' MALIK MUHAMMAD ASLAM KHAN, J.-Through this appeal by leave, the appellant challenges the judgment dated 31-1-1977, passed by a Division Bench of the High Court, dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant.
2. The appellant, who was a candidate alongwith respondents Nos. 2 to 4, for the female seats reserved for Azad Kashmir nationals in the Medical Colleges of Pakistan, filed a writ petition challenging order dated 29-11-1976, nominating respondents 2 to 4 to the medical seats in preference to the appellant, by respondent No,
1. The background of the writ petition was that District Magistrates of the districts under Circular No, 4468-74/77, dated 29-10-1977, used to issue domicile certificates concerning the candidates of their respective Districts. Respondents Nos. 2 to 4, accordingly, were issued domicile certificates by the District Magistrate Poonch. It appears that on a complaint by the appellant to the District Magistrate Poonch, that respondents 2 to 4 were not the domicile of Poonch District and had obtained the certificates by false representations, District Magistrate kept his previous order of domicile certificates of these candidates in abeyance and called them to appear before him. Since the respondents did not appear before the District Magistrate, their certificates were cancelled without any further enquiry. These candidates then approached the Nomination Board, which itself held an enquiry and found that they were the genuine domicile of Poonch District and were thus allocated medical seats as their marks in F. Sc.
(pre-medical) were higher than that of the appellant.
' The appellant challenged this order of the Nomination Board through a writ petition in the High Court mainly on the ground that District Magistrate Poonch was the only proper authority to issue and cancel the domicile certificates and that the Nomination Board's order being without any authority was null and void and without any legal effect to entitle the respondents to the election against the medical seats.
3. The learned Judges of the High Court, after examining the testimony placed before them, came to the conclusion that the selectee-respondents had their domicile of origin in Poonch District and that it was not lost by the mere fact that their fathers resided or carried business elsewhere. The writ petition was accordingly dismissed vide the impugned order which is the subject of the present appeal before us.
4. The only point raised by the learned counsel for the appellant before us is, that the Nomination Board had no authority to determine the domicile of the candidates especially when District Magistrate Poonch, who was duly empowered by the Government to issue the domicile certificates, had cancelled the domicile certificates of respondents. In the alternative, it was contended, that even if the Nomination Board had such an authority, it had already delegated it to the District Magistrate, who had duly exercised the delegated authority and thus the Nomination Board as a delegator, had been left with nothing to exercise after the cancellation of the certificates by the District Magistrate.
' It may be stated that the stand of the learned Additional Advocate-General was, that the since there was no enactment like the Pakistan Citizenship Act, 1951 (Act XI of 1951) in force in Azad Kashmir, the District Magistrate had no authority to issue or cancel the domicile certificate and there was no bar against the Nomination Board to itself decide about the domicile of the respondents specifically when the District Magistrate had cancelled their certificates without any enquiry.
5. We have given deep thought to the arguments addressed at the bar. There is no doubt that unlike Pakistan, we have no Citizenship Act in Azad Kashmir. In Pakistan, under section 17 of the Pakistan Citizenship Act, 1951, the Central Government has the authority to grant a certificate of domicile to any person under the conditions mentioned therein. Under section 18 of this Act, the Central Government can delegate its powers to any authority or an officer as may be specified.
Under rule 23, a District Magistrate duly authorised by the Provincial Government, can issue a domicile certificate after holding proper enquiry. Rule 30 provides the forum for appeal, revision and Review. But so far as Azad Kashmir is concerned, it is conceded by the learned Additional Advocate-General as well as by the counsel of the parties, that there is neither any law nor rule for regulating the question of domicile of its subjects. This question also came up before our High Court in a case entitled Miss Tahira Mahmood v. Chairman Nomination Board and others (1). In this case, the Nomination Board had rejected the domicile certificate issued by the District Magistrate Kotli District, in favour of the petitioner, on the basis of the personal knowledge of one of Board's members that the petitioner was not a domicile of that District. The petitioner was, therefore, refused the medical seat by the Nomination Board. This order of the Nomination Board was challenged by the petitiones through a writ petition precisely on the identical ground that the Nomination Board had no authority to cancel her domicile certificate duly issued by the District Magistrate. The learned Judge, after going through the Government Order No, 241/63 dated 28-5- 1963 and Government Order No, 1550-61 dated 6-5-1972, rightly came to the conclusion that the Nomination Board had merely issued instructions for the production of the domicile certificate issued by the District Magistrate of the district. But because of these instructions the Nomination Board was not itself debarred from examining the correctness of the domicile certificate. The learned Judge also opined that there was neither any rule authorising the District Magistrate to issue domicile certificates nor any machinery provided for challenging the correctness of such certificates.
