' SALIM KHAN, J.-Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that, vide order sheet No.3 dated 27- 6-2005, the learned original Court directed the pre- emptor respondent to deposit l/3rd of the pre- emption amount before the next date. It was on 12-7-2005, the next date fixed by the Court, that the pre-emptor submitted an application for permission to deposit the 1 /3rd pre-emption amount and the Court allowed the deposit of the same, which amount was deposited on the same date.
2. On 10-12-2005, the present petitioner (defendant) submitted application with a request to dismiss the suit on the ground that the l/3rd of the pre-emption amount was not deposited in time.
Vide the reply of the plaintiff, it was alleged that the Court had ordered the deposit of the l/3rd pre- emption amount, but had practically granted extention in the time in the light of section 148, P.P.C., and the pre-emption amount was deposited accordingly. The learned original Court, vide order dated 16-2-2006, dismissed the application of the present petitioner. A civil revision was filed by the defendant, numbered as 22/CR dated 28-3-2006, which was dismissed on 14-12-2006. Hence this writ petition.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the words used in subsection (1) of section 24 were "within such period as the Court may fix". He referred to the order dated 27-6-2005 wherein the words used are "plaintiff is directed to deposit l/3rd of pre-emption amount before the date fixed. File to come up for attendance of defendant on 10-7-2005".
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the time fixed by the Court had already ended on 11-7-2005 and extention in time could not be granted by the learned original Court. . He repeated his contention that the respondent had also accepted that the time fixed had passed but the Court had practically extended the time.
' The learned counsel for the petitioner relied on 2003 CLC 535, 1997 M LD 2945, 2002 SCMR 365 , 2004 SCM R 418 and 2005 SCM R 1588 in support in his contention.
5. The learned counsel for the respondent, however, contended that the application dated 12-7- 2005 was not for extention of time, and it was for permission to deposit the pre-emption amount which was already allowed. The learned counsel for the respondent relied on 1998 MLD 2413 and contended that, in rent cases, the tentative rent could be deposited on the date fixed. The words used in those laws, however, were "on or before the date fixed".
6. The word "shall" has been used in subsection (1) of section 24 of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1987, subsection (2) thereof is the penalty clause which has categorically-mentioned that the suit would be dismissed if the amount was not deposited within the period prescribed/ fixed by the Court. The order of the Court was unambiguous and clear-cut. It was for the learned trial Court to consider at the initial stage, before issuing the first order, whether the time to be fixed was or was not sufficient, but once that period was fixed, the learned original Court did not have the power to take up the question of insufficiency of the period at a later stage. The learned original Court did not have any power, to extend the time once 11-7-2005 had passed. It was immaterial whether the amount was deposited on 12-7-2005 before calling the case or otherwise.
7. In the light of above, we have come to the conclusion that the impugned order of the learned original Court, dismissing the application of the present petitioner, and the impugned order of the learned revisional Court, dismissing the civil revision of the present petitioner, are against the law and are liable to setting aside. We, therefore, accept the present writ petition and declare that both the above mentioned impugned orders are illegal and without lawful authority and are hereby set aside. The suit of the plaintiff, consequently, is liable to be dismissed. We direct the learned original Court and the learned revisional Court accordingly.