' SABIHUDDIN AHMED, C.J.--- Petitioner No,1 was the Collective Bargaining Agent for Workmen and the remaining petitioners are workmen in Thatta Cement Company Limited, have called in question an order of the Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal dated 25-5-1993, interpreting, the terms of a Settlement dated 2-12-1984 between the petitioner No,1 and the respondent No,2. The controversy between the parties is confined to the question whether the increase in the wages of permanent employees in terms of the settlement is liable to be set off against the statutory increase in wages through section 3(6) of the Employees Cost of Living Relief Amendment Act, 1985, and the 18% increase in terms of section 3(7) of the Employees Cost of Living Relief Amendment Act, 1986, which were enacted during the operation of the settlement in question.
2. To explain the controversy it may be stated that Legislatures enacted the Employees Cost of living (Relief) Act in 1973 to provide for an allowance to employees on account of rise in cost of wages in terms of section 3. Such allowance was increased from time to time by adding different subsections in the aforesaid section 3 and at times the benefit so granted were adjustable against any relief for meeting the rise in cost of living provided by the employer either by law or through a settlement between the employer and the employees. Subsections (6) and (7) with which we are concerned stipulated an increase in wages but such increases were made subject to any relief provided through a settlement which became effective on or after 1st January, 1984 providing relief due to rise in cost of living. The only question to be considered is whether the increase in the wages of remaining employees under the settlement in question was intended to provide such relief.
3. Mr. Ghulam Sarwar Chandio, learned counsel for the petitioners, argued that the settlements in question were not expressly designed to provide relief against rise in the cost of living. In this context, the terms of the two settlements were compared with the immediate preceding settlement dated 12-12-1992. The short recital of the 1992 settlement records as follows:-- "As a consequence of mutual goodwill and understanding between the parties and keeping in view the rise in the cost of living the parties have arrived at the following settlement."
' However, the word "rise" in the cost of living is conspicuously absent both from the terms of the settlement of 1984 and 1986. It was further contended that a large number of benefits granted under the two settlements had no nexus with rise in the cost of living.
4. On the other hand, Choudhry Rasheed Ahmed, learned counsel for the respondent No,2, defending the impugned order of the learned Tribunal, contended that the increases in the wages and other benefits in terms of the two settlements were extraordinary and were not in any manner linked with usual increments or incidence of promotion. Reliance was placed upon the pronouncement of the Honourable Supreme Court in R.B. Industries Limited v. Employees Welfare Union PLD 1983 SC 15 upon which the learned Tribunal has also relied in the impugned order. It may, therefore, be appropriate to refer to this case in some detail.
5. The question before their Lordships was also similar, in that it was the appellant's case that the increases contained in the Settlement were adjustable against the cost of living allowance granted under section 3(2) of the Act on account of the proviso to section 8, which was more or less couched in similar language but was also appended with an explanation, which reads as follows:-- "Explanation.--- For the purpose of this proviso any increase in wages accruing by virtue of the usual annual increment or promotion to a higher grade or an allowance not specifically given to provide a relief due to a rise in the cost of living, shall not be deemed to be an increase intended to provide relief due to a rise in the cost of living."
6. That the learned Judges of the High Court in their judgment 1976 PLC 43 held that only such payments were adjustable which were clearly specified to account for rise in the cost of living and the explanation clarified that the legislature by adding the explanation clearly wanted to set at rest as to what is and what is not an increase due to rise in the cost of living. It went on to hold that since the settlement has not specifically declared that the increase was occasioned due to the rise in the cost of living on the basis of the explanation the amount payable thereby was not adjustable.
7. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court, however, did not subscribe to this view. Despite the fact that the settlement did not mention rise in cost of living, they went on to hold that for determining whether the increase was occasioned by rise on cost of living the totality of circumstances needed to be considered and the explanation could not be viewed as a final yardstick. It was held that since the increase was neither occasioned by incidence of promotion or normal increment and related to basic wages and not an "allowance" the explanation was considered inapplicable and the amount payable was found to be adjustable and the appeal was allowed.
8. Applying the yardstick laid down in the above decision the learned Tribunal held that the increase in wages granted through settlement was adjustable under the relevant provisions of subsections (6) and (7) of section 3. Indeed, the word "rise" specifically has not been used in any of the provisos to sections 3(6), 3(7) and section 8 though it finds mention in the decisions of this Court where the amount under the settlement was not found to be adjustable. Nevertheless, since we are bound to follow the law declared by the Honourable Supreme Court, it is not possible for us to take a different view and we are, therefore, constrained to dismiss this petition.