' RAHMAT HUSSAIN JAFFERI, J.---Brief facts given rise to the present appeal are that Ghulam Abbas Memon, Inspector Anti-Narcotic Force, Karachi, during Investigation of Crime No,83 of 2001 of Police Station Main ANF, Karachi, vide order dated 11-4-2002, froze the Flat No,202 Marine Heights-III, G-3, Block-Clifton, Karachi in the name of Giran Bibi mother of the accused Abdul Qudoos involved in the above mentioned crime. The said order reads as under:- ' M/s Naushad and Salim Associates, Builders and Developers G-3 Block-2 Clifton, Karachi.
' Subject: Order under section 6(5) of A.N.F. Act, 1997 for freezing of assets/properties of accused Abdul Quddus son of Abdul Rasheed (Case No,38 of 2001 of PS Main A.N.F., Karachi.
' Ref:- your office letter dated 20th March, 2002 refers.
1. I, Ghulam Abbas Memon, Inspector, Anti-Narcotics Force, Karachi am conducting an enquiry under section 6(5) of Anti-Narcotics Force Act, 1997 into the assets/properties of drug baron Abdul Quddus son of Abdul Rasheed and his relatives/associates.
2. During the course of the above said enquiry the assets/properties detailed below have been traced. In my opinion there is reasonable suspicion that this property has been acquired through illicit involvement in narcotics by the above said drug baron and being held by him and his family members.
Details of assets/properties ' Flat No,202, Marine Heights-III, G-3 Block-2 Clifton, Karachi in the name of Giran Bibi mother of accused Abdul Quddus,
3. Whereas in my opinion the above mentioned assets is likely to be transferred or otherwise disposed of, therefore, in pursuance of authorization by the Director General Anti-Narcotics Force and in exercise of power under section 6(5) of A.N.F. Act,- 1997. I, the Enquiry Officer, hereby order that you being in possession of office of Regional Directorate, Anti- Narcotics Force, Karachi and this order shall be subject to any order made by the Court having jurisdiction in the matter.
4. Please also note that any contravention of the above order is punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years or with fine or with both as provided under section 6(6) of the A.N.F. Act, 1997.
Sd/ (Ghulam Abbas Memon) Inspector, Anti-Narcotics Force
2. The order was communicated to the respondent. On 13-11-2004 the respondent moved an application before the trial Court with a prayer to set aside the above mentioned order. The learned trial Judge, after hearing the parties' counsel set aside the said order and further ordered that the property should be reverted to the respondent, hence the present appeal.
3. We have heard the special prosecutor for A.N.F., Advocate for the respondent and perused the record of this case very carefully.
4. From the record it appears that the Inspector, A.N.F. Froze the property in exercise of powers under section 6(5) of Anti-Narcotics Force Act, 1997 (herein after referred to as "Act"). Before exercising such powers the officers of the Narcotics Force are required to comply, with the previsions of subsection (4) of section 6 of the Act. The said provisions are as under:- "6 (4) ,Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, a member of , the Force not below the rank of Inspector authorized by the Director-General, may inquire, investigate and trace the assets of a person who has committed an offence referred to in clause
(a) of section 5 or when in his opinion, there is a reasonable suspicion that the said assets were acquired through illicit involvement in narcotics; and may, for this purpose, require a bank or other financial institution or departments, whether under the control of Government or otherwise to furnish such information as he may specify.
6(5) If in the opinion of a member of the Force, conducting an inquiry investigating or tracing any assets under subsection (4), which is likely to be removed, transferred or otherwise disposed of, such member may, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, by order in writing direct the owner or any person who is for the time being in, possession thereof, not to remove, transfer, or otherwise dispose of such property in any manner except with the previous permission of that member and such order shall be subject to any order made by the Court having jurisdiction in the matter."
5. Before passing an order under subsection (5) the officer is first required to form an opinion that there was reasonable suspicion that the said assets were acquired through involvement in narcotics. The learned Special Prosecutor was inquired to show us any material on which the Inspector formed opinion of required reasonable suspicion but he was unable to point out any such material from the record except the order of the Inspector and the letter dated 20-3-2002 of the respondent addressed to the Inspector of ANF informing him that Abdul Qudoos approached them for booking the said flat in the name of his mother Mst. Giraan Bibi and had paid Rs,23,70,000 and still a balance of amount of Rs,16,30,000 was to be paid.
6. The entire case hinges upon forming of opinion of required reasonable C suspicion. The word "reasonable" has been derived from word "reason" which has been interpreted in the case of Gurdial Singh v. State of Punjab (1979) 2 SCC 368 at page 377 as under:-- ' "Reasons are the links between the materials on which certain conclusions are based and the actual conclusions."
