' CH. IJAZ AHMED, J.--- The petitioner has sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, dated 3-10-2002 wherein the revision petition filed by the petitioner was dismissed.
2. The necessary facts out of which the present petition arises are that the petitioner filed a suit for specific performance against the respondents in the Court of Civil Judge, Okara on 13-10-1990. The contents of the plaint reveal that the respondents Nos.2 to 7/defendants Nos.2 to 7 prepared residential scheme under the name Almasoom Zafar Colony. Respondents Nos.2 to 7 authorized respondent No,1 to sell the plots of the said housing colony. Respondent No,1 with the consent of the respondents Nos.2 to 7 entered into an agreement with the petitioner to sell Plots Nos.152-153 and Shop No,13 for consideration of Rs,6,5000 in 1985. Petitioner/plaintiff issued Cheque No,07122631, dated 13-1-1985 amounting to Rs,50,000. The said amount was deposited in the account of respondent No,3 Shahid Zafar. Respondents Nos.2 to 7 had agreed to execute sale-deed in favour of the petitioner till 15-10-1985 and also promised to pay the damages equal to sale price in case of default. The respondent No,1 had also received Rs,10,000 on 18-2-1985 and promised to execute the sale-deed till 15-10-1985. The petitioner had paid all the consideration to respondent No,1 in terms of the agreement arrived at between them. The respondents refused to execute sale-deed in terms of agreement, dated 9-2-1985 and agreed to sell Plots Nos.156-157 with Shop No,13 and requested the petitioner that he should execute sale-deed of Plots Nos.156-157 and sale-deed of shop would be executed subsequently. The contents of the plaint further reveal that respondents Nos.2 to 7 had sold the Shop No,13 to respondents Nos.8 to 10 vide registered sale-deed dated 2-7-1985.
Respondent No,/defendant No,1 filed written statement, controverted the allegations levelled in the plaint while taking the stand that he was neither owner nor attorney of the respondents Nos.2 to 7.
Therefore, he could not execute the sale-deed on behalf of respondents Nos.2 to 7 and stated that he 'had simply introduced the petitioner to respondents Nos.2 to 7 as broker. Respondents Nos.2 to 7 filed written statement and stated that they had not executed any agreement with the petitioner/plaintiff with regard to the shop in question. The shop in question was sold by them to respondents Nos.8 to 10/defendants Nos.8 to 10 after receiving the sale consideration whereas the respondents Nos.8 to 10 filed written statement and controverted the allegations levelled in the plaint. Out of the pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed 10 issues. The learned trial Court after recording the evidence of the parties, decreed the suit vide judgment and decree, dated 28- 9-1991. Respondents Nos.8 to 10 being aggrieved filed appeal in the Court of District Judge who accepted the same vide judgment and decree dated 28-10-1995 and dismissed the suit of the petitioner for specific performance but decreed the suit for recovery of Rs,34,000 against respondent No,1/Muhammad Anwar throughout with costs. Petitioner being aggrieved filed civil revision before the Lahore High Court, Lahore which was also dismissed vide impugned judgment as mentioned above. Hence, this petition.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the learned trial Court had decreed the suit in favour of the petitioners after proper appreciation of evidence whereas First Appellate Court had reversed the findings of the trial Court without judicial application of mind He further maintains that the trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court had given finding of fact in favour of the petitioner that petitioner had paid the consideration of the property in question to respondents. Respondent No,1 had implied authority from respondents Nos2. To 7 to sell the property as, admitted by P.W.7 Muhammad Yousaf. He further urges that First'Appellate Court had non-suited the petitioner merely on the ground that specific performance is discretionary relief and when money compensation is an adequate relief, it cannot be granted. He further submits: that the learned High Court had also committed the same error which was committed by the First Appellate Court and decided the case against the petitioner in violation of mandatory provisions of sections 186 and 187 of the Contract Act read with section 27(b) of the Specific Relief Act and section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act.
