiling, and the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Aslam Industries The learned counsel for the plaintiffs has vehemently made an attempt to persuade me that the orders of the Single Judge and the Division Bench are to be ignored as per incuriam, having been rendered in ignorance of statute and the binding pronouncement of this Court. In this regard, reliance is placed on the case of Abdul Razzak v. Collector of Customs (1995 CLC (Karachi) 1453) wherein it has been observed that judgments which are per incuriam do not bind any court and "it matters little that such Court itself be at the lowest rung in the hierarchy of Courts.Be that as it may, the better course in the facts and circumstances is to refer the matter to the Hon'ble Chief Justice for constitution of a larger Bench to resolve this issue. In doing so I am guided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Multi Line Associates .v. Ardeshir Cowasjee (PLD 1995 SC 423 at pp.43 AA, 435B and 435C).
6. In the light of the above discussion, the matter is referred to the Hon'ble Chief Justice for constitution of a larger Bench to resolve this controversy, which is of paramount public importance.
The precise terms of reference are humbly proposed as follows:--
(i) Whether the term "subjects" appearing in section 17 of the Court Fees Act, 1870 is amenable to the same connotation as the terms "cause of action"'?
(ii) Whether the court fee is to be calculated on the plaint or pleading in relation to "distinct subjects", irrespective of the number of parties to the case?
(iii) Whether the aggregate Court-fee calculated under section 17 of the Court Fees Act, 1870 is subject to the maximum statutory ceiling of Court-fee of Rs.15,000, prescribed for the Province of Sindh through the Court Fee (Sindh Amendment) Ordinance, 1977 reported in PLD 1977 Sindh Statutes 98 read with the decision of the Supreme Court in Aslam Industries Ltd., Khanpur v.
Pakistan Edible Corporation and others, 1993 SCMR 683?
(iv) Whether the order of the learned Single Judge in Suit No.1553 of 1997 dated 26-1-1998 and the order of the Division Bench in H.C.A. No.15 of 1998 dated 3-4-1998, both of this Court, are not the correct pronouncements of law having been rendered in ignorance of the operative statute i.e. Court Fees (Sindh Amendment) Ordinance, 1977 and the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Aslam Industries, having the binding force of law under Article 189 of the 1973 Constitution?
The office is therefore directed to place these matters expeditiously before the Hon'ble Chief Justice for appropriate orders. The office is further directed also to place along with the files copies of the orders passed in Suit No.1553/1997 and H.C.A. No.15/1998."
2. It seems that other suits fixed along with this reference also involve similar controversy as regards payment of proper Court-fee, thus have been tagged with this reference.
3. With reference to the relevant facts of each case and in the context of various questions proposed in the reference, we have heard M/s. Munir A. Malik, Abid Akram, Shafi Muhammadi, B.M, Bungash, Mazhar Ali B. Chohan, K.A. Wahab, and Amir Malik, Advocates for plaintiffs in various suits, Mr. Anwar Mansoor Khan, Advocate General, Sindh, and M/s, Muhammad Ali Sayeed and Iqbal Kazi, Advocates as Amicus Curiae.
4. Mr. Munir A. Malik after making brief reference to the relevant facts of the case of Jamil Ahmed and others v. Province of Sindh and others, wherein he is representing the plaintiffs in the suit, has contended that the pith and substance of the controversy involved in this reference has been resolved by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Aslam Industries (Pvt.) Limited, Khanpur v. Pakistan Edible Corporation and others (1993 SCMR 683). To add force to his submission learned counsel has made reference to. Paragraphs. 16 & 17 of the judgment in the said case which read as under:- "16.Under Article 1 of the Schedule I of the Court Fees Act, VII of 1870 as amended by section 8 of the Punjab Finance Act, XVI of 1973, the court-fee payable on a plaint and other documents as is therein stated is as follows:-- S. No,Article proper Fee
1. Plaint, written statement pleading a set-off or counter-claim or memo-randum of appeal (not otherwise provided for in this Act) of cross-objection presented to any Civil or Revenue Court except those mentioned in section 3.Seven-and-half per centrum on the amount of value of the subject-matter in dispute subject to a maximum of fifteen thousand rupees.
Note:--The amount payableunder this number shall be rounded to the nearest fifty paisas.
It is an admitted position between the parties that the suit of the 'appellant is of a multifarious nature and therefore one filed under section 17 of the Court Fees Act, 1870. The only question therefore that arises is whether the plaint is one "not otherwise provided for in this. Act", Schedule II of the Act does refer to certain plaints and memoranda of appeal in respect of certain suits and applications and petitions presented to Civil Courts and other office partaking of the nature of original proceedings and we have no reasons to doubt that the words "not otherwise provided for in this Act" apparently refer to the provisions made for plaints and memoranda of appeal in certain suits referred to in Schedule II. The, instant suit not being one specially provided for in the Court Fee Act, would be governed by Article 1 of Schedule I of the Act.
17. The next question is whether the proviso in Article 1 of the Schedule I of the Court Fees Act limits the court-fee chargeable on a plaint or memorandum of appeal of the nature mentioned in section 17 and whether the case is taken out of the operation of Article 1 of Schedule I by being "otherwise provided for in this Act" that is to say provided for by section 17. Schedule I and II deal leviability of court-fees whereas the other provisions of the Act deal with chargeability, computation, etc. The language of Article 1 of Schedule I clearly states that this. Article will not, apply to a plaint or memorandum of appeals "otherwise provided for in this Act". These words obviously refer to a provision in the schedules dealing with leviability. Thus a plaint or memorandum of appeal cannot come under the operation of Article 1 of Schedule I, if it falls under some other specific Article in any of, the Schedules, Schedule II refers to certain plaints and memoranda of appeal in certain suits where specific court fee is provided for. Section 17 of the Act makes no provisionof this kind. It merely lays down a rule whereby aggregate amount of fee leviable on the plaint or memorandum of appeal in suits embracing separate subjects will have to be paid, but does not itself fix the amount of the court-fee. Rather, it refers to other parts of the Act for the amount leviable i.e. To the Schedules, which deal with the subject. Section 17 is subject to the rules as to the amount of the fee which is stated in the Schedules. Thus, the court-fee payable on a plaint in respect of a multifarious suit covered by section 17, where the court-fee is not otherwise provided for by the Act, would be Article 1 of Schedule I. Well, if this Article is applicable, it is to be applied according to its exact tenor. A maximum ceiling to court-fee is provided on the documents listed in this Article, which includes a plaint. This would therefore apply, irrespective of the consideration whether section 17 is applicable to the case. The ceiling overrides the rule contained in section 17. Ava A. Cowasjee's case cited by the learned Deputy Attorney-General has failed to mention the intent of the Government to limit the fee leviable. Arbab Ghulam All Khan's case is in favour of the appellant. If the view as suggested by the learned Deputy Attorney-General is applied, it would, as observed by Stauart, C.J. In Raghobir Sindh's case, "work so extravagantly as to make the court-fee payable under it rather in, the nature of a penalty." Even otherwise, a taxing statute must be construed in the light of what is clearly expressed and if the legislature wants to fix a maximum ceiling beyond which it does not want to recover court-fees, true recognition must be given to that intent".
5. Making reference to the other cases viz. Ava A. Cowasjee v. Nasreen Nizam 1984 CLC 2705 and judgment dated 3-4-1998 in H.C.A. No.15 of 1988, containing somewhat different view in the context of payment of court fee, he urged that these judgments are per incuriam as the case of Aslam Industries Limited (supra), which is squarely applicable and covers the controversy as regards payment of proper court-fee was not brought to the notice of learned Single Judge and the Division Bench passing such orders. While concluding his submissions, he submitted that it would entirely depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case that the question of payment of proper court-fee will be decided on the basis of nature of multifariousness of causes of action, vis- a-vis subject-matter of dispute, and the causes of action accrued to the parties will be the real test to decide that if the relief(s) sought is to be granted on the basis of individual claims(s) of each plaintiff separately then the court-fee would be separately payable by each plaintiff, but if the relief
(s) claimed in the suit is such which is common to the interest of all the plaintiffs in the suit and grant of relief to one will be applicable in rem to 'the claims of other plaintiffs then maximum payment of court-fee in the sum of Rs.15,000 will suffice.
