Sardar Muhammad Raza. J.--The legal heirs of Nawab Din, pre-emptor in the original suit, have filed this appeal after leave of Court against the judgment dated 4.12.2002, whereby, his revision against the judgment dated 13.5.1998 of the First Appellate Court, was dismissed. Nawab Din pre- emptor, granted a decree by the trial Court, was non-suited by the appellate Court as well as the High Court - holding that the pre-emptor had not performed talb-i-mowathibat, etc.'
2. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in the written statement the defendant had only challenged the performance of talb-i-ishhad, whereas, the Courts have non-suited the pre- emptor for the non-performance of talb-i-mowathibar as well. That no issue was framed regarding talb-i-mowathibat. So far as the real controversy between the parties is concerned, it can better be reflected from the issues framed. Issue to that effect clearly contains a reference to both the talbs, of mowathibat and of ishhad. There seems to be no surprise sprung upon the pre- emptor.
3. Talb-i-mowathibat is a personal act of prospective pre-emptor whereby his actual right is activated. It is to be exercised at a time when no suit is yet filed, no notice of talb-i-ishhad is- served, no khasomat is preferred and when no defendant is in picture. Thus the act. of talb-i- mowathibat being prerequisite to activate the very right of pre-emption and being subjective and spontaneous, of the pre-emptor, has little to be waived by the defendant. The proof thereof is, therefore, necessary even if some suit for pre-emption is not contested by the defendant and even if the proceedings are ex-parte. Any omission in this behalf, in the written statement, does not extend any benefit to the plaintiff/pre-emptor.
4. To see the proof or otherwise of Talabs, we would revert to the record. The sale having taken place on 26.4.1993, the plaintiff in his plaint discloses having received knowledge thereof on 1.8.1993.
As the performance of talb-i-mowathibat is restricted to a specific period of time, that is, before dispersal of a majlis, it remains a matter of limitation by itself and further limits the performance of talb-i-ishhad within 14 days therefrom_ The plaintiff, therefore, has to prove also as to what majlis it was that he performed talb-i-mowathibat in.
5. No such majlis at all is indicated in the plaint. It is notmentioned in the plaint as to who informed the pre-emptor about sale for the first time. Talb-i-ishhad is nothing but creating evidence about the talb concerned. Quite interesting it is to note that even notice of talb-i-ishhad is totally silent about the existence or otherwise of Muhammad Din as informer. This Muhammad Din is for the first time introduced in the evidence but no benefit could be drawn from him because he is alleged to have died. Even if alive, there is evidence and strong inferences on record, that he was not present in the majlis, that he was not an informer and that no talb was performed in his presence.
6. The Courts have rightly concurred and non-suited the preemptor. There being no force in the appeal, it is hereby dismissed.