HASNAT AHMAD KHAN, J.---. Through this writ petition order, dated 16-6-2007 passed by the Special Judge Anti-Terrorism Court, Faisalabad whereby the application under sections 12/19 of the Anti- Terrorism Act, 1997 filed by the respondent No,2 was accepted has been called in question.
2. Brief facts of the case are that on a written application filed by respondent No,2 a case was registered with Police Station Langrana. District Jhang in respect of offences under sections 337- H(ii), 435, 440, 148 and 149, P.P.C. Against the petitioner and his co-accused. According to the complainant he was running a shop of fertilizers and diesel etc. The complainant further alleged that on 22-11-2006 at 5-00 p.m. The petitioner along with his co-accused armed with various weapons reached the shop of the complainant. Thereafter Jaffar co-accused allegedly drew off five litres of diesel from a drum and splashed the same upon the complainant's son namely Nausher and tried to set him on fire but he succeeded to run away. Jaffar co-accused allegedly shot at said Nausher but missed the target. In the meanwhile rest of the accused including the petitioner barged into the shop of the complainant and after sprinkling/splashing diesel on the bedding put the same to torch. During the said process the fire allegedly broke out and other articles lying in the shop also caught the same and huge quantity of high-speed diesel, light diesel, sacks of fertilizers were allegedly gutted by the fire. The complainant estimated his loss to the tune of Rs,5,00,000 (Rupees five lac). After the investigation the challan was submitted against the petitioner and his other accomplices under the above-mentioned provisions of law before the Magistrate 1st Class Chiniot. During the pendency of said trial the respondent No,2 i.e. The complainant submitted an application before the respondent No,3 for the transfer of case to said Court i.e. Special Judge Anti-Terrorism Court, Faisalabad. The said application was accepted by the Special Judge Anti-Terrorism Court, Faisalabad vide impugned order, dated 16-6-2007 and the prosecution was directed to submit challan before the said Court after adding section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The petitioner having felt aggrieved has challenged the said order before this Court.
3. In support of this petition it has been submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Special Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court had got no authority to summon the case file; that mere perusal of the F.I.R. Shows that section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 is not attracted to the facts and circumstances of the case and that during the investigation it was found that articles of the complainant were not fully burnt. To substantiate the last contention learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to an application having been filed by the complainant/respondent No,2 before the concerned Judicial Magistrate, for seeking "Superdari" of articles, which at the time of arson were lying in the shop. On the basis of said application he has tried to convince us that the complainant had not suffered any loss during the alleged occurrence.
4. Conversely, learned counsel for the respondent No,2 as well as the learned Assistant Advocate- General, Punjab have resisted the petition tooth and nail by contending that mere perusal of the F.I.R. Reveals that the petitioner along with his co-accused had committed the offence of serious form of arson; that during the occurrence the diesel as well as petrol lying in the drums was burnt and the application seeking "Superdari" filed by the respondent No,2 was regarding the empty drums/barrels and obviously not for the burnt diesel; that the provisions of section 6(2)(c), (d) and
(j) being fully attracted to the facts and circumstances of the case the impugned order is perfectly legal.
' At this stage the Police Officer present with the record has submitted that during the investigation it was found that so many articles owned by the complainant were burnt and gutted by fire.
5. After hearing the arguments of the parties we do not see eye to eye with the learned counsel for the petitioner. Mere perusal of the F.I.R. Reveals that firstly an effort was made to set the complainant's son ablaze after splashing diesel on his body and after failing in said nefarious and horrendous attempt, the diesel was sprinkled on the bedding/bed clothes lying in the shop and during the process 2000 litres high speed diesel and 1600 litres light diesel, a drum of kerosene oil, two drums of mobil oil besides so many other articles had allegedly been burnt due to blazing fire and the complainant claimed to have suffered a loss of Rs,5,00,000. During the investigation remnants of burnt articles were taken into possession by the police. During the occurrence the said articles were set on fire while the same were lying in a Shop. Therefore, prima facie it cannot be held that it was not a case of serious form of arson. To further understand the matter the relevant provisions of section 6(2) are reproduced as under:-- "6. Terrorism.--- (1)............................................................................