6. Mr. B.M. Bangush learned counsel for plaintiff in Suit No.02/1999 (Haji Muhammad Ibrahim & others v. K.M.C. & others) -made reference to the judgment in the case of Dr. Mahmood-ur- Rehman Faisal v. Secretary, Ministry of Law & Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and 6 others (PLD 1992 FSC 195) and contended that in view of this pronouncement by the Federal Shariat Court, no court-fee 'could be charged on the plaint.
Hovvever, learned counsel did not dispute that against such judgment appeal has been preferred before the Shariat Appellate Bench of Hon'ble. Supreme Court, which is still pending and by virtue of filing of such appeal the operation of judgment in the case of 'Dr. Mahmood-urRehman Faisal (Supra) is automatically suspended.
7. Other learned counsel appearing for the plaintiffs in various suits have adopted the above-noted submissions of the learned counsel.
8. Mr. Anwar Mansoor Khan, Advocate-General Sindh, in his -arguments, also made reference to the case of Aslam Industries Limited (Supra), and other cases referred and discussed in Paragraphs 8,11 to 15 of the said case and contended that the question of payment of proper court- fee in each case is to bedetermined on the basis of guidelines given in this judgment. For citing such cases and the contentions raised therein, Paragraph No.8 of the judgment referred by learned Advocate General Sindh isreproduced as under:- "8. On behalf of the appellant it is submitted that, without challenging in any way the facts that the suit in instance filed by the appellant was of a multifarious nature and that the aggregate amount of court-fees to which the plaint in suit embraced separately the two subjects did work out to Rs.30,000, but in view of the proviso to Article 1 of Schedule. I of the Court Fees Act, 1870, as substituted by section .8 of the Punjab Finance Act, 1973,, the appellant is only liable to pay the maximum court-fee provided therein which is Rs.15,000, and no further. In this connection the learned counsel for the appellant refers to Reghobir Singh v. Dharam Maur ILR 3 All. 108, Kashi.
Prosad Singh _v. Secretary of State for India-in-Council (ILR 29 Cpl. 140 and C.P. Syndicate Ltd. v.
Sardar Naurang Singh AIR 1950 Nag.189".
9. To further fortify his submission, he also made reference to the cases reported as T.S. Venkatanaryana Lyer v. The State of Madras AIR 1953 Madras 888 and In re: D. Lakshminaravana Cheetiar AIR 1954 Madras 594. In the case of T.S. Venkatan,arayana Lyer, while dealing with Civil Revision Petition against the order .Of subordinate Courts directing the plaintiff to pay enhanced court-fee, learned Single Judge carefully examined section 17 of the Court Fees Act and held as under:-- "(7). There can be no question in this case that S. 17 of the Act would govern, the case and the only question then is as to what is the correct interpretation of S.17 of the Act with reference to the facts of the present case. S. 17 of the Act is to the following effect: Where a suit embraces two or more distinct subjects, the plaint or memorandum of appeal shall be chargeable with the aggregate fees to which the plaint is or memoranda of appeal in suits embracing separately each of such subjects would be liable under this Act'."
This section relates to court-fee payable in respect of multifarious suits. But unfortunately in the whole of the Act the word "subject" has not been defined, whereas in Ss. 7 and 13 of the Act, the words used are "suit embraces two or more distinct subjects". It is not, therefore, clear from the language of the `section as such as to whether the word "subject" here means and includes subject-matter or whether it means something else. On a reading of the entire provisions of the Act as a whole I am inclined to the view that the terminology, namely, "distinct subjects" used in S.17 of the Act should be interpreted to mean distinct subject-matter only, and it should also be understood to mean such subject-matters as are distinct but which can be clubbed together in a single suit. Otherwise if the words "distinct subject" in a very comprehensive sense, then the meaning of S.17 would become absurd; for distinct categories of subjects could not be embraced in a single suit. Obviously, the intention underlying this S.I7 seems to be to provide for suits which offend against the other provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, such as misjoinder of causes of action and so forth."
10. In the other case of a D. Lakshminarayana Chettiar and another, the question as to the proper interpretation of section 17 of the Court Fees Act ,vis-a-vis payment of proper court-fee was referred to the Full 'Bench, for its opinion. The learned Bench examined plethora of case-law on the subject from various High Courts of Indian jurisdiction to answer the question what is the real meaning of the words "distinct subject" used in section 17 of the Court Fee Act" and answered the same as under:- "Distinct subject" in S.17, Court-fees Act means distinct causes of action in respect of which separate suits should be filed but for the enabling provisions allowing them to be clubbed up in one suit. The distinctness or identity of the cause of action is the only criterion for the applicability of the section."
11. The above opinion of Full Bench again came up for consideration before a Division. Bench (AIR 1954 Madras 602), which passed the order dated 6-10-1953, and observed as under:-- "it is not necessary to multiply cases, for it is now fairly well-settled that "cause of action" means the bundle of essential facts which is necessary for the plaintiff to prove before he can succeed in the suit. Or to put it differently, it refers "to the media upon which the court arrived at a conclusion in his favour". To define it is comparatively easier but to apply it to the facts of each case is more difficult."
12. Concluding with his submissions learned Advocate-General submitted that the questions framed in this reference are thus required to be answered on the basis of guidelines given by our Apex Court in the case of Aslam Industries Limited (supra).
13. Mr. Muhammad Ali Sayeed learned senior counsel appearing as Amicus Curia highlighted the concept of access to justice as one of the fundamental rights for each citizen of this country, guaranteed under the Constitution. In this context, he made reference to the following cases:--
(1) Federation of Pakistan v. The General Public PLD 1988 SC 645.
(2) Government of Sindh and others v. Sharaf Faridi and others PLD 1994 SC 105.
(3) Government of Balochistan v. Azizullah Memon and 16 others PLD 1993 SC 341.
(4) Al-Jehad Trust through Raseesul Mujahideen Habib-ul-Wahabuul-Khari and others v.
Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 1996 SC 324.
(5) Aftab Shaban Mirani v. President of Pakistan and others 1998 SCMR 1863.
(6) New Jubilee Insurance Company Ltd., Karachi v. National Bank of Pakistan PLD 1999 SC 1126.
(7) Mehram Ali and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 1998 SC 1445.
(8) Sh. Liaquat Hussain and others v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1999 SC 504.
(9) Sh. Riazuddin v. Aquilur Rhemna Siddiqui v. And 4 others PLJ 1993 SF 141.
14. As regards the applicability of ratio of judgment in the case of Aslam Industries Limited (supra), learned counsel endorsed with respect the merits of the conclusion recorded in the said judgment of the Apex Court. In the end, Mr. Muhammad Ali Sayeed also made reference to the well- recognized rule of interpretation of fiscal statute that where, upon interpretation of any provision of law two equally logical conclusions are possible, then the one favourable to the subject is to be given preference over the other.
