' MUHAMMAD JEHANGIR ARSHAD, J.---The petitioner who is accused in case F.I.R. No,333 of 2005 dated 8-8-2005 under section 302, P.P.C. Read with section 10(7) of Offence of Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance VII of 1979 Police Station Saddar Kehror Pacca, is aggrieved of the order dated 26-9-2005 passed by learned Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court No,1, Multan dismissing his application for sending back the file of said case for trial to the Court of ordinary jurisdiction, as according to the petitioner in view of the version recorded in the F.I.R. And the police record it is established that it is a case of simple murder involving no aspect of terrorism, therefore, should be tried by a Court of ordinary jurisdiction and there is no element of section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 on the basis of which section 7 of the said Act has been added in the F.I.R.
2. It is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that although per contents of the F.I.R. It is a case of child molestation with murder and was exclusively triable by Anti-Terrorism Court prior to the amendment in section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, providing a general definition of word "terrorism" and amending third schedule by omitting the offence of child molestation from the scheduk, the intention of the legislature is very much clear that inasmuch as, the legislature did not consider it appropriate to include the offence of child molestation as a schedule offence, therefore, the petitioner had rightly moved application before the learned Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court, Multan for sending the case back to the Court of ordinary jurisdiction which prayer of the petitioner has been wrongly and erroneously refused by the learned Anti-Terrorism Court. The learned counsel for the petitioner alternatively has argued that even on the basis of the present definition of the word "terrorism" given in section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, the present case is not covered by the same and thus the learned Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court while recording his findings wrongly held the same as an act of terrorism in order to equip itself with jurisdiction to try the case.
3. We have considered the arguments of learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the contents of the F.I.R. As well as material available on the record but are not persuaded either with the abovementioned contentions of learned counsel for the petitioner nor tend to agree with the same. In a recent judgment in the case "Mirza Shaukat Baig v. Shahid Jamil" (PLD 2005 SC 530), the Honorable Supreme Court of Pakistan after fully dilating upon the word "terrorism" as provided in section 6 of the Act as well as the question pertaining to the jurisdiction of Anti- Terrorism Court, recorded the following observations:-- ' "After having gone through the entire law as enunciated by this Court in different cases the judicial consensus seems to be that striking of terror is sine qua non for the application of the provisions as contained in section 6 of the Act which cannot be determined without examining the nature, gravity and heinousness of the alleged offence, contents of F.I.R., its cumulative effects on the society or a group of persons and the evidence which has come on record. In so far as the factum of intention is concerned that cannot be evaluated without examining the entire evidence which aspect of the matter squarely falls within the jurisdictional domain of the Court constituted under the Act and such questions cannot be decided by Invocation of constitutional jurisdiction without scrutinizing all the circumstances in a broader prospect by keeping in view the ground realities in mind. There could be no second opinion that where the action of an accused results in striking terror or creating fear, panic, sensation, helplessness and sense of insecurity among the people in a particular vicinity it amounts to terror and such an action squarely falls within the ambit of section 6 of the Act and shall be triable by a Special Court constituted for such purpose. What was the real intention of the offender could only be adjudged on the basis of evidence which cannot be determined by invocation of constitutional jurisdiction and learned Special Judge who is usually a Senior Sessions Judge can take care of the matter which can be transferred by him if it does not fall within his jurisdictional domain. There is no denying the fact that it was a never the intention of legislature that every offender irrespective of the nature of the offence and its overall impact on the society or a section of society must be tried by the Anti-Terrorism Court but the question as to whether such trial shall be conducted or not initially falls within the jurisdictional domain of Anti- Terrorist Court which cannot be interfered with in the absence of sufficient lawful justification which appears to he lacking in these cases. It is, howeyer, obligatory for such Courts to watch carefully the nature of accusation and examine the entire record with diligent application of mind to determine as to whether the proyisions as contained in the Act would prima facie be attracted or otherwise? Where such Courts are of the yiew after taking cognizance of the offence that the alleged offence does not fall pririia facie under the proyisions of the Act it must transfer the same to regular Court without loss of time."
Respectfully following the aboye observation of the apex Court, we are satisfied that the question as to whether the trial of the petitioner be conducted or not by Anti-Terrorism Court initially falls within the domain of the Anti-Terrorism Court and this Court while sitting in constitutional jurisdiction cannot interfere with the discretion of the Anti-Terrorism Court in the absence of any material requiring us to hold otherwise.
4. Even this Court while sitting in constitutional jurisdiction can neither act as an appellate authority nor can substitute its findings for the findings arriyed at by a competent Court/tribunal constituted under the Special Law who has the exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate and decide the matter and while acting in its constitutional jurisdiction this Court has only to see as to whether the judgment/ order impugned in the constitutional petition is with or without jurisdiction. Since, we find that the findings recorded by the learned Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court, Multan holding that the case of the petitioner was triable by Anti-Terrorism Court and the said findings have been recorded by the leamed Judge within the purview of jurisdiction conferred on Anti- Terrorism Court under the said Act, as well as in the light of the law laid down by the Honorable Supreme Court of Pakistan in the cited judgment, we do not feei that these exists any justification for this Court to interfere and sit over the findings of the leamed Judge, Anti- Terrorism Court No,l, Multan and while holding so we are guided by judgment of the Honorable Supreme Court of Pakistan reported as "General Manager, Pearl Continental Hotel, The Mall, Lahore/ Rawalpindi v. Farhat Iqbal" (PLD 2003 SC 952) and "Sardar Hussain and others V. Mst. Parveen Umer and others" (PLD 2004 SC 357). Resultantly, this writ petition has got no force and is accordingly dismissed being not maintainable.