(2) An 'action' shall fall within the meaning of subsection (1), if it
(a) ...............................................
(b) ..........................................................................................................................
(c) involves grievous damage to property;
(d) involves the doing of anything that is likely to cause death or endangers a persons' life; (e)..
(ee).
(f)
(g)
(j) involves the burning of vehicles or any other serious form of arson."
As observed above the facts of the case indicate that the respondent No,2 suffered a grievous damage to his property, therefore, clause (c) of subsection (2) of section 6, prima facie, attracts. As an effort was made to set the complainant's son ablaze after splashing, diesel upon him, so clause
(d) of said subsection also attracts. Similarly clause (j) of the said subsection, prima facie, is also applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case. The impugned order cannot be quashed or set aside simply on the ground that an application was made by the complainant for having unburnt articles on "Superdari". The learned counsel for the petitioner has failed to point out that while submitting said application for "Superdari" any prayer regarding the diesel was also made by the complainant. Speaking tentatively, all the provisions mentioned above attract to the facts and circumstances of the case. However, after recording the evidence, the learned trial Court would give its final verdict regarding the applicability of section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. Without recording the evidence it cannot be said that offence under section 7 of the said Act is not made out against the petitioner and his accomplices. Reliance in this regard is placed upon the case of Mirza Shaukat Baig and others v. Shahid Jamil and others PLD 2005 SC 530.
6. As far as question of entertaining and accepting the complainant's application under sections 12 and 19 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 by learned Special Judge Anti-Terrorism Court, Faisalabad is concerned, learned counsel for the petitioner has failed to convince us that the impugned order is bad due to the lack of jurisdiction of the said E Court. To expound the proposition we would like to reproduce section 12 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997:-- "Section 12. Jurisdiction of (Anti-Terrorism Court).--- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code or in any other law, a schedule offence committed in an area in a Province shall be triable only by (the Anti-Terrorism Court) exercising territorial jurisdiction in relation to such area.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (1), if, in respect of a case involving a scheduled offence committed in any area, the Government having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, is satisfied that in order to ensure a fair trial, or for the protection and safety of witnesses., that such offence should be tried by (an Anti-Terrorism Court) established in relation to any other area, the Government may make a declaration to that effect."
' A bare perusal of said section reveals that a scheduled offence shall only be triable by Anti- Terrorism Court. Therefore, the offence committed by the petitioner and his accomplices is obviously not triable by the ordinary Court rather it can only be tried by the Special Judge, Anti- Terrorism Court. Reliance in this regard is placed upon the cases of Ismat Naureen v. Additional Sessions Judge, Attock and another PLD 1998 Lah. 275 and Faisal Iqbal v. The State and 3 others PLD 1998 Lah.
371.
7. By enacting section 23 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 the Legislature has safeguarded the interest of the accused. To further clarify the legal position section 23 of the said Act is reproduced as under:-- "23. Power to transfer cases to regular Courts.--- Where after taking cognizance of an offence, (Anti-Terrorism Court) is of opinion that the offence is not a schedule offence, it shall notwithstanding, that it has no jurisdiction to try such offence, transfer the case for trial of such offence to any Court having jurisdiction under the Code, and the Court to which the case' is transferred may proceed with the trial of the offence as if it had taken cognizance of the offence."
' A perusal of provisions of said section reveals that after taking cognizance of offence and forming an opinion that offence is not a scheduled offence, the Anti-Terrorism Court can send the case to any Court having jurisdiction under the Code. On this score too this petition is not maintainable.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has failed to point out any irregularity in the procedure or illegality in the impugned order. Similarly he has failed to point out any jurisdictional error committed by F the Special Judge Anti-Terrorism Court/respondent No,3. Therefore, this petition is found to be meritless and is dismissed.