4. We have considered the submissions made by counsel for the petitioner and perused the record.
The learned High Court had taken a lot of pain to reappraise the evidence on record as evident from paragraph No,3 of the impugned judgment. The relevant portion of the impugned judgment is reproduced hereunder:-- ' Now the question for determination validity of the agreement to sell entered into in between the plaintiff and Muhammad Anwar, defendant No,1, there is nothing on record to establish that Muhammad Anwar, defendant No,1 was or is the owner of the property in question. Nothing has also been placed on record that Muhammad Anwar, defendant No,1 at the time of alleged agreement was having any authority to sell, the property in favour of the plaintiff on behalf of defendants Nos.2 to 7. There is also nothing on record that the power of attorney was shown by Muhammad Anwar at the time of agreement to sell to the plaintiff, and no such power of attorney has been annexed with the plaint and is available before this Court. The defendant No,1 appearing in the witness-box had denied to be having any such authority on behalf of the defendants Nos.2 to 7 to enter into agreement to sell with the plaintiff. Even if it be presumed that Muhammad Anwar was having any authority to enter into an agreement to sell the property, the registered sale-deed with regard to the sale of Plots Nos.156, 157 by the defendants Nos.2 to 7 in favour of the plaintiff belies this contention. Had the defendants Nos.2 to 7 transferred the Plots Nos.152, 153 in favour of the plaintiff then authority in favour of Muhammad Anwar, defendant No,1 to act on behalf of defendants Nos.2 to 7 might have been implied. Apart from this situation, defendants Nos.8 to 10 get a registered sale-deed in their favour of sale of Shop No,13 on 2-7-1985 whereas the Plots Nos.156, 13 1 were transferred in favour of the plaintiff much later in time and that is on 22-9-1986.
Even after the transfer of the Plots Nos. 156, 157 on 22-9-1986, there is nothing on record as to why the plaintiff kept on waiting to institute the suit for specific performance till October, 1988."
5. Mere reading of the aforesaid operative part of the impugned judgment clearly shows that learned High Court had passed the impugned judgment after judicial application of mind. It is a settled law that the jurisdiction under section 12 of the Specific Relief Act is discretionary A and equitable in nature. See Ghulam Nabi's case PLD 1983 SC 344, Syed Arif Shah's case PLD 1991 SC 905, Mrs. Mussarat Shaukat Ali's case 1994 SCM R 2189, Abdul Karim's case 1973 SCM R 225 and Irshad Hussain's case PLD 1994 SC 326 and Abdul Aziz's case 1994 SCM R 111. It is pertinent to mention here that both the Courts below had refused to exercise discretion in favour of the petitioner concurrently with cogent reasons as mentioned in the operative part reproduced hereinabove that respondents Nos.2 to 7 had sold the shop in question to respondents Nos.8 to 10 and sale-deed was also executed in favour of respondents Nos.8 to 10 qua the Shop No,13 in question on 2-7-1985 whereas Plots Nos.156-157 were transferred in favour of the petitioner on 22-9-1986. It is a settled law that registered documents has sanctity attached to it and stronger evidence is required to cast aspersion on its genuineness as law laid down by this Court in Mirza Muhammad Sharif's case NLR 1993 Civil 148. Both the Courts below had given findings of fact against the petitioner with regard to the bona fide purchaser of the property in question. The petitioner had failed to bring the case within the parameters prescribed by the Legislator in its wisdom in section 27(b) of the Specific Relief Act and section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act and the parameters prescribed by this Court in Muhammad Afzal's case PLD 2006 SC 84. It is a settled law that this Court does not normally, meddle in finding of fact recorded by the learned High Court, unless it can be shown that the finding is apparently against the evidence or so patently improbable, or perverse to accept it, could amount to perpetuating a grave miscarriage of justice or if there has been any misapplication of any principle relating to appreciation of evidence or finally, if the finding could be demonstrated to be physical impossible. This being the practice- and the rule of this Court in civil petitions, the burden lies rather heavily on the petitioner, to show that the findings recorded by the High Court are not sustainable on the record and should be interfered, by us. This would be notwithstanding that a different view might also be possible. It is a settled law that constitutional jurisdiction is discretionary in character. He who seeks equity must come with clean hands. Both the Courts below had not exercised discretion in favour of the petitioner with cogent reasons as mentioned above. Therefore, we are not inclined to exercise our discretion in favour of the petitioner as law lai down by this Court in Khuda Bukhsh v. Muhammad Sharif and another 1974 SCM R 279. Even otherwise the registered sale-deed was executed by the respondents Nos.2 to 7 in favour of the respondents Nos.8 to 10 with regard to the property in question before purchasing the same by the petitioner coupled with the fact that the petitioner had not made any inquiry before purchasing the property in question, therefore, petitioner does not deserve any discretionary relief in view of his conduct as law laid down by this Court in Haji Saifullah Khan's case PLD 1989 SC 166.
6. For what has been discussed above, we do not find any merit in this petition which is dismissed.
Leave refused.