15. Mr. Iqbal Kazi the other learned senior counsel appearing as Amicus Curia, during the course of his arguments made specific reference to the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Sindh High Court Bar Association Karachi and another v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan PLD 1991 Kar. 178, and contended that legally by virtue of sections 4 and 6 of the Sindh Finance Act IV of 1990, the Court Fee (Sindh Amendment) Ordinance, 1977 has been repealed with effect from 1-7- 1990, therefore, the earlier benefit available to the litigant public by limiting the payment of maximum court-fee to Rs.15,000 was no more available, however, explaining the applicability and import of this judgment, learned counsel referred concluding paragraph 19 of the judgment to show that by this judgment, Court has held sections 4 and 6 of the Sindh Finance Act, 1990 repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam and also violative of Articles 2-A and 37(d) of the Constitution and therefore, directed the office of the High Court and all the Courts subordinate to the Sindh High Court to ignore the amendments made by sections 4 and 6 of the Sindh Finance Act, 1990, as a result whereof the earlier provisions of Court Fees (Sindh Amendment) Ordinance, 1977 are still being followed in Sindh. He also made reference to Para. 18 of the same judgment to show the legal difficulty faced by the Divisions Bench in declaring sections 4 and 6 of the Sindh Finance Act, 1990 ultra vires to the Constitution. Learned counsel further made statement at the bar that the said judgment in the case of Sindh High Court Bar Association Karachi (supra) has been maintained by the apex Court, therefore, the provisions of Court Fees (Sindh Amendment) Ordinance, 1977 are still being applied by all Courts in Sindh for charging the maximum court-fee in the sum of Rs.15,000. In the cm referring to the judgment in the case of Aslam Industries Ltd. (supra), learned counsel reiterated that the parties to the suit; subject-matter of litigation; the multifariousness of the causes of action; nature of reliefs claimed, and in that context the guideline given in this judgment, will be the relevant considerations to determine whether each of the plaintiff is required to pay separate court-fee in the suit or payment of maximum court-fee once would be sufficient on behalf of any number of plaintiffs in the suit, and such principle will be applied by the Courts keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case.
16. We have carefully considered the arguments advanced before us by the learned counsel and also perused the relevant record.
As evident from the record, the basis for making of reference in hand dated 17-5-1999 by the learned Single Judge Ataur Rahman, J. (as he then was), are the judgments in the case of AVA A.
Kowasjee v. Nasreen Nizam Shah 1984 CLC 2705, followed by another Hon'ble Judge of this Court Abul Inam, J. (as he then was) in his order dated 24-12-1997 in Suit No.1553/1997, which order was also maintained by the Division Bench of this Court vide its order dated 3-4-1998 passed in High Court Appeal No.15/1998. It seems that at the time of passing of two preceding orders in Suit No.1553 of 1997 and H.C.A. No.15/1998, learned counsel appearing in the matter had not brought to the notice of the Court the case of Aslam Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. Khanpur v. Pakistan Edible Corporation and others 1993 SCMR 683, a authoritative pronouncement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan, which is binding on all other Courts in Pakistan by virtue of Article 189 of the Constitution, and had already laid at rest the controversy from which the questions proposed in this reference application emanate. In paragraph 15 of judgment in the case the Hon'ble Supreme Court had specifically taken notice of the earlier judgment in the case of AVA A. Kowasjee (supra) and observed under:-- "In AVA A. Kowasjee v. Nasreen Nizam Shah 1984 CLC 2705 a number of plaintiffs jointly sued a number of defendants for a number of reliefs arising out of one cause of action; each relief being claimed for damages accruing to different plaintiffs. The Court held that the suit embraced two or more distinct subjects. However, the Court repelled the plea that the proviso to Article 1 of Schedule I of the Court Fees Act was applicable, on the ground that it did not relieve the plaintiffs from liability to pay court-fees separately on each of the distinct subjects 'merely because separate claims had been made by different plaintiffs. That however conceded that on each separate distinct subject, the maximum court-fee payable separately would not be more than Rs.15,000."
Further, taking into consideration several judgments from the Indian jurisdiction on the subject, the judgment of Peshawar High Court in the case of Arbab Ghulam Ali Khan v. Arbab Muhammad Hussain and 4 others PLD 1986 Peshawar 72, containing a contrary view to the one in the case of AVA A. Kowasjee (supra), and also taking into consideration the relevant provisions of the Court Fees Act, in Paragraphs 16 and 17 of the judgment (already reproduced above) Hon'ble Supreme Court has elucidated and amplified the relevant aspects which need careful consideration in each case for this purpose, and provided comprehensive guidelines for determining the issue of payment of court-fee on that basis. It has also been observed at the bottom of paragraph 17 of the judgment that a taxing statute must be construed in the light of what is clearly expressed and if the legislative wants to fix a maximum ceiling beyond which it does not want to recover court-fees, true recognition must be given to that intent.
