' KARAM ELAHEE CHAUHAN, J.-The Government of the Punjab by means of a notification bearing No, 16-14-H-Spl. 11/77 dated 5th August, 1979, published in the Extraordinary Issue of the Punjab Gazette, of the even date (at page 1237) and issued under section 3 of the West Pakistan Tribunals of Inquiry Ordinance II of 1969, ordered the appointment of Mr. Khalid Pal Khawaja, District and Sessions Judge, Rawalpindi, as one man tribunal to hold an inquiry into "a conflict going on between the sons of late Nawab Malik Amir Muhammad Khan of Kalabagh and the "Baghochi Muh'az" led by Amir Abdullah Khah Advocate". 'The said notification which is quite comprehensive on the subject reads as follows :- "Home Department Notification ' The 5th August, 1979, ' No, 16-14-H-Spl.-11/77-Whereas there has been a conflict going between the sons of late Nawab Amir Muhammad Khan of Kalabagh and the "Baghochi Mohaz led by Amir Abdullah Advocate ; and ' And whereas in view of the serious allegations made by the aforesaid parties against each other it has become a matter of public importance and it is necessary to hold an inquiry in the interest of maintenance of peace and order in the area.
' Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred on it under section 3 of the West Pakistan Tribunals of Inquiry Ordinance, 1969 the Government of the Punjab orders the appointment of Mr. Khalid Pal Khawaja, District and Sessions Judge, Rawalpandi as one man Tribunal to hold an inquiry into the aforesaid conflict.
' The Government of Punjab is further pleased to order that all the provisions as mentioned in subsections (2), (3), (4), (5), (6) of section 5 of the West Pakistan Tribunals of Inquiry Ordinance 1969 shall apply to the aforesaid Tribui.Al.
' The Tribunal will complete its inquiry within a fortnight from the date on which it starts its proceedings.
' The terms of reference will be as follows :
(1) The alleged abduction of Hafiz Abdur Rahim and Qazi Ghulam Murtaza brothers of Amir Abdullah Advocate, Mianwali by Nawabzadgan of Kalabagh who are still said to be untraced.
(2) The allegation of attrocities committed by Nawabzadgan of Kala Bagh on Tariq Niazi and Khalid Niazi, students and others.
(3) The creation of Baghochi Muhaz and its object.
(4) The alleged establishment of Begar Camps and private jails of Nawabzadgan in order to confine their political rivals.
(5) The allegation that the Baghochi Muhaz is being patronised by Amir Abdullah Rokheri, ex-M. P.
A. And Abdul Sattar Khan Niazi, General Secretary, J. U. P. On account of political rivalry with Nawabzadgan.
(6) Immediate reasons of the agitation against Nawabzadgan launched by Baghochi Muhaz with effect from 5th July, 1979.
(7) Anything relevant to the above terms of reference which may come to the notice of the learned Inquiry Officer.
S. K. Mahmud, Secretary to Government of Punjab, Home Department, Additional Chief Secretary, Punjab."
2. Malik Muzaffar Khