1. ' FAISAL ARAB, J.--- This order disposes of C.M.A. No,6375 of 2004 filed by defendant No,1 under Order VII, rule 11, C.P.C.
2. ' Facts in brief are that prior to January, 2000, defendant No,1 was running the cricket stadium in Defence Housing Authority on rental basis. The defendant No,1 was also aspiring to obtain its long- term lease from defendant No2, the owner of the stadium: ' The plaintiff is a . Qualified engineer and runs his consultancy firm in the name of "American Consultants Inc." The case of the plaintiff is that defendant No,1 acquired his services for obtaining long term lease of the cricket stadium from defendant No,2. In that regard the plaintiff made presentations on behalf of defendant No,1 to defendant No,2 that in case long lease is given the defendant No,1 will develop the stadium on modern lines. Eventually, the defendant No,1 in January, 2000 succeeded in obtaining long term lease of the cricket stadium from defendant No,2. To enable the plaintiff to lawfully represent defendant No,1 before defendant No,2, the defendant No,1 executed a power of attorney on 6-1-2000 in favour of the plaintiff. The grievance of the plaintiff as evinced from paragraph 2 of the plaint is that defendant No,1, who had earlier promised to compensate the plaintiff for his services once the long term lease of the stadium is obtained from defendant No,2, retracted from his commitment and cancelled the power of attorney that was executed on 6-1-2000 by defendant No,1 in favour of the plaintiff.
3. ' It is also stated in paragraph 5 of the plaint that on 1-2-2001 defendant No,1 issued a cheque for a sum of Rs,50,00,000 to the plaintiff for the services that plaintiff rendered for defendant No,1 but the cheque was dishonoured. This led to the filing of Suit No,41 of 2004 by the plaintiff.In this Court against defendant No,1 on 12-1-2004. In the said suit the plaintiff has claimed recovery of amount of cheque along with interest at the rate of 18%.
4. ' I called for the suit file and have observed that it was not filed as a summary suit under Order XXXVII, C.P.C. But as a regular suit. In the said suit, except for the claim of Rs,50,00,000 and interest thereon no other amount was claimed towards the services which the plaintiff rendered for obtaining long term lease of the stadium for defendant No,1 nor the plaintiff claimed any sum as damages.
5. ' While Suit No,41 of 2004 was still pending, the plaintiff filed the present suit on 31-1-2004 wherein the same cause of action is disclosed which was the basis of Suit No,41 of 2004. In the present suit however, the reliefs sought against defendant No,1 are different which are reproduced as follows:-- "(A)Declaration that cancellation of Registered Power of Attorney dated 6-1-2000 executed by defendant No,1 in favour of the plaintiff is mala fide, illegal and without any reason after acting upon the same and consequently the same remains intact with all the benefits arising therefrom.
(B) Defendants be directed to pay damages amounting to Rs,70 million severally or jointly to the plaintiff for the loss sustained by him.
(C) Any other relief that the Honourable Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case."
6. ' The defendant No,1 then filed application under Order VII, rule, 11, C.P.C. Seeking rejection of the plaint inter alia on the ground that the reliefs sought in the suit are barred by time.
7. ' Mr. Shaukat Hayat, learned counsel for defendant No,1 contended that the plaintiff is seeking declaration to the effect that the revocation of power of attorney by defendant No,1 is mala fide and unlawful as well as damages to the extent of 70 million on account of such revocation. Mr. Hayat then submitted that the period of limitation for seeking such reliefs is three years from the accrual of the cause of action, which arose on 24-8-2000 when power of attorney executed by defendant No,1 in favour of the plaintiff was cancelled and the present suit was filed on 31-1-2004 when three years limitation period had already expired.
8. ' Mr. Zaki Muhammad, learned counsel for the plaintiff on the other hand argued that the plaintiff put in his efforts and utilised his contacts and expertise to obtain long term lease for defendant No,1 and when defendant No,2 granted long term lease to the defendant No,1, the defendant No,1 cancelled his power and also failed to honour his promise to compensate the plaintiff for his services. With regard to the plea of limitation learned counsel for the plaintiff submitted that as no Article of Limitation Act provides any period for seeking relief of compensation therefore, residuary Article i,e, Article 120 of Limitation Act is attracted, which prescribes a period of 6 years. In support of this argument he placed reliance on the cases reported in AIR 1933 Lah. 270, AIR 1940 Cal. 29 and 1992 MLD 1196. Learned counsel for the plaintiff further argued that the plaintiff has claimed damages in the suit and, therefore, an application for rejection of plaint could not be considered as the evidence is to be adduced in order to establish whether the claim for damages is made out or not. In support of this argument he placed reliance on the case reported in 2004 YLR 373.