18. Indeed, in the case of Aslam Industries Ltd., reference has been made to the provisions of Article 1 of Schedule I of the Court Fees Act (VII of 1870) as amended by section 8 of Punjab Finance Act (XVI of 1973) and on that basis it has been held that the maximum court-fee payable on the plaint was Rs.15,000 and no further . But in the Province of Sindh, also in view of the judgment of this Court in the case of Sindh High Court Bar Association Karachi and another v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan PLD 1991 Karachi 178, which has been maintained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan, despite amendment in the Court Fee Act, 1870, made by sections 4 and 6 of the Sindh Finance Act, 1990, thereby repealing the earlier amendment in Article 1 of Schedule I of the Court Fees Act, VII of 1870, introduced by section 2 of Sindh Finance Ordinance VII of 1977, the position has remained unchanged i.e. The maximum court-fee recoverable is still in the sum of Rs.15,000. For further elucidation of this aspect relevant/operative paragraphs 18 and 19 of the judgment are reproduced as under:-- "18. Having reached the conclusion that sections 4 and 6 of the Sindh Finance Act, 1990, are repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam and also violative of Articles 2-A and 37(d) of the Constitution, it has to be considered as to what relief can be granted in this petition under Article 1990 of the Constitution. Till the Supreme Court gives its final verdicts on Constitutional provisions relating to Islamization of laws, it will remain doubtful whether a declaration can be given under Article 199 that a statutory provisions is void on the ground that it is repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam. Yet, to enforce its findings that sections 4 and 6 of the Sindh Finance Act, 1990, are repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam and also violative of Articles 2-A and 37(0), the Court can certainly give appropriate directives to regulate its working and procedures and so also of the Courts subordinate to it.
19. In view of our conclusions in this petition, we have decided to issue the following directives:--
(a) The concerned officers of the Sindh High Court will accept plaints, written statements, pleading, set-offs or counter-claims, memoranda of appeals or cross objections presented or filed in the Sindh High Court with Court-fees affixed on such documents payable ,under the Court Fees Act, 1870 (as applicable to the Sindh Province) ignoring its amendment by sections 4 and 6 of the Sindh Finance Act, 1990, as if these two sections were not enacted;
(b) Similar directive be issued to all Courts subordinate to the Sindh High Court and exercising civil jurisdiction."
19. Thus the ratio of judgment in the case of Aslam Industries Ltd. Is fully applicable and binding on all Courts in the Province of Sindh.
20. The submission of Mr. B.M. Bhangesh Advocate, with reference to the judgment of Federal Shariat Court in the case of Dr. Mahmoodur Rehman Faisal (supra) has also no relevancy/practical implication at this point of time, as its operation stood automatically suspended due to filing of appeal against such judgment before the Shairat Appellate Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan, which is an admitted position.
21. The submission of Mr. Muhammad Ali Sayeed Advocate, with reference to the plethora of case law cited by him, highlighting the concept of Access to Justice as one of the fundamental rights, guaranteed for every citizen of this country, has also persuasive force for liberal application of the view taken by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Aslam Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. Khanpur (supra).
22. In the context of chargeability of court-fee in the Suits involved in this reference, a reference to Article 2-A and Article 37(d) of the Constitution is also pertinent, as by virtue of these Articles of the Constitution, State, is obliged to promote the ends of social justice by providing inexpensive and expeditious justice to every citizen of this country.
23. To sum up, following the guidelines given by the Apex Court in the case of Aslam Industries (Pvt.) Limited Khanpur v. Pakistan Edible Corporation and others 1993 SCMR 683, all the four questions proposed in this reference application are answered in the affirmative.
24. The reference made to this Bench is disposed of accordingly.