JAVED IQBAL, J.--- This appeal with leave of the Court has been preferred on behalf of Government of the Punjab (appellant) assailing the judgment, dated 14-2-2000 whereby the writ petition (Writ Petition No,200/R of 1997) preferred on behalf of appellant has been dismissed and the writ petition (Writ Petition No,214/R of 1996) preferred on behalf of respondents has been accepted.
2. The facts of the case have been mentioned elaborately in the judgment impugned hence reproduction whereof would be of no use.
3. Heard Ch. Mushtaq Masood, learned senior Advocate Supreme Court on behalf of appellants. Mr. Najamul Hassan Kazmi, learned Advocate Supreme Court for respondent No,1, Mian Qamar-uz- Zaman, learned Advocate Supreme Court for respondent No,3 (Civil Appeal No,1588 of 2001) and Mr. Ihsanul Haq Chaudhry, learned Advocate Supreme Court for respondents Nos.4 to 6 (Civil Appeal No,1587 of 2001) and respondents Nos.5 to 7 (Civil Appeal No,1588 of 2001) at length. We have carefully examined the entire record with the eminent assistance of learned counsel for the parties and perused the judgment impugned with care and caution. We have also gone through the orders dated 20-2-1993, 22-10-1996 and 7-11-1996 passed by the different forums in the hierarchy of settlement laws. The pivotal question which needs determination would be as to whether five Kanals land was available for allotment in Mozang area in favour of the respondents or otherwise? After having gone through the entire record we are of the view that no such land was available for allotment and hence the question of any allotment does not arise. It is quite amazing that the learned Single Judge in Chambers did not bother to examine the status of the property which being evacuee trust property could not have been allotted A in favour of Akhtar Ali Khan (respondent). The Settlement Authorities have not been empowered to make such allotment. It must not be lost sight of that unfettered powers have not been conferred upon any functionaries of the Government to make such allotment in accordance with their own whims and wishes but it is always subject to law.
4. The learned Advocate Supreme Court on behalf of respondents failed to convince us that the property in question was a part of compensation pool and without inclusion in compensation pool the allotment could have been made. A similar proposition was examined by this Court in Evacuee Trust Property v. Mst. Zakia Begum 1992 SCMR 1313 with the following observation:-- "5. For facility of reference, relevant provisions of the statute, Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act, 1975 (Act XIII of 1975) may be reproduced as under:- "
8. Declaration of property as evacuee trust property.--- (1) If a question arises whether an evacuee property is attached to a charitable, religious or educational trust or institution or not, it shall be decided by the Chairman whose decision shall be final and shall not be called in question in any Court.
(2) If the decision of the Chairman under subsection (1) is that an evacuee property is evacuee trust property, he shall, by notification in the official Gazette, declare such property to be evacuee trust property.
(3) If a property is declared to be evacuee trust property under subsection(2), the Chairman may pass an order cancelling the allotment or alienation, as the case may be, take possession and assume administrative control, management and maintenance thereof: ' Provided that no declaration under subsection (2) or order under subsection (3) shall be made or passed in respect of any property without giving the person having interest in that property a reasonable opportunity of being heard.
9. Exemption of property in Trust Pool from process.--- No evacuee trust property shall be liable to be proceeded against for any claim in any manner whatsoever in execution of any decree or order or by any other process of Court or other authority.
10 Validation of certain transfers.-- (1) An immovable evacuee trust property,---
(a) if situated in a rural area and utilised bona fide under any Act prior to June, 1964, for allotment against the satisfaction of verified claims; and
(b) if situated in an urban area and utilised bona fide under any Act for transfer against the satisfaction of verified claims in respect of which Permanent Transfer Deeds were issued prior to June, 1968, shall be deemed to have been validly transferred by sale to the Chief Settlement Commissioner, and the sale proceeds thereof shall be reimbursed to the Board and shall form part of the Trust Pool.
(2) If a question arises whether a transaction referred to in subsection (1) is bona fide or not, it shall be decided by the Chairman whose decision shall be final and shall not be called in question in any Court.
(3) If it is decided that a transaction referred to in subsection (1) is not bona fide, the Chairman may pass an order cancelling the allotment of transfer of such property. Provided that no decision under subsection (2) or order under subsection (3) shall be taken or passed in respect of any property without giving the person affected a reasonable opportunity of being heard."
14. Bar of jurisdiction. Save as otherwise provided in this Act, no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of any matter which the Federal Government or an officer appointed under this Act is empowered under this Act to determine, and no injunction, process or order shall be granted or issued by any Court or other authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken in exercise of any power conferred by or under this Act.
' A perusal of the above would show that when a question arises whether a property is evacuee trust property the decision of the Chairman, Evacuee Trust Property Board shall be final section 8(1) and if it is so, the Chairman may cancel the allotment or alienation section 8(3), further, it shall be exempted from any process of Courts or other authority (section 9). Section 14 excludes jurisdiction of any Court in respect of any matter which is determinable by any authority under the Act.
' However, section 10(1) provides that if an Evacuee Trust Property has been utilized bona fide for transfer against satisfaction of claims in respect of which Permanent Transfer Deed was issued prior to June, 1968, that shall be deemed to have been validly transferred by sale to Chief Settlement Commissioner and the proceeds shall be reimbursed to the Board. In case, a question arises whether transfer is bona fide or not, it shall be the Chairman whose decision shall be final and shall not be called in question in any Court section 10(2)."
5. The question of allotment has been examined on the touchstone of the criterion as laid down in case of Mst. Zakia Begum (supra) and we are of the considered view that the allotment in favour of Akhtar Ali Khan (respondent) was illegal having no legal sanctity whatsoever and such allotment could not have been justified on any ground irrespective of the fact by whom the allotment was scrutinized because it is not the satisfaction of Ch. Talib Hussain and Mehr Jewan Khan (Members Board of Revenue) but the significant consideration would be as to whether it was a legal allotment made in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Evacuee Laws or otherwise? Since the allotment was illegal, it could not have been substituted with that of "alternate allotment". Any order passed by learned Chief Settlement Commissioner being not sacrosanct can be examined and reversed if found unlawful. The learned Single Judge in Chambers erred while holding that "even if the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent-department is accepted that this land was not evacuee in nature but was evacuee trust, yet the fact remains that since the Settlement Department itself had allotted the land to the petitioner, he was entitled to have alternative land in lieu of land which was not available" for the reason that when the initial allotment was ab initio void how subsequent allotment could have been made on the basis of an illegal allotment.
6. We have also observed that learned High Court has not examined the question of laches in accordance with the settled norms of justice but on the contrary undue importance has been given to it and in oblivion of the fact that order, dated 19-12-1992 was ab initio void. It is well-settled by now that "laches is not delay simplicitor. To constitute laches it should adversely affect other party who has in the meantime, gained a benefit of which it should not be deprived of on equitable considerations. Where no rights had come to vest in respondents, plea of laches raised by respondents resulted in denial of justice. Delay per se was, therefore, not a ground for refusing discretionary relief in exercise of constitutional jurisdiction. The question whether delay in filing of constitutional petition was fatal, would depend upon facts of each case. Delay in some cases even several years old could be overlooked while short delay or laches could be fatal in other cases.
Where writ petition was filed after great delay when valuable right for consideration had already accrued to respondent, petition suffered from laches and was liable to be dismissed on such ground. In suitable cases exceptions have been made when the delay is satisfactorily explained, or otherwise the circumstances are such as to justify intervention by Courts. No hard and fast rule can be laid down as the statute does not prescribe any period of limitation within which constitutional petitions have to be presented. The length of the delay that has occurred, the circumstances responsible for it, the nature of the injury suffered by the petitioner, the altered position of the opposite party and the requirements of equity have all to be taken into account before deciding whether relief would be refused on the ground of laches or delay. Delay, per se is not sufficient to dismiss the petition under Article 199. It is only when the petitioner is guilty of delay combined with some conduct on his part which acts as an estoppel against him, the petition can be dismissed.
