' SYED TAHIR ALI SHAH, J.--- Instant petition for leave to appeal is the outcome of judgment/order passed by the Northern Areas Chief Court on 21-6-2006 whereby the appeal filed against judgment/ decree of the trial Court dated 27-9-2000 was dismissed and judgment of trial Court was upheld.
2. Facts succinctly narrated of the case, are that plaintiff/respondents filed a suit in the trial Court for declaration of their entitlement to a sum of Rs,8,88,052 on the basis of an award passed by petitioner No,3, the Settlement Officer, Gilgit on 31-12-1992 exercising the powers of Collector Land Acquisition. Plaint reveals that during the construction of Gilgit-Gupis Truck Road land, walls and trees, owned by the plaintiff/respondents were affected and damaged. Such claims were estimated, verified and lastly valued by the Revenue Field Staff assisted by the representative, of P.W.D. And F.W.O. On the recommendation of the field staff an award bearing No,SO- HE(13)/2920/92, dated 1-12-1992 was passed for Rs,8,88,052 defendants, now petitioners approached the acquiring agency time and again for the payment of compensation money but faced colourful excuses in the way of such payment and lastly, plainly denied alleging the award to be one as fake and bogus. The plaintiff/respondents having left no alternative instituted the present suit. The learned trial Judge after receiving the written statement and examining the material put before him by the parties vide its judgment, dated 21-6-2006 decreed the suit as prayed for.
3. Findings so returned by the trial Court was assailed through Civil Appeal No,25 of 2000. A learned Division Bench of Chief Court, after affording a fair opportunity of hearing to the parties arrived at the conclusion that appeal being meritless entails dismissal. However, the First Appellate Court reduced the interest ratio from 11% to 8% as provided in section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act. Felt aggrieved the petitioners challenged the vires of such findings before us through the petition in hand.
4. Learned Advocate-General appearing for the petitioners vehemently contended that:--
(i) The Civil Judge, Gilgit lacks jurisdictions in matters pertaining to acquisition arena, which exclusively rest with the District Judge enjoying the status of an Acquisition Judge.
(ii) That the impugned award being bogus and fake one stood already cancelled by petitioner No,3, and lastly that the Court for the sake of justice and fairplay should have called defendant/ petitioner No,3 as a court-witness. The trial Judge, according to the Advocate-General, as well as the Chief Court having not considered the points failed to discharge the duties towards imparting justice.
5. We have minutely gone through the entire record of two lower Courts and examined the relevant provisions of law besides having a patient hearing to the learned Advocate-General.
6. To meet the first objections raised, we are of the considered view that the matter in issue in the instant litigation pertains to the domain of ordinary civil suit triable by the normal Civil Court. The wisdom behind the conferment of jurisdiction to the ordinary Civil Court by the Legislature is that the Land Acquisition Act has created a special jurisdiction and provided a special remedy for persons aggrieved with anything done in the exercise of that jurisdiction. The General Rule is that once jurisdiction conferred upon a special forum for investigation of a particular matter such jurisdiction is exclusive and being of exclusive nature and special Tribunal has alone to exercise such jurisdiction with the exclusion of ordinary forum. However, when the relief claimed does not find place in the machinery of such special exclusive jurisdiction, recourse is to be had to be normal Courts for relief not provided in the special Act. Matters therefore, falling out of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act can only be dealt with by the ordinary Civil Courts. Refusal of the payment of compensation money by the authorities concerned, as in instant case and relief thereof pertains to the domain of ordinary Courts as the Land Acquisition Judge, under the Land Acquisition, Act, is not competent to grant such relief. Since the particular circumstance appearing in the instant matter and no remedy provided in the special Act the general jurisdiction of normal Civil Court can never be disputed. Suit filed in the ordinary Civil Court and decree granted by it after proper adjudication, is above question, hence contention repelled.
7. As for the second contention raised by the learned Advocate-General is concerned, we found it a mixed question of law and facts. The legal aspect is that the Collector, once passes the award becomes functus officio and is never competent to cancel it. No provisions for cancellation of award by the learned Acquisition Collector is available in the Land Acquisition Act. The allegation regarding fake and bogus preparation of award requires concrete evidence resting on the shoulder of the party who wants that the Court should believe his contentions.
8. While going through the record, we experienced that a specific issue as Issue No,5 stood framed on the point of fabrication and forgery of the award, the onus probendi rightly placed on the petitioner/ defendants. The petitioners defendant has utterly failed to substantiate the issue. It further transpires that the representative of the Government has, in the trial Court handled the case recklessly and in a preposterous way as he did not cite a single witness in proof of the issue and rebuttal of the opposite's claim. The acumen, he expected towards defending the case seems entirely missing. The evidence has been closed on the basis of his solitary statements. The strong allegation like fraud and fabrication cannot be established without concrete evidence and that too convincing. As against, the plaintiffs, who were not at all burdened, have adduced witnesses some of them very relative to the matter in question to discharge the onus. One of the witnesses the citation here deserves, a subordinate to respondents No,3, participated in the preparation of record towards passing the award, acquainted with the signature of respondent. No,3, not only authenticated such signature on the award but also reitrated the entire story of the award from the beginning to the last episode. The convincing deposition of the witness could not be flatly ignored which otherwise was not shattered by the opposite party during cross. We, therefore, are unable to give any weight to mere assertion of fraud and forgery in passing award which is not supported otherwise by a single iota of evidence. The contention stood, therefore, repelled.
9. As for the last contention is concerned nevertheless petitioners during the proceedings in appeal before the Chief Court moved an application for additional evidence but the same was rejected on 2-6-2005. No remedy was availed against such rejection and the order resultantly attained finality.
Since no reason for the rejection has been furnished we would like to thrash the matter within the parameter of Order XLI, rule 27, C.P.C. Which runs as under:-- "(27) Production of additional evidence in Appellate Court.-(1) The parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, in the Appellate Court. But if---
(a) the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted, or
(b) the Appellate Court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause. The Appellate Court may allow such evidence or document to be produced, or witness to be examined.
(2) Wherever additional evidence is allowed to be produced by an Appellate Court, the Court shall record the reason for its admission."
10. The prayer for additional evidence does not qualify the requirements enshrined in the above quoted provisions, as neither the trial Court refused to admit the evidence at the time during proceedings before it as there is no evidence was at all led, nor the Appellate required such evidence to enable it to pronounce the judgment. It was rather a prayer for patch up the weaknesses in the defendant case which floated from the reckless attitude of the defendants. The Appellate Court therefore, though no reason advanced for such rejection to allow the additional evidence, has rightly disallowed such prayer. The parties, otherwise are not entitled to produce additional evidence in the Appellate Court, which otherwise was able to pronounce judgment. It is upto the Court alone that can call for such evidence. The contention, therefore, having no force is turned down.
11. As to the calling of petitioner No,3, the ex-Settlement Officer as Court-witness, though the Court enjoys power under Order XVI, Rule, 14, C.P.C. But such discretion will not be exercised by the Court to fill in the gaps or to remedy the omissions by examining such witness. The conduct of the petitioners in pursuing the case at trial Court level seemingly does not demand for such discretion.
12. Having dealt with the points raised, we do not find any substance in the argument advanced to substantiate the points so raised. Resultantly the petition for leave to appeal fails. Leave, therefore, declined. A copy of the judgment be sent to the Chief Secretary Northern Areas for perusal.