7. The word "reasonable" has been defined in Chambers 21st Century Dictionary as under:-- ' "Reasonable:
1. Sensible; rational; showing reason or good judgment.
2. Willing to listen to reason or arguments.
3. In accofdance with reason.
4. Fair or just moderates; not extreme or excessive."
8. In Raghbir Singh v. CIT (AIR 1958 Punjab 250) the word "reasonable" has been interpreted as rational according to the dictates of reason and not excessive or immoderate. An act is reasonable when it is conformable or agreeable to reason, having regard to the facts of the particular controversy. The Supreme Court of India in case of Rena Drago v. Lalchand Soni (1998) 3 SCC 341 observed that it is difficult to give an exact definition of the word "reasonable". Reason varies in its conclusions according to the idiosyncrasy of the individual and the times and the circumstances in which he thinks. The word "reasonable" has in law prima meaning of reasonable in regard to those circumstances of which the actor, called upon to act reasonable, knows or ought to know. In the case of R K Garg v. Union of India 1982 SCC (Tax) 30 at page 64 it has been observed that terms like 'reasonable', 'fair', 'just' derive their significance from existing social conditions. That action is called reasonable which an informed, intelligent, just minded, civilized man could rationally favour. The concept or reasonable does not exclude notions of morality and ethics.
9. The words "reasonable suspicion" has been defined in Judicial Dictionary 13th Edition. K J Aiyar as under:-- ' "What is a reasonable complaint or reasonable suspicion, no doubt depends upon the facts of each case, but it should be at least founded upon some definite feelings tending to throw suspicion on the person arrested and the proceedings.
' Suspicion and credible information. What is a reasonable suspicion or credible information must depend on the circumstances of each particular case, but it must be based on some definite facts tending to throw suspicion on a person arrested and not on mere vague surmises or information."
10. The same words have been defined in Black's Law Dictionary 17th Edition as under: -- ' "reasonable suspicion. A particularized and objective basis , supported by specific and articulable facts, for suspecting a person of criminal activity. A police officer must have a reasonable suspicion to stop a person in a public place."
11. It will be noticed by reading the suspicion that the word 'suspicion' has been qualified with the word 'reasonable', therefore while forming the opinion, as required under subsection (4), the opinion must be based on some reasons which shall serve as links between the material on which the suspicion is based and the opinion. Thus, the reasonableness of the suspicion has to be shown by the prosecution by displaying its cards to the Court, as it may possess or is expected to possess as demonstrating evidence available in the case, both direct or circumstantial. If such reason existed tending to connect the assets and that too were acquired through the illicit involvement in the narcotics by the accused involved in the case then the officer may obtain the required information. If the above conditions are fulfilled then under subsection (5) the officer is further required to form opinion that the said property is being removed transferred or otherwise disposed of then the property can be frozen. However, if it is found that there are no reason assigned by the authority of the required suspicion or for transferring etc. The property then the absurdity, stands exposed on a plain view, therefore the freezing order would become I nullity.
12. Further in the present case, there is nothing on record which can suggest that it was founded upon some definite feelings and facts tending to show the required suspicion or forming opinion of the transfer etc. Of the property. Thus the link between the opinion and suspicion is missing.
13. A perusal of order of Inspector dated 11-4-2002 shows that the Inspector did not assign any reason for forming this opinion on the points mentioned in subsection (4) and (5) of section 6 of the Act. It is pointed out that under the newly-added section 24-A in the General Clauses Act, 1897 even an administrative authority, officer or person making an order or issuing a direction under the powers conferred by or under any enactment, is now obligated, so far as necessary or appropriate, to give reason for making the order or, as the case may be, for issuing the direction. Thus, the Inspector was required to mention the reason in his order but he failed F to do so. However, the learned Special Prosecutor was asked to show us from the record that the Inspector had assigned such reason so as to uphold F the findings of Inspector but he could not do so.
14. The Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Zain Yar Khan v. Chief Engineer, C.R.B.C., WAPDA (1999 SC 1105) at page 1113 observed as under:-- ' "This throws up the questions, as finding mention in the leave granting order, whether the appellate order suffered from an incurable infirmity, bereft, as it was, of reasons resulting in the remand. There can be no gainsaying the fact that quasi-judicial order should, in principle, carry due reasons. Indeed, as had lately been recognized, in virtue of the newly added section 24-A in the General Clauses Act, 1897, even an administrative authority, office or person, making an order or issuing a direction under the powers conferred by or under any enactment, is now obligated, so far as necessary or appropriate to give reasons for making the order, as the case may be, for issuing the direction. In eventualities where due reasons are missing from such an order, an affectee stands armed with a right to require the authority, office or person concerned, to furnish due reasons and an obligation attaches in response to furnish such to the aggrieved party. In departmental appeals, equally covered by section 24-A ibid, but belonging to higher genus as the same attract quasi judicial functions necessary treatment of reasons therein, cannot but be a sine qua non for orders issuing therefrom. Even so, the fora in which such orders are questioned, in the instant case the Service Tribunal and ultimately this Court, have a discretion either to simply set aside the departmental appellate orders for want of necessary reasons or, where the justice of a case so demands, to discover the reasons, if discernible from the record, to uphold the finding, if the finding appears to be otherwise just, convenient and purposeful."
15. Thus, the order dated 11-4-2002 passed by the Inspector Ghulam Abbas Memon is not sustainable under the law.
16. The learned trial Judge under the impugned order directed that the property should be reverted to the applicant who is the builder though the property was booked in the name of Mst. Giraan Bibi.
The trial Court, in the present proceedings and being Criminal Court, cannot decide the question of title of property that is for the Civil Court to decide the said question. In the circumstances, the property is required to be reverted to its original position as stood on the date on which the Inspector passed the order dated 11-4-2002, that is accordingly done.
17. Above are the reasons of our short order dated 29-3-2006 by which we had dismissed the appeal.