' CH. IJAZ AHMED, J.--- The brief facts out of which the present petition arises are that the petitioner was the owner of Pasroor Sugar Mills. In pursuance to the policy of the Government of the Punjab petitioner has advertised for sale in the Press qua the project in question (Pasroor Sugar Mills) in July, 1984. Respondent participated in the auction proceedings. Ultimately an agreement arrived between petitioner and respondent through negotiations among the Banks and Pakistan Banking Council in the following terms:- "(i) PSM was to be sold on the basis of fixed assets and the shares to be transferred to respondent against a notional value of Rupees one only.
(ii) Current assets of PSM were to be sold to the respondent separately.
(iii) Petitioner would receive a fixed sum of Rs,3,00,00,000 (Rupees three crores only) against its equity and investment in PSM, which would be paid by the respondent within a period of ten (10) years, with two (2) years grace period. The payment was to be secured by a bank guarantee.
(iv) Respondent was to enter into a separate agreement with PBC and NFDC for assuming and taking over the total liabilities of PSM towards the financial institutions. These were fixed at Rs,20,00,00,000 (Rupees twenty Crores only).
' Petitioner had delivered possession of the project in question to the respondent on its request without executing formal agreement on 4-9-1985. It was specifically agreed that all the stocks and cash belonging to the petitioner in the said project shall remain with the petitioner because the petitioner was still dealing with the past and ongoing transactions. The said arrangement was approved vide letter, dated 27-9-1985 which was issued by the petitioner to Habib Bank Limited on the request of the respondent. From 16-9-1985 to 15-11-1985, a period prior to execution of agreement dated 9-2-1986 but subsequent to handing over of the project in question to respondent it was the responsibility of the petitioner to administer the day to day affairs of the project in question to deal with and conclude the continuing transactions. Formal agreement executed between the parties on 9-2-1986. Dispute arose between petitioner and respondent. The matter was referred to Arbitrator. The Arbitrator announced award on 30-3-1991. The facts as depicted from the judgment of the trial Court are as follows:--- "By his award dated 30-3-1991 sole Arbitrator Mr. M R Khan former Chairman Pakistan Banking Council, pursuant to the arbitration agreement dated 9-2-1986 executed between Punjab Industrial Development Board and United Sugar Mills Limited, rejected the claims of both the parties except a sum of Rs,12,09,385. By his award he directed that defendant PIDB shall pay the aforesaid amount to the plaintiff-United Sugar Mills Limited with 1% interest/mark-up from the date of the award.
' Consequent upon the notice of filing of the award registered as Suit No,1094 of 1991 defendant PIDB filed applications under section 30 read with section 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 for setting aside the award."
' The respondent being aggrieved filed an application (Suit No,1094 of 1991) under section 30 read with section 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 in the High Court of Sindh, Karachi. Learned Single Judge dismissed the objections of the petitioner vide judgment and decree dated 29-1-2000 in the said suit and maintained the award. Petitioner being aggrieved filed an appeal under section 39 of the Arbitration Act read with section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1973 and section 15 of Ordinance X of 1980 in the High Court of Sindh at Karachi. The learned Division Bench dismissed the same vide impugned judgment, dated 25-8-2005. Hence the present petition.
2. The learned counsel fore the petitioner submits that the learned Appellate Court has decided the appeal without judicial application of mind as is evident from paragraphs Nos.7 to 12 of the impugned judgment. He further maintains that the learned Appellate Court has reproduced the judgment of the learned Single Judge in the aforesaid paragraphs and thereafter dismissed the appeal of the petitioner without discussing evidence and points raised by the petitioner before the Appellate Court. He further maintains that Arbitrator has misread clauses 8 and 10 of the Agreement and this fact was not scrutinized by the learned Single Judge/Trial Court and the Appellate Court has also not considered this aspect of the case in its true perspective.
3. The learned counsel of the respondent has supported the impugned judgment.
4. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. This Court has laid down the principle in various pronouncements that it is duty and obligation of the Appellate Court to decide the controversy between the parties after judicial application of mind. See Mollah Ejahar Ali v. Government of Pakistan PLD 1970 SC 173. Relevant observation is as follows:-- "To deal with the second contention first, there is no doubt that the High Court's order which is unfortunately perfunctory gives the impression of hasty off-hand decision which, although found to be correct in its result, is most deficient in its content. If a summary order of rejection can be made in such terms, there is no reason why a similar order of acceptance saying 'there is considerable substance in the petition which is accepted', should not be equally blessed. This will reduce the whole judicial process to authoritarian decrees without the need for logic and reasoning which have always been the traditional pillars of judicial pronouncements investing them with their primary excellence of propriety and judicial balance."
5. The said proposition of law was also considered by this Court in Gouranga Mohan Sikdar v.
Controller of Import and Export and 2 others PLD 1970 SC 158 and laid down the following principle:- - "Such an order, we regret to say, does not disclose a proper application of mind of the High Court to the merits of the case that was before it. As was pointed out by this Court in the case of Adamjee Jute Mills Limited v. The Province of East Pakistan PLD 1959 SC (Pak.) 272."
6. It is also a settled law that Appellate Court has to decide the appeal after independent application of mind and mere reproduction of the judgment of the trial Court and thereafter dismissing the appeal is not in consonance with the law laid down by this Court in Ghulam Mohayyauddin's case PLD 1964 SC 829. After addition of section 24-A in the General Clauses Act, even the public functionaries are duty bound to decide the applications of citizens while exercising statutory powers with reasons after judicial application of mind as laid down by this Court in Airport Services v. The Airport Manager, Quaid-e-Azam International Airport, Karachi and others 1998 SCM R 2268. As the Appellate Court has decided the case in violation of the dictum laid down by this Court in aforesaid judgments and has not decided the appeal after perusing material on record in accordance with the law. This Court normally does not interfere with the findings of fact reached by the learned High Court and the Court below when it is satisfied that the findings of the Courts below are on the whole reasonable and are not arrived at by disregarding of any provision of law or any accepted principle concerning appreciation of evidence. In the instant case however, it is difficult to avoid the impression that the conclusions reached by the learned Appellate Court suffer from errors of law while not deciding the appeal in terms of the dictum laid down by this Court in various pronouncements including the aforesaid judgments. Therefore, the learned Appellate Court has committed material irregularities as laid down by this Court in Kanwal Nain and others v. Fateh Khan and others PLD 1983 SC 53.
7. In view of what has been discussed above this petition is converted into appeal and allowed. The judgment of the learned appellate Court is set aside and case is remanded to the Appellate Court to decide the case afresh in accordance with the law. The appeal filed by the petitioner shall be deemed to be pending adjudication before the Appellate Court. No order as to costs.