6. We find that a circular letter was later on issued (No, 4468-74/77, dated 17-10-1977) under the signatures of Deputy Secretary Home, containing instructions for the guidance of the District Magistrates at the time of issuing domicile certificates in Azad Kashmir till the rules on the subject were framed. This circular, at the best, is an administrative order, containing instructions and as such cannot be equated with law or rule having the force of law. Therefore, in our view, this does not debar the Nomination Board from itself scrutinizing the domicile certificates issued by a. District Magistrate. The absence of any law or rule for issuance of domicile certificates and the provisions of any appellate or revisional authority, where such certificates could be challenged, has created a very unhappy situation as often the question of domicile certificates becomes, every year, the subject of hot contest and prolonged Court battles between the selected and rejected candidates resulting sometimes in loss of precious years of the students and creating very awkward situations when a candidate's domicile certificate is turned down by the Courts after prolonged proceedings.
Cases are not lacking where a selectee is declared not entitled to a seat for want of a (l) PLD 1975 A J & K 108 genuine domicile certificate in technical college after the selectee has completed the academic studies for a year or two in a college of Pakistan. This un-fortuate situation arises generally for want of an enactment, like the Pakistan Citizenship Act, 1951 or rules providing some authority which is legally vested with the powers of issuing the domicile certificates and a machinery before which the aggrieved candidate can approach by way of appeal, revision or review. It is high time for the Government to address itself to this pressing need of the student community with a view to avoiding unnecessary worry, loss of year and money of the students and their parents.
' In view of the above-stated situation prevailing in Azad Kashmir, we cannot agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the Nomination Board had no power itself to crutinize the cancellation order, passed by the District Magistrate especially when the certificates were cancelled for no other reason than for the failure of the candidates to appear before the District Magistrate. We could not even be shown any law or rule under which the Deputy Secretary Home had issued the instructions vide circular No, 4468-74/77, dated 27-10-1977, in which it is clearly stated that a District Magistrate may issue domicile certificate in Form P. I.
' We also feel that the main plank of the appellant-that the Nomination Board had no authority itself to crutinize the factum of domicile 'of the respondents and hold contrary to the findings of the District Magistrate-is reduced to mere acamedic discussion as the High Court in writ petition was not debarred for deciding about the genuineness or otherwise of the respondents domicile in Poonch District. The' learned Judges have, in our view, thoroughly sifted the material placed before them-the Income-tax receipts, the revenue record, the registration of vehicles, the allotment of evacuee land and the construction of shop thereon, the bills and receipts (all trustworthy pointers to show the domicile of respondents in Poonch District)- and rightly come to the conclusion that the respondents are the genuine domiciles of Poonch District. It may also be stated here that even the learned counsel for the appellant could not find any fault with the findings of the learned Judges. It is also not contested that in the writ proceedings the High Court could itself probe into and decide about the disputed domiciles on the basis of testimony brought before it.
' In view of the above discussion we hold that the learned Judges of the High Court have, on the basis of evidence, produced before them, rightly come to the conclusion that the fathers of respondents had their domicile of origin in Poonch District which had neither been lost nor replaced by any domicile of choice. This finding of the learned Judges has not been questioned even by the learned counsel for the appellant, who has mainly directed his attack against the action of the Nomination Board in itself scrutinizing the domicile of the respondents in disregard of the order of cancellation passed by the District Magistrate Poonch.
7. At the time when we were about to announce the judgment, a point struck us as to whether Circular No, H. & P. 4468-74/17, dated 29-10-1977 and the letter No, 5571, dated 5-12-1973 (copy Annexure page 14 of the High. Court's file), have any statutory backing so as to form the basis for a writ petition. We, therefore, passed the following order on 16-9-1979:- "While studying the record of this case a point that has neither been taken up nor argued before us, strikes as to whether voilation of administrative instructions or orders could be challenged through a writ petition. An authority in this respect that has come to our notice is PLD 1967 Lab. 709 Mailis- Intzamia, Masjid v. Secretary to Government of West Pakistan. Since this is an important legal point touching the very writ jurisdiction, we deem it proper to hear the counsel of the parties on this point."
Accordingly the counsel for both the parties were asked to address us on this point as the above- quoted circular and the letter are frequently being made the subject of litigation. Unfortunately the counsel for both the parties have not been able to assist us much. Our study, however, shows that the above-mentioned circular and the letter of the Board have neither any statutory backing nor they can be termed as rules deriving their authority from any enactment. At best their position is that of instruments issued for the guidance of the concerned Deputy Commissioner as an internal arrangement. The infringement of such instructions, therefore, cannot be made the basis of a writ petition for the simple reason that they have no statutory covering either under law or rules. That such instructions or orders which are in the nature of internal regulations for guidance of the concerned officers, are merely instructions of convenience, cannot be amenable to a claim of vested right for forming the subject-matter of writ petition is clear from PLD 1967 Lah. 709, PLD 1962 SC 65 and PLD 1973 SC 497. Therefore, in our view, the instructions issued by the Government or the Nomination Board in this respect, do not create any vested right in any person so as to entitle an aggrieved person to seek remedy through a writ petition on their basis. From this angle too, the appeal before us is not sustainable: ' The net result is that for the above-stated reasons we find no force in the appeal and accordingly dismiss it. No order as to costs in the peculiar circumstances of this case. A copy of the judgment drawing attention of Secretary Services and Law to the portion of the judgment marginally underline as 'A' be sent.