1. ' NADEEM AZHAR SIDDIQI, J.--- 2. Allowed.
3. Exemption allowed for the time being subject to all just legal exceptions.
2. 1, 4 & 5. This appeal has been preferred against the judgment, dated 19-9-2006 passed by the learned 1st Civil Judge and Judicial Magistrate No,II, Shandadkot. Learned Magistrate has acquitted the respondent No,2 from the charge under section 13(d) of Pakistan Arms Ordinance The judgment was announced on 22-9-2006. The appeal was filed on 13-6-2007 after the expiry of period of limitation which is 6 months in terms of Article 157 of the First Schedule of the Limitation Act, 1908.
3. ' Learned State Counsel has submitted that the delay was occurred as after obtaining the copies of the judgment the complainant requested the concerned D.P.O. On 26-2-2007 to file appeal who in turn has requested the competent authority on 27-2-2007 to grant such permission which was received in the A.-G. Office on 11-6-2007 and the appeal was filed within next two days. The learned counsel further contends that the time consumed in obtaining the sanction for filing appeal was beyond control of A.-G. Office. He submits that under the circumstances of compelling nature the delay can be condoned. He relied upon case of Col. Rtd. Ayub Ali Rana v. Dr. Carlite S. Pune PLD 2002 SC 63 and Muhammad Sharif v. Jamshed Ali PLD 1996 Lah.
4. 471.
5. ' I have gone through the appeal and considered the submission made by the learned State Counsel.
6. The appeal was filed with the delay of about two months. The only plea urged is that the delay was accrued due to obtaining sanction from the concerned department. From the submission of the learned counsel it appears that the sanction was applied on 27-2-2007 after five months of the receiving of the copy of order. For seeking the condonation delay of each day has to be explained which is lacking in this case. Furthermore, the Government cannot be treated differently than ordinary litigant and is not entitled to preferential treatment and is A to be treated on equal footing with ordinary litigant. In the reported case of the State through Advocate-General Sindh v. Amir Bux 1981 SCM R 410 the Honourable Supreme Court has held as under:-- "It must also be stated that it has been the consistent view of this Court, as expressed in Nazar v.
7. The State 1968 SCM R 715, Jalal Khan v. Lakhmir 1968 SCM R 1345, Muhammad Khan v. Sultan 1969 SCM R 82, Piran Ditta v. The State 1970 SCM R 282 and Nur Muhammad v. The State 1972 SCM R 331, that in petition against acquittal delay cannot be condoned unless it is shown that the, petitioner was precluded from filing his petition in, time due,to some act of the acquitted respondents; or by some circumstance of a compelling nature, beyond the petitioner's control. The reason for taking the strict view is that in most jurisdictions an acquittal, once recorded by a competent Court is final, and the matter cannot be reopened at the instance of any party including, the State. However, under our law, an acquittal can be challenged in certain circumstances, but if it is not challenged within the period allowed by law, it becomes final. In these circumstances it is only just and proper that a petition against acquittal must not be entertained if it is filed beyond time, unless it be shown that the petitioner was prevented from moving the same by an get of the acquitted accused; or by some circumstance of a compelling nature beyond the control of the petitioner."
8. ' In the reported case of Government of Punjab v. Muhammad Salam PLD 1995 SC 396 the Honourable Supreme Court has held as under:-- "In the present case, the High Court gave good reasons for declining to condone the delay. It held that the ground taken by the appellants in their application under section 5 of the Limitation Act that they could not file the appeal within time as they had entered into correspondence with litigating departments and the Solicitor was quite vague and reliance was also placed on a judgment of this Court reported in 1990 SCM R 1059 wherein it was held that "it is a well-settled principle of law tha under section 5 of the Limitation Act, delay of each day is to be explained" and further that, the Government cannot be treated differently than a private litigant on the question of limitation under section 5 of the Limitation Act."
9. ' In another reported case of WAPDA v. M.A. Rashid 2001 SCM R 722 the Honourable Supreme Court has held as under:-- "The contention of the petitioner that the delay in filing the above petition resulted on account of late sanction received from the Head Office for filing of the above petition is hardly a ground for condoning the delay."
10. ' In the reported case of Muhammad Sharif v. Jamshed AU PLD 1996 Lah. 71 the'delay was condoned for the reason that before filing acquittal appeal a revision was filed which was dismissed not on merits but on the ground that against the order of acquittal an appeal was maintainable and the delay was condoned by attracting sections 5/14 of Limitation Act.
11. ' In the reported case of Col. (Rtd.) Ayub Ali Rana v. Carlite S. Pune the High Court has condoned the delay after holding that the order impugned in the revision petition was without lawful authority and the Supreme Court has declined to interfere.
12. In order to bring a case for condonation of delay, appellant is required to show that there was sufficient cause and it was beyond the control to file appeal within prescribed time.
13. ' The only reason shown for seeking condonation of delay is that the time was consumed in obtaining sanction from the concerned department. This ground is not sufficient and cannot be termed to be a "circumstances of compelling nature" beyond the control of the appellant. The appellant by acting promptly and diligently can overcome the problem. Furthermore nothing has been alleged against the acquitted accused that the delay was accrued due to some act of the acquitted accused who acquired valuable rights which cannot be lightly disturbed or destroyed as held by the Honourable Supreme Court in the reported case of Muhammad Bashir v. Province of Punjab 2003 SCM R 83.
14. ' The judgment cited by the learned counsel for the State ,have distinguishable facts and have no direct bearing upon the merits of the case.
15. ' The ground shown for condonation of delay is neither reasonable nor cogent nor inspire confidence and the delay of about two months cannot be condoned.
16. ' This appeal is dismissed as barred by limitation.