Thus, if a person seeking a remedy has not been guilty of such delay as would cause prejudice to the other side or would amount to waiver or acquiescence on the part of the person seeking the remedy, technical plea of laches, by itself, would not be sufficient to bar the remedy. Where provisional transfer order made in 1960 were challenged in 1975 when alleged fraud came to light after investigation. Delay in filing writ petition, was held, to be not "inordinate". But where the delay is accompanied by such circumstances as indicate clear negligence on the part of the applicant to pursue his remedy with due diligence or conscious acquiescence in the adverse order made against him, then that would be a very good ground for denying this extraordinary remedy. The law assists those who are vigilant about their rights and not those who sleep over them. Where condonation of laches has the effect of prejudicing the other party, delay would not generally be condoned, in absence of compelling reasons such as fostering cause of justice or in cases of continuing wrong. But where no prejudice is caused to the opposite party, laches may be condoned. Faiz Ahmed v. Settlement Commissioner Lands 1985 CLC 974, Muhammad Yaqoob Khan v. Member, Board of Revenue 1984 SCMR 940, Noor Muhammad v. Muhammad. Iqbal Khan 1985 CLC 1280, Muhammad Sadiq v. Anver Majeed 1989 PCr.LJ 1223, Ata Muhammad v. Zubair Mahmood Khan 1980 CLC 446, Rashda Perveen v. Deputy Settlement Commissioner PLD 1982 Lah. 250, Nasima Begum v. Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner 1982 SCMR 913, Jan Muhammad Alvi v.
Assistant Registrar 1983 CLC 1714, Nazir Ahmed Khan v. Muhammad Yasin 1983 CLC 2268, Wajdad v.
Mir Muhammad Baloch PLD 1982 Quetta 41, Settlement Authority v. Akhtar Sultana PLD 1976 SC 410, Mohsin Khan v. Chief Settlement commissioner 1969 SCMR 306, Dawood Yahma Ltd. v. Government of Balochistan PLD 1986 Quetta 148, Zeenat Nisa v. Settlement Commissioner PLD 1976 Kar.
595.
7. The principle of laches is equally applicable to the case of Akhtar Ali Khan (respondent) whose conduct appears to be dishonest, dubious and suspicious. It is worth-mentioning that P.T.O. In favour of Akhtar Ali Khan (respondent) was issued on 29-7-1963 and permanent transfer deed was issued on 4-1-1965. The first application for allotment was moved by Akhtar Ali Khan on 20-10-1968 followed by another application moved on 22-12-1971 and thereafter on 1-12-1992 another application was moved to the Member Board of Revenue which culminated into order, dated 19-12- 1992 by the Member Board of Revenue directing that allotment be made in favour of respondent in substitution of the earlier land, possession whereof could not be delivered to the respondent.
Akhtar Ali Khan (respondent) kept mum and got up from a deep slumber after about two decades and moved an application on 1-12-1992 for alternate allotment. Nobody knows what Akhtar Ali Khan (respondent) had been doing during two decades and why the proper forum could not be approached for the redressal of his grievances. It can be inferred safely from the chequered history of the case that Akhtar Ali Khan(respondent) being fully aware about the merits of his case was waiting for opportune moment and finally succeeded in getting the land in question allotted through Ch. Talib Hussain, Member Board of Revenue whose all orders qua allotment of different lands were cancelled by the Government for certain obvious reasons which hardly needs any elaboration. We are deliberately withholding our comments in this regard as Ch. Talib Hussain, Member Board of Revenue is not before us.
8. The learned Single Judge in Chambers has attempted to justify that land in question was not allotted illegally and referred Writ Petition No,3/R of 1995 and Writ Petition No,29/R of 1995 by endorsing the version of the department concerned without examining as to whether the said version was in accordance with law or otherwise? The view point of the department being not in consonance with law would have no substantial bearing on merit of the case. The learned Single Judge in Chambers also erred while holding that the respondent was entitled to alternative land pursuant to the order, dated 19-12-1992 without examining the legality of the said order. The learned Single Judge in Chambers also failed to determine the question as to whether the urban land could have been allotted by way of substitution by ignoring the fact that initial order was ab initio void. Besides that the judgment impugned is not in consonance with the dictum as laid down in case Muhammad Raman v. Member (Revenue/C.S. 1997 SCMR 1635, relevant portion whereof is reproduced hereinbelow for ready reference:-- "(23) Now carefully examining the details of each case in hand, it would be quite apparent, that specific land had been allotted to some of the appellants prior to the date of notification, dated 16- 5-1973 and they were unsuccessful in getting its possession and effecting mutation concerning the same in their favour. In majority of cases, applications seeking grant of "alternate land" were submitted to Chief Settlement Commissioner after repeal of evacuee laws, rather towards beginning of year 1999: In certain matters directions were also obtained from Lahore High Court for ensuring expeditious disposal of the grievances agitated by the claimants/respondents whose verified claims despite strenuous follow up had not been satisfied. In one of the cases when Writ Petition No,2523/91 was filed before Lahore High Court the Settlement Department made categoric concession for providing alternate land to respondent Mirza Shamim Ahmed Baig and said petition was accordingly disposed of on 14th July, 1992. Therefore, it has to be seen that when claims were not satisfied or direction issued by superior Court regarding subject-matter which inherently suffered from want of jurisdiction were not complied on concession for allotting alternate urban land to claimants against unsatisfied produce index units even if any concession was made by the Department, otherwise having no authority specially after repealing Act could be legitimately sustained. The ratio decidendi in cases reported in 1991 SCMR 377, 1991 SCMR 1255 and 1993 SCMR 732 postulates that Chief Settlement Commissioner was competent to issue notification for converting agricultural land into "building sites" and consequently notification, dated 16-5-1973 was valid. Therefore, on the issuance of said notification every agricultural urban land which had not been adjusted, allotted or utilized till then against verified claims ceased to be available for transfer. Additional, Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975, became effective from the first day of July, 1974. Hence the status of evacuee property as existed on such date could not be changed or converted subsequent to promulgation of said enactment. The authority for disposal of the property or residual work was merely to be restricted to finalize rehabilitation process. Therefore, we find no difficulty in observing that when repealing Act was promulgated there did not exist any agricultural urban land, which could be adjusted against unsatisfied verified claims of produce index units. The claimants with unsatisfied entitlement could resort to any other remedy if available under the law, but were not entitled to obtain allotment of urban land in satisfaction of pending units as alternate land/measure or otherwise.
(24) Besides, it was mandatory condition for grant or allotment of land that proceedings must be pending, which could be dealt with and finalized by the "Notified Officer" within the four corners of law and jurisdiction vested in him. Undoubtedly in all the matters under consideration, claims of respondents had not been fully adjusted or lands allocated to them for being transferred in their favour was not available for one or the other reasons. Therefore, without much comments relying on the instructive observations in cases of Member, Board of Revenue v. Muhammad Mustafa and others 1993 SCMR 732 Syed Saifullah v. Board of Revenue, Balochistan and others 1991 SCMR 1255 and Muhammad Ashraf Khan and others v. Administrator (RP)/Settlement Commissioner, Lahore and others 1987 SCMR 1358 we are inclined to hold that on the promulgation of the "Notification" dated 16th May, 1973 (supra) no agricultural urban land existed or was available for disposal.
Moreover the date when the repealing Act became operative there was no land available for adjustment against produced index units. Mere fact that in some matters regarding adjustment of specified land were under consideration or had not been carried out; would not bring the grievance within the purview of section 2(2) of Act XIV of 1975. Therefore, Notified Officer had no jurisdiction to allot, or transfer the land or grant alternate lands against unadjusted verified units.
(25) There is yet another aspect whereby Chief Settlement Commissioner vide order,' dated 3-5- 1986 (reproduced hereinabove) has unambiguously declined request for granting alternate land to claimants (i) Pir Muhammad, (ii) Siraj Din, (iii) Wali Muhammad and (iv) Sher Muhammad, respondents in Civil Appeals Nos.195, 196, 199, 201, 202, 203 and 205 of 1995. This was not challenged by said claimants, therefore, it had attained finality. Repealing Act XIV of 1975 does not contain any provisions for exercising power of review. Therefore, on the strength of principles laid down in cases of Hussain Bakhsh v. Settlement Commissioner, Rawalpindi and others PLD 1970 SC 1 and Muzaffar Ali v. Muhammad Shafi PLD 1981 SC 94, Chief Settlement Commissioner the Notified Officer was not competent to recall or by pass his previous decision. Therefore, the order for allotment of alternate land was vitiated on this source as well.
