' MUHAMMAD SADIQ LEGHARI, J.-The facts leading to this order are that Haji Abdul Ghani respondent No,2 had filed a Suit (Old Nos. 139 of 1998 New No, 135 of 2003) against Jameela Khatoon and her brother Naim Baig. It was pending before VI Senior Civil Judge, Karachi Central where Naim Baig was pursuing it for self and on behalf of Mst. Jameela Khatoon as her attorney. Plaintiff/ respondent Haji Abdul Ghani pleaded that Jameela Khatoon had expired soon after the institution of the suit in 1998 and Naim Baig had been falsely claiming and continuing as her attorney. Since Naim Baig was claiming Jameela Khatoon to be alive the Court, at the request of plaintiff Haji Abdul Ghani directed the production of Jameela Khatoon before it on 17-9-2004. It was only after that when Naim Baig came out with the plea that Jameela Khatoon had died on 17-9-2004 together with that statement he filed death certificate on 18th September, 2004 purporting to have been issued by Nazim Union Council No,l Azizabad. He also claimed that the dead body had been buried in graveyard Yaseenabad. As Haji Abdul Ghani challenged the genuineness of the plea as well the death certificate produced in support thereof the learned Court undertook the preliminary enquiry into the matter and sought confirmation from the Nazim of UC No,l Azizabad and the Incharge of the graveyard. The Nazim denied the issuance of- death certificate and existence of entry about the death of Jameela Khatoon in their record. The Incharge of graveyard also expressed complete ignorance about the burial of Jameela Khatoon in the graveyard. The Court then recorded its conclusion that the document i.e, death certificate produced in the judicial proceedings appears to be forged one and took cognizance of the offence under section 193* P.P.C. In exercise of powers conferred upon it by section 476, Cr.P.C.
2. The criminal proceedings were started against Naim Baig. After reading over charge, evidence was also recorded. After that his statement under section 342, Cr.P.C. Was recorded.
3. Thereafter, Naim Baig filed revision application before Sessions Judge challenging the order of the learhed Vth Senior Qivil Judge, Karachi Central whereby he had taken cognizance of the offence. The revision application was assigned to the Third Additional Sessions Judge, Karachi Central who heard and dismissed it by order dated 3-12-2005. The two orders have been attacked before this Court invoking the jurisdiction under section 561-A, Cr.P.C.
4. After hearing the arguments the order was reserved. Now, I proceed to pass the order.
5. It was argued by Mr. Chaudhry Abdul Rasheed, Advocate for the applicant that the Senior Civil Judge had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence under section 193 and start the proceedings against the applicant. According to him section 195, Cr.P.C. Puts bar on taking cognizance for the offence under section 193, P.P.C. If committed in the proceedings unless a complaint is filed by the Court. Mr. Chaudhry further contended that the learned Senior Civil Judge could only file the complaint before the competent Court and that Court was competent to take cognizance of the offence. In support of his contention he has referred to the case of Farayad Ali and others (2004 SCM R 1728), Abdul Wahab Khan v. Muhammad Nawaz (2000 SCM R 1904) and Muhammad Suleman and others (PLD (sic) Lahore 386).
6. Mr. Chaudhry contended in continuity that section 476, Cr.P.C. Provides only for the procedure to be adopted in such cases and does not confer jurisdiction upon the Court before which the proceedings are pending.
7. Mr. Muhammad Mustafa Hussain appearing for the respondent No:2 defended the impugned orders. He argued that Section 476, Cr.P.C. Is exception to the restriction put by section 195, Cr.P.C. It authorized the Courts before which the offence under section 193, P.P.C. Has been committed to take cognizance of the offence and try it. In support of his view he referred to the decision of the honourable Supreme Court in the case of Abdul Hakeem (1994 SCM R 1103). In continuity he also argued that section 476-A, Cr.P.C. Makes the things further clear and empowers the Court before which the offence has been committed to forward the case to the Court otherwise competent to try it.
8. The contention of Mr. Muhammad Mustafa Hussain has weight in it. It is true that section 195, Cr.P.C. Bars that Court from taking cognizance of the offence under section 193, P.P.C. Committed in judicial proceedings except on the complaint filed by the concerned Court but section 476, Cr.P.C.
Is exception to that bar. This section specifically refers to the offences specified in column (b) of subsection (1) of section 195 if committed in Judicial proceedings or in relation thereof before' civil, revenue or criminal Court and authorizes that very Court to take the cognizance of the offence and try the same in accordance with the procedure described for summary trials. The position becomes further clear from section 476-A, Cr.P.C. Which provides for forwarding the case to the Court having jurisdiction to try the same after taking of cognizance of the offence by the Court before which the offence was committed. The position which is already clear in section 476, Cr.P.C, itself is made further clear by section 476-A, Cr.P.C. Thus, the Court before which the offence under section 193, P.P.C. Is committed can take the cognizance thereof. After that it can either try the case adopting summary procedure or forward it to the Court competent to try it otherwise. The contention of Mr. Chaudhry that section 476, Cr.P.C. Only provides for the procedure is devoid of substance.
9. In present case the offence is alleged to have been committed in relation to the proceedings of suit before the VI. Senior Civil Judge, Karachi Central therefore that Court could take its cognizance and try it according to procedure of summary trials. This view gets support from the dictum laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Abdul Hakeem (1994 SCM R 1103). The cases referred to by Mr. Chaudhry are not on the point of exercise of powers under section 476, therefore, those do not help the applicant.
10. In the light of above discussion and conclusions the orders impugned through present Miscellaneous Application have not been passed illegally or in misuse of the powers. They therefore, do not call for interference. Consequently, the application is dismissed at katch peshi stage.