9. ' In terms of Order VII, rule 11(d), C.P.C. a plaint is to be rejected if it appears from the statements in the plaint that suit is barred by any law. Before defendant No, l's plea that suit is barred by statute of Limitation is considered, I shall proceed to examine the effect of filing Suit No,41 of 2004, which is prior in time, on the maintainability of the present suit in the light of the bar contained in Order II, rule 2(3), C.P.C. In order to examine this I called for the file of Suit No,41 Of 2004 and examined the contents of the plaint. From the contents of the plaint it becomes evident that the cause of action in that suit is also shown to be the breach of the same commitments which are the basis of the present suit.
10. ' Order II, rule 2(2), C.P.C. Provides that every suit must include all claims to which a plaintiff is entitled in respect of a cause of action. Sub-rule (3) of Order II, rule 2 provides that where a plaintiff is entitled to more than one relief in respect of a cause of action he may sue for all or any of such reliefs but if he in his suit either omits or relinquishes any of the reliefs to which he was entitled to, then he shall not be allowed afterwards to sue for such relief or reliefs. Thus, it is quite evident that rule 2 of Order II, C.P.C. Was devised to prevent a party front splitting up its claims and remedies arising out of same cause of action against the same party. Where a plaintiff complains of a breach of a contract, commitment or obligation, then several reliefs arising out of such breach cannot be allowed to be split up so as to seek remedy in more than one proceedings. The object is to prevent a plaintiff to initiate multiple proceedings against a defendant on the basis of same cause of action and in case he had omitted to seek any relief in one proceedings then he in terms of Order II, rule 2, C.P.C. Is estopped from seeking the relief so omitted in subsequent proceedings:.
11. ' A bare reading of the plaints of the both the suits, particularly paragraph 2 of both the plaints , show that the present suit is founded upon the same cause of action that is foundation of Suit No,41 of 2004. Thus, cause of action in both the suits is identical. Only reliefs sought in each of the two suits are different. In terms of the provisions of Order II, rule 2, C.P.C., a plaintiff is not allowed to seek a relief in subsequent suit, which he could have sought in the earlier suit. It is the commonality of cause of action in the subsequent suit that bars its maintainability and the fact that reliefs sought in both the suits are different are of no ,legal consequence. The present suit being subsequent to Suit No,41 of 2000 and based on same cause of action is, therefore, not maintainable in law under the provisions of Order II, rule 2, C.P.C. Now I shall proceed to examine the plea that reliefs sought in the present suit is barred under the provisions of Limitation Act.
12. ' The plaintiff in paragraph 2 of his plaint has claimed that defendant No,1 promised him that once lease was granted to defendant No,1 by defendant No,2, he shall compensate the plaintiff. As this promise was contingent upon happening of an event, which happened in January, 2000, the time to sue for compensation commenced in January, 2000 in terms of Article 65 of the Limitation Act.
13. Though Article 115 of the Limitation Act also provides a period of 3 years for claiming compensation for breach of an unwritten contract, in my opinion more appropriate Article in the present case is Article 65 of the Limitation Act which provides three years period for filing suit for compensation based on a breach of a promise to do anything upon the happening of a specified contingency commences when the contingency happens. In the present case long term lease was awarded to defendant No,1 on 2-1-2000 therefore, three years limitation commenced on 2-1-2000 and expired on 1-1-2003.
14. 'It is an admitted position that under power of attorney dated 6-1-2000, the plaintiff was only authorised to act as representative of defendant No,1. Thus, plaintiff was to act at the pleasure of defendant No,1 as his representative who on 26-8-2000 deemed fit to revoke the same at his own sweet-will. An attorney has no legal right to object to revocation of power of attorney or seek declaration that revocation is inconsequential in law unless the attorney was conferred any proprietary interest in the property for which he was authorised to act. As that is not the case here, with the revocation of power of attorney, the plaintiff's authority to represent defendant No,1 and act on his behalf came to an end. Thus, the relief which the plaintiff is seeking in terms of prayer clause "A" is not even available to him under any provision of law. No law permits a person to act and represent any other person against his wishes. Therefore, this suit insofar as prayer clause "A" is concerned is bad in law and thus, not maintainable for seeking such relief.
15. ' With regard to relief sought in prayer clause "B", indeed a suit for damages could be filed, which was the only remedy left with the plaintiff on account of revocation of power of attorney but such remedy is to be availed within three years of accrual of cause of action as envisaged under Article 65 of the Limitation Act. In the present case, cause of action accrued to the plaintiff when lease was granted by defendant No,2 to defendant No,1 in January, 2000 or at best on 24-8-2000 when power of attorney in his favour was revoked, whereas the present suit was filed on 31-1-2004 hence patently barred by time. Not only the claim for damages is barred by time but such relief having not been sought in Suit No,41 of 2004, the same cannot be sought in this suit being barred under the provisions of Order II, rule 2(2) and (3), C . P. C .
16. ' In view of the bar contained under Order H, rule 2, C.P.C. As well as the fact that reliefs sought in the suit are also barred by time, no useful purpose would be served to try this suit. In the circumstances, this Court is left with no alternative but to allow C.M.A. No,6375 of 2004 filed under Order VII, rule 11, C.P.C. And reject the plaint.
17. Plaint rejected.