' Now we will proceed to deal with other aspect regarding consequence of order passed by authority being no jurisdiction in the matter. Question relating to legality and impact of void order and for disregarding the same when nullity, has been considered by this Court on numerous occasions. Pivotal question which needs attention is whether impugned orders concerning allotment of land passed by Notified Officer are mala fide or suffer from total lack of jurisdiction or have been passed in disregard of existing law and tends to frustrate provisions of evacuee laws and schemes framed thereunder, therefore, be deemed as nullity. In case of Muhammad Swaleh PLD 1964 SC 97 this Court, ruled, that if circumstances disclose that order pre-eminently provides right to either party is nullity the same should be ignored. In the case of Yousaf Ali v. Muhammad Aslam Zia PLD 1958 SC 104 the Court did not attach finality to the orders which were passed by any authority in excess of its jurisdiction or suffered from want of jurisdiction and were found to be devoid of lawful authority and nullity. It was observed in these matters that edifice constructed on the basis of void order crumbles along with same, and did not require to be set aside through appeals or any other proceedings. In the case of Mansab All v. Amir and 3 others PLD 1971 SC 124 it has been observed that elementary principles. Of law require mandatory condition regarding exercise of jurisdiction by a Court, Tribunal or Authority must be fulfilled, otherwise all proceedings drawn by such forum would suffer from total want of jurisdiction, otherwise action taken and decision rendered by said forum shall have no legal effect. Similar view was taken in case of Major Syed Walayat Shah v. Muzaffar Khan and others PLD 1971 SC 184 wherein it was held that orders passed by Tribunal having no jurisdiction are not sustainable and all successive proceedings based upon the same are equally illegal and devoid of lawful authority. In Chittaranjan Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Staff Union PLD 1971 SC 197 it was observed that "where the Court is not properly constituted; all the proceedings must be held to coram non judice and, therefore, non-existent in the eye of law.
There can also be no doubt that in such circumstances it could never be too late to admit and give effect to the plea that the order was a nullity" and thus impugned order was set aside. The above discussed proposition was elaborately discussed in case of Khuda Bakhsh v. Khushi Muhammad and 3 others PLD 1976 SC 208 wherein action and orders were found to be coram non judice and nullity in the eye of law. After surveying case-law this Court in a recent judgment reported in PLD 1997 SC 351 (Province of the Punjab through Secretary, Health Department v. Dr. S. Muhammad Zafar Bukhari) also dealt with the defect of orders which are void and coram non judice, and propounded that same may not be carried out.
(26) Learned counsel for the respondents have greatly stressed upon directions which were issued by superior Court for ensuring expeditious disposal of the grievances made by the claimants regarding non-adjustment of their produce index units or failure to grant them alternate land. It was also emphatically canvassed that in one of the case department had made concession.
Therefore, directions of the High Court existed for providing alternative land. They accordingly asserted that Notified Officer stood protected and his orders were not assailable. It is indeed well- settled that consent can neither vest nor taken away jurisdiction which otherwise did not vest in any authority or forum. Reference, however, be made to observations in the cases reported in PLD 1983 SC 243, (Sultan Ali v. Khushi Muhammad), 1983 PCr.LJ 682 (Azad Jammu and Kashmir Government through Chief Secretary and 4 others v. Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan) and 1980 SCMR 469 (Shahul Hamid v. Tahir Ali). It is noteworthy that after issuance of notification, dated 16- 5-1973 and promulgation of repeal Act, 1975 Chief Settlement Commissioner Punjab or Notified Officer did not possess any power to make allotment of any agricultural land in the urban areas of Punjab. No one in the Settlement Department was, therefore, competent to transfer or consent for giving any land muchless an "alternate land" for adjustment of produce index units, especially when they did not even assert possession over any portion of such land. Additionally, by virtue of notification dated 16th May, 1973 entire agricultural urban land was declared as "building site" and subsequently on account of repealing enactment all unutilized properties by operation of law were transferred to the Government of Punjab in the consolidated pool, which could only be disposed of in accordance with procedure prescribed under regular schemes. Besides, none of the "building sites" could be legitimately transferred even under , the scheme framed by the Punjab Government, except such portion upon which construction has been raised by the claimants and other adjoining land not exceeding three times the constructed area. Even under the Scheme presently in force limit of granting agricultural urban land was considerably restricted. The "Notified Officer" flagrantly disregarding the law granted alternate land, to the claimants against verified produce index units which otherwise did not belong to Settlement Department. It is noticeable that "Notified Officer" had illegally assumed powers which were not vested in him. His conduct does not appear to be above board and is prima facie mala fide. This certainly calls for probe and suitable departmental action against persons responsible for concealment of facts and wanton abuse of power by the then Chief Settlement Commissioner (Ch. Talib Hussain)."
