' M. JAVED BUTTAR, J.--- This petition is directed against the judgment, dated 20-9-2005 passed by a Division Bench of the High Court, of Sindh, Karachi, whereby petitioner's appeal against the injunctive order, dated 31-8-2005, in favor of respondent/plaintiff passed by learned Single Judge of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi under Order XXXIX, rules 1 and 2, C.P.C., restraining the petitioners/defendants from entering into the premises in dispute, has been disposed of, directing the parties to maintain status quo.
2. The relevant facts are, that the respondent instituted the suit for declaration and permanent injunction alleging that the petitioners/ defendants were licensees under the plaintiff/respondent and after revoking their licences, the plaintiff had taken over the possession of the premises by use of minimum force. The following reliefs were sought in the suit:-- "It is, therefore, respectfully prayed that this Honourable Court may be pleased to pass judgment and decree in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants in the following terms:--
(a) declare that the plaintiff is in lawful possession of the shops and the defendants have no right to repossess the shops;
(b) permanently restrain the defendants jointly or severally and any person acting under or on behalf of the defendants trespassing the property of the plaintiff particularly Karachi Sheraton and/or repossessing of attempting to repossess the shops;
(c) permanently restrain the defendants jointly or severally and any person acting under or on behalf of the defendants from harassing and threatening any of the hotel management or staff;
(d) grant costs of the suit; and
(e) grant such other relief(s) as may be deemed just and proper by this Honourable Court."
' Along with the plaint, an application for the grant of temporary injunction, was also filed.
3. The petitioners, through their counter-affidavit took the plea that they were not licensees but tenants under the plaintiff/respondent and, therefore, they could not be dispossessed otherwise than in due course of law. It was stated that the premises were leased out to them in the year 1982, at that time they had made payment at the rate of Rs,2,500 per sq. Ft. For construction of the shops and that they were owners of the structure in addition of being lessees. The learned Single Judge of the High Court vide his detailed and lengthy order dated 31-8-2005, granted the temporary injunction in favor of the plaintiff.
4. In appeal, the learned Division Bench of the High Court, after hearing the learned counsel for the parties, concluded as follows:-- "After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and perusal of the contentions raised before the learned Single Judge, we are of the opinion that there is no sufficient material on record to give any prima facie finding about the status of the parties. The factual position is that the goods of the appellants are lying in the shops, where the respondent has blocked the way to shops by erecting barrier which has been welded to close the shops."
5. After coming to the above conclusion that there was no sufficient material on record to give any prima facie finding about status of the parties, worthy Judges directed the parties to maintain status quo and issued further directions to learned Single Judge of the High Court for the disposal of the suit within a reasonable time.
6. Mr. Makhdoom Ali Khan, learned counsel for the petitioners, has argued with vehemence that petitioners are not licensees, they are paying rent and the learned Division Bench of the High Court, after concluding that there was no sufficient material on record to give any prima facie finding about the status of the parties, ought to have dismissed the plaintiff's application for the grant of temporary injunction by way of setting side the order impugned before it, so that the petitioners could resume their business, which at the moment has been stopped as the shops leased out to the petitioners have been locked and sealed by the respondent with the petitioners goods lying inside the shops.
7. Mr. S.M. Zafar, learned Senior Advocate Supreme Court representing the respondent, while opposing the petition and supporting the impugned judgment/orders, has submitted that petitioners are licensees and the respondent is the licensor and in terms of section 60 of the Easements Act, 1882, the respondent has revoked the license through a notice and, therefore, the learned Single Judge of the High Court correctly granted the temporary injunction in favor of the plaintiff restraining the petitioners from entering into the premises in dispute, i,e, the shops. Learned counsel in this regard, has shown us the written agreements entered into between the parties, wherein the parties have been described as licensor and licenses and the nature of the agreements have been described as licences. The learned Senior Advocate Supreme Court has also relied on Abdul Rashid Khan and 8 others v. President, Services Institute P.A.F. Base, Lahore through his Incharge and 2 others 1999 M LD 1870, Ghulam Rasool v. Muhammad Waris Bismil 1994 M LD 527 and Abdullah Bhai and others v. Ahmad Din PLD 1964 SC 106.
8. However, we are of the view that since the suit is pending between the parties and as the dispute i,e, the status of the parties, is yet to be determined in the suit, therefore, we should be careful in making any observations on merits of the case. We are also of the view that on having come to the conclusion that there was no sufficient material on record to give any prima facie finding about the status of the parties, the learned Division Bench of the High Court ought to have set aside the impugned injunctive order because this conclusion in itself disclosed that plaintiff had failed to make out a prima facie case as it had failed to prima facie establish before the Honourable Judges that the petitioners were licensees. Thus, in such a circumstance, the balance of inconvenience, because of the stoppage of business, was in favor of the A petitioners and in such a situation, in our view, the learned Division Bench of the High Court erred in directing the parties to maintain status quo other than status quo ante.
' Therefore, the impugned orders dated 31-8-2005 and 20-9-2005 are set aside to the extent indicated in our short order, dated 13-10-2005 whereby the petition was converted into appeal and allowed with no orders as to costs. These are the reasons of the above said short order.