' SH. AZMAT SAEED, J.-This Civil Revision is directed against the consolidated appellate judgment and decree dated 9-5-2005 whereby two appeals filed by the respondents as well as two appeals filed by third parties were accepted and the consolidated judgment and decree passed in favour of the petitioner dated 17-12-2005 was set aside.
2. Brief facts leading to the filing of this civil revision are that the petitioner filed two separate suits for declaration contending therein that he had been awarded a contract for the collection of Toll Tax by the respondents for Mianwali- Muzaffargarh Road (Mianwali to Asif Bridge Section) for an initial period from 1-6-2002 to 30-6-2005 and in accordance with the terms and conditions of the contract the petitioner was entitled for an extension for further period of two years with an enhancement of 5 %. It was prayed that a decree for declaration be passed to the aforesaid effect.
It was further prayed that the respondents be directed to extend the said contract. In the subsequent suit in addition to the above a further prayer was made that the subsequent auction in favour of one Irfan be declared to, be without lawful authority. The defendants in the suit entered appearance and submitted written statements. The two suits were consolidated and on the divergent pleadings of the parties consolidated issues were framed. The parties were put to evidence and such evidence both oral and documentary was recorded. Whereafter the trial Court vide its consolidated judgment dated 17-12-2005 decreed the two suits in favour of the petitioners.
Aggrieved the respondents filed two separate appeals and the subsequent successful bidder also filed two separate appeals against the same judgment and decree dated 17-12-2005, all of which were accepted vide the consolidated impugned appellate judgment and decree dated 9-5-2006.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner and the .Learned Additional Advocate-General have been heard and the record appended with this revision petition has been perused.
4. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that in accordance with the terms and conditions of the contract as is evident from the instructions to bidders, the contract was liable to be extended for further period of two years with the approval of the competent authority. It is contended that in terms of the aforesaid provision a formal application was filed by the petitioner which was forwarded to the Executive Engineer, Highway Authority, Mianwali who with favourable remarks forwarded the same to the Superintending Engineer. The said gentlemen also appended his favourable remarks and sent the matter to the Chief Engineer (South). The said Chief Engineer also recommended the extension and dispatched the matter to the Secretary concerned who vide order dated 6th June, 2005 addressed to the Chief Engineer (South) declined to extend the contract of the petitioner and directed that a fresh reserve price be fixed and re-auction be held for a period of 1-7-2005 to 30-6-2006. The aforesaid facts are not disputed between the parties. In the aforesaid context the learned counsel has contended that in the facts and circumstances of the case the competent authority was the Chief Engineer and in view of his recommendations for extension of the contract the petitioner stood entitled to the extension as prayed for. The learned counsel adds that the contract in question was executed by the said Chief Engineer on behalf of the Governor of the Punjab; hence, for the purpose of the said contract the. Chief Engineer was the competent authority. Thus, the impugned appellate judgment and decree is liable to be set aside.
5. The learned Additional Advocate- General vehemently controverted the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner. It was contended that in view of the provisions of the Punjab Tolls on Roads and Bridges Ordinance, 1962 the lessor was the Government of the Punjab and therefore, by operation of law concerned Secretary, Government of the Punjab was the competent authority for the purposes of the contract in question and its execution. He has further contended that no power for extension of the contract has been delegated to (be Chief Engineer and no such delegation has been proved in evidence by the petitioner during the course of evidence. Malik Zafar Iqbal Awan, learned Additional Advocate-General further stated that even otherwise it is evident from the record that no extension in fact was granted by any authority competent or otherwise.
' Under the contract extension could only be effected through mutual consent and, it is contended, that no such mutual consent of the parties has been pleaded by the petitioner let alone proved through evidence. Even if the Chief Engineer is prescribed to be the competent authority he never agreed to the extension of the contract but merely recommended the same to the higher authority, therefore, it is contended that the petitioner had no cause of action and the suits were not maintainable and have been rightly dismissed by the appellate Court.
6. The learned Additional Advocate- General has also taken exception to the maintainability of the present civil revision. In this behalf he contended that the impugned appellate judgment and decree decided four separate appeals arising from two separate suits yet only one civil revision has been filed. He has further contended that the private defendant in the suit who was also an appellant before the first appellate Court has not been impleaded. Hence, the revision is not competent and liable to be dismissed.
7. At the very outset it may be observed that there appears to be on serious factual controversy between the parties. The facts necessary for adjudication of this civil revision are not in dispute. It is an admitted fact that the contract was awarded by the respondents to the petitioner. The terms and conditions of the contract are on the record and admitted between the parties. The correspondence both between the petitioner and the respondents and between the various respondents and other officers of the department are also in evidence and not disputed by the parties. The only matter in controversy is the interpretation of the extension clause (s) of the contract and its application or otherwise to the facts of the case.
8. In the instructions to bidders. The relevant instruction 3 reads as follows:- ' "The period of contract will be 3-years and 1-month: which will be extendable by another two years (730 days) with the approval of the competent authority at 5% compound increase in the bid cost every year or at an any enhanced amount mutually agreed by the department and the lessee."
' Additional Condition No, 16 reads as follows:- .
' "The period of contract will be 3-years and 1-month (37 months) which will be extendable by another two years with the approval of the competent authority at the enhanced amount mutually agreed by the department and the lessee."
9. A perusal of the aforesaid provisions of the contract when read together leave little room for doubt that period of the contract could be extended for a further period of two years subject to only two conditions firstly, with the consent of the parties and secondly with the approval of the competent authority. It is not even the case of the petitioner that the petitioner alone had a unilateral right for the extension of the contract nor are the provisions of the contract reproduced above couched in such language which would imply such a right. There is nothing in the terms reproduced above which can be read to matter that either party can force the other to continue with the contract for an extended period without its consent. A perusal of the plaint and the evidence produced by the parties make it clear and obvious that the respondents nor any officer competent or otherwise thereof ever communicated the consent of the respondents for the extension of the contract. At best it is the case of the petitioner that he made an offer for extending the contract which was admittedly never accepted. Some officers of the department in their internal correspondence only recommended the extension vide letter dated 6-6-2005 Exh.P.8 the petitioner was informed that the contract cannot be enhanced and his offer had been declined.
Thus, in the absence of the consent of the respondents to the extension of the contract no right was conferred upon the petitioner which came within the purview of section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, hence the first appellate Court has rightly held that the suit was not maintainable and liable to be dismissed.
10. Furthermore there can be no escape from the fact that the contract was between the petitioner and the Government of the Punjab which exercises powers through its concerned Secretary who would be the competent authority unless such powers were delegated to some other officer. No such, delegation is on the record therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case the first appellate Court has rightly held that it has not been proved that the Chief Engineer was the competent authority. Be that as it may, as has been stated above, the Chief Engineer also admittedly never extended the period of the contract. '
11. It has also been noticed as has been pointed out by the learned Additional Advocate-General, Punjab that a single civil revision against the consolidated appellate judgment and decree pertaining to four separate appeals arising out from two separate suits was not competent especially in the absence of a defendant who was also an appellant before the first appellate Court.
12. The upshot of the above is that the civil revision is without any merit. There is no material irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction by the first appellate Court. Consequently, this petition must fail and is hereby dismissed. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.