9. It has been held in a categoric manner that at the time of promulgation of the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975 no agricultural urban land was in existence for allotment against unsatisfied verified claims. Ch. Talib Hussain has allotted the land by misusing and abusing his official authority which cannot be appreciated. It has been observed with grave concern that Messrs Talib Hussain and Jewan Khan as well as learned Single Judge in Chambers have not bothered to examine the original record qua P.T.D. And the original transfer order of the urban land to Akhtar Ali Khan (respondent) and allotment has been made in a haphazard manner merely on the basis of two or three applications simplicitor made after a gap of more than two decades. It was all the most bounden duty of the learned Single Judge in Chambers to have examined as to whether the land in question belonged to the Evacuee Trust Property Board enabling him to decide the question of allotment. We found substance in the contention of learned Advocate Supreme Court on behalf of appellant that the Government is not bound to implement the void orders which are erroneous, coram non judice and without jurisdiction and passed on the basis of forged, false, fictitious and fabricated documents. We are of the considered opinion that the question of allotment can be re-examined subject to sufficient lawful justification especially in case of fraud and cheating. The learned Advocate Supreme Court on behalf of respondents was pointedly asked that how the application dated 1-12-1992 preferred on behalf of appellant was entertained by the Member, Board of Revenue without having any jurisdiction, but no satisfactory answer could be given. In fact jurisdiction was assumed in utter disregard to law merely to grant benefit by way of allotment in favour of respondent by ignoring the fact that the property in question was evacuee trust property which could not have been allotted by the learned Member, Board of Revenue. The so-called inquiry got conducted appears to be laconic and hardly renders any assistance to the case of respondent. It is worth-mentioning that the statement of Patwari a petty official of the Settlement Department cannot change the nature of the land in question. It also transpired from the scrutiny of record that process of allotment was completed after holding inquiry within a period of few days which smacks of mala fides. As mentioned hereinabove the Settlement Authorities have acted in a most reckless and irresponsible manner by placing reliance on forged and fabricated record without having gone through the original record which was never summoned. We have also examined the case from another angle as to whether any proceedings were pending with regard to the disputed land or otherwise before the target date i,e, 1-7-1974 as stipulated in the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975 (XIV of 1975). A careful scrutiny of the record would indicate that no such proceedings were pending and in order to make out a case, two different applications were filed on 2-10-1968 and 22-12-1971 which were neither entertained by the competent authority nor there is any endorsement or verification by the Settlement Department that such applications were ever processed. The allotment has been made on the basis of unauthentic record with the connivance of the Settlement Department. It is shocking to note that original record qua P.T.D. Was found missing but amazingly a file having the copies of two applications dated 2-10-1968 and 22-12-1971 was available, copies whereof were issued by the Settlement Department to the respondent enabling him to avail the target date I e . 1- 7-1974.
10. As mentioned hereinabove the property being evacuee trust property could not have been allotted by Ch. Talib Hussain, Member Board of Revenue/Chief Settlement Commissioner which could have only been sold under the Reservation Scheme and no payment whatsoever was made against it. The land comprising of Khasra No,871 was evacuee trust property and therefore, it could have neither .Been allotted nor transferred and therefore, the question of alternate allotment in lieu thereof does not arise. The Settlement Authorities and the Notified Officers were not competent to make such allotment which powers vested with the Chairman Evacuee Trust Board pursuant to the relevant provisions as enumerated in the Evacuee Trust Property (Management and Disposal) Act, 1975. We have also examined the order passed by Ch. Talib Hussain, Member Board of Revenue whereby reliance has been placed on the concessional statement given on behalf of the department which in fact has been misinterpreted and misconstrued because the statement given by the learned counsel on behalf of the department was qua the evacuee land and no mentioned whatsoever was made regarding urban land. The record is also silent as to whether any land was allotted under the Reservation. Scheme to the respondent and if so by whom and when the allotment was made are the questions which could not be examined properly by the learned Single Judge in Chambers. The order, dated 19-12-1992 passed by Ch. Thlib Hussain, Member Board of Revenue, appears to have been passed in an indecent haste which smacks of mala fides hence it cannot be made a base for alternate allotment being illegal, coram non judice and ab initio void.
11. We have also examined the case of Mushtaq Hussain which has got no merits at all. It is worth- mentioning that his writ petition was dismissed on 7-3-1995 which was never assailed any more.
Insofar as Aadil Hussain is concerned he is also sailing in the same boat as his application for allotment of land to the extent of six Marlas was rejected by the Chief Settlement Commissioner by means of order dated 12-12-1995 which was not assailed further and thus, the order had attained finality.
' In sequel to above mentioned discussion the above mentioned appeals are accepted and the judgment dated 14-2-2000 passed by learned single Judge of the Lahore High Court in Chambers is set aside. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.