1. ' ZAHID HUSSAIN, J. The petitioners who are sons of Wadera Anah Diwaya Khan have through this petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 sought a declaration that they are owners of land measuring 1947 Kanals 10 Marlas of Village Lal Sohara, Tehsil Khairpur Tamiwali, District Bahawalpur and it should not be allotted or disposed of in any manner as a surrendered land under the Land Reforms Act, 1977. Their case primarily is that in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Shariat Appellate Bench of Supreme Court in Qazalbash Waqf and others v. Chief Land Commissioner, Punjab Lahore and others (PLD 1990 SC 99), neither any resumption of the land could be ordered nor the change of entries in the Revenue Record made after the target dated of 23-3-1990 have any effect whatsoever.
2. ' Report and para wise cerements have been filed. The perusal whereof shows that the Deputy Land Commissioner, Bahawalpur had resumed 252 acres, 2 Kanals and 13 Marlas land equivalent to 5215 units) Mauza Lal Soharana vide order dated 27-6-1987, which had not been assailed any further, either by the petitioners or their father. It is further stated that the declarant (Wadera Allah Diwaya Khan the father of the petitioners) had exercised his option to surrender the land of Village Lal Soharana with the consent of his sons (the petitioners), which had become final and since the land had been resumed long before 23-3-1990 the judgment in Qazalbash Waqf case had no effect whatsoever. The learned Assistant Advocate-General Punjab has also produced the relevant file before us.
3. ' This petition was filed in the year 1998 in which only Deputy Land Commissioner, Bahawalpur and Assistant Land Commissioner, Tehsil Khairpur District Bahawalur have been impleaded. Allah Bachaya the occupant of land (the beneficiary) has not been impleaded. It does not make mention of even order dated 27-6-1987 through which the land was resumed. At that time or thereafter till date this resumption order was not assailed. It is not their case in the petition that the petitioners were unaware of all these developments. Indeed order dated 27-6-1987 had been passed in presence of the learned counsel for Wadera Allah Diwaya Khan. It is quite evident that a deliberate attempt was made to bypass the resumption proceedings and order dated 27-6-1987 and a belated attempt has been made through this petition to seek relief on the basis of judgment in Qazalbash Waqf case supra. The reliance of the learned counsel for the petitioner upon the judgment in Qazalbash Waqf case and the cases of Salah-ud-Din Qureshi v. Federal Land Commission and others (1992 CLC 2362), Munir Ahmed and 2 others Chairman Federal Land Commission, Pakistan and another 1994 CLC 20, Muhammad Yusuf Ali Shah v. Federal Land Commission, Government of Pakistan, Rawalpindi and 2 others (1995 CLC 369), Malik Mumtaz Ali Khan v. Additional Deputy Commissioner (Consolidation) Attock, and another (1997 CLC 1634) and Shah Jehan Khan Abbasi v. Deputy Land Commissioner, Bahawalpur and another (2006 SCM R 771) is inapt. In Chief Land Commissioner, Punjab and others v. Chief Administrator of Aucial, Punjab and others (PLD 1988 SC 132), it was observed that "if the excess land had already vested in the Government prior to 23-3-1990, no benefit could be taken of the decision in case of Qazalbash Waqf". The question in that case which engaged the attention of their lordships was "whether in the absence of any action under the Land Reforms laws either on the part of the Waqf or by the Federal Government/Land Reforms Authorities, the land in excess of the permissible limits under the Land Reforms laws automatically vested in the Government on the enactment of he Land Reforms laws".
4. While quoting observations from Qazalbash Waqf case, it was held that "the excess land, if any, of the Waqf did not, automatically, vest in the Government on the promulgation/enactment of the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972/Land Reforms Act, 1977 and, after 23-3-1990, the date fixed by the Qazalbash Waqfi judgment, fresh action could not be initiated by the Land Reforms Authorities against the Waqf," It may however, be mentioned that in the instant case, the proceedings under the Act of 1977 had commenced and concluded long before the judgment in the Qazalbash Waqf case as the effective order in the case had been passed by the Deputy Land A Commissioner, Bahawalpur on 27-6-1987. Mere late entry of mutation would not denude the legal efficacy of order dated 27-61987. It may be observed that in Shah Jehan Khan Abbasi v. Deputy Land Commissioner, Bahawalpur and another (2006 SCM R 771) such a plea based on the judgment in Qazalbash Waqf case was dealt by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan as follows:-- "The crux of the aforesaid rulings is that repugnancy to the Injunctions of Islam, of para. 13 of Land Reforms Regulation is prospective with effect from 23-3-1990. Any positive action towards resumption by the Land Reforms Authorities taken and completed prior to 23-3-1990 shall not be affected by the declaration given by this Court in Qazalbash Waqf case (supra). The law on the point is even otherwise not disputed. What now we have to decide is simply a question of fact as to whether, in the instant case, the Land Reforms Authorities had or had not completed the resumption proceedings prior to 23-3-1990." In view of the resumption order dated 6-4-1981 in that case it was held that "it is, thus, proved on record that in the instant case the material proceedings qua resumption had already been taken much prior to the date (23-3-1990) given by this Court in Qazlabash Waqf case (supra)." Since in the present case the Deputy Land Commissioner had passed order dated 27-6-1987 thus no benefit can be derived by the petitioners from the judgment of the august Court in Qazalbash Waqf case.
5. ' The learned counsel for the petitioners attempted to raise some new points, which according to him were of relevance, but he was reminded that no new case could be set up at this stage of arguments in writ jurisdiction.
6. ' In view of the above, the petition is without merit, which is dismissed accordingly.