1. MRS. YASMIN ABBASEY, J.---This appeal has been directed against the order of Registrar of trade mark dated 16-1-2004, disallowing to register the mark LOTUS for the products manufactured by the appellant. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that appellant company is manufacturing and marketing cotton yarn in Pakistan since long. On 24-9-1990 appellant applied for registration of Trade Mark named as LOTUS for its goods i.e. Tissues (piece goods) bed, table covers and other textile articles under Class 24 of the Fourth Schedule of Trade Mark Rules, 2004.
2. Number was allotted to the application and on 1-9-1993 it was advertised in trade mark journal. In reply to it respondent No.1 filed objection, stating that they are doing business since 1990 under the name of mark LOTUS, and had also applied for registration of it under Class 23. Considering the objection of respondent No.1 appellants application was rejected. From the perusal of impugned order it is observed that order is missing from reasoning of rejection of appellants application. Respondent No.2 has failed to distinguish in between the goods of both appellant and respondent No.
1. Classification of Goods and services as specified in fourth Schedule of Trade Mark Rules, 2004, describes. Class 23-inch ides yarns and threads: for textile use. Class 24-includes Textiles and textile goods not included in other classes, bed and table cover. The bare reading of both classes show that apparently the use of products defined in these classes are absolutely different to each other having different categories of consumers. Product in Class 23 relates to the yarn and thread used for textile manufacturing having no common access of consumers of open market, whereas goods defined in Class 24 are finished goods to be supplied in open market for class of consumer among general public. Therefore, to say that if the application of applicant is allowed it will create confusion and deception amongst the traders and consumer have no -force therein because the class of consumers of the very two products detailed in Classes 23 and 24 have no nexus in between them. It is further pleaded that the ground taken up by appellant was neither considered nor discussed by the Registrar. The fact that application for registration of trade mark is earlier in time i.e. Of 24-9-1990 than to that of the respondent No.1 of 1991 too has been totally ignored.
3. However, if it is taken that similar or identical trade mark will create any confusion or deception among their consumer then no reasons has been assigned by the registrar that when the same trade mark was already assigned to Dost Muhammad Cotton Mills Ltd. Under Registration No.24325 in Class No.23 then why the same was intended to be entertained for the opponent on his application made in 1991.
4. It is under these circumstances learned counsel for the applicant has referred 1998 SCMR 2268, wherein it is observed that "section 24-A of General Clauses Act,. 1897" declare that where a statute confers a power to make any order or to give any direction to any Authority, office or person, such would be exercised reasonably, fairly, justly and for the advancement of the purpose of the enactment. What is more the order or direction so far as necessary or appropriate would reflect reasons for its making or issuance and where the same is lacking an affectee may demand the necessary reasons, which in response, would be furnished."
5. 1998 SCMR 2419. In departmental appeal, equally covered by section 24-A (ibid), but belonging to a higher genus, as the same attract quasi-judicial functions, necessary treatment of reasons therein, cannot but be a sine qua non for orders issuing therefrom. Even so, the fora, in which such orders are questioned, in the instant case the Service Tribunal and ultimately this Court, have a discretion either to simply set aside the departmental appellate orders for want of necessary reasons or, where the justice of a case so demands, to discover the reasons, if discernible from the record to uphold the finding, if the finding appears to be otherwise just, convenient and purposeful.
6. PLD 2002 Karachi 524. The last sentence in the above order manifestly discloses the indifferent attitude of the learned Family Judge in dismissing the application for setting aside the ex parte order simply on the ground that ex part order had already been announced. Such a slipshod and rough order is to be refrained from while performing sacred duty of judicial dispensation. Not only a Judge but by way of introduction of new provision in section 24-A(2) of the General Clauses Act every authority, office or person making an order under the powers conferred by or under any enactment is required to assign/record reasons for passing the order indeed, if the mentioned sentence is the only ground for passing the order dated 25-5-2000 it can irresistibly be opined that it is no reason in the eye of law. An order shall be a speaking order and more particularly while dealing with substantive rights of parties a cursory and a groundless order without assigning reasons cannot be conceived, nor would it be treated as a legal one".
7. To converse the arguments advance by the learned counsel for appellant, none was in attendance on behalf of respondent in spite of service on them through bailiff as well as by publication in Newspaper Dawn dated 23-10-2004.
8. In view of above discussion is that impugned order dated 16-1-2004 is set aside. Appeal is allowed with direction to Registrar to consider the application of appellant for registration of trade mark LOTUS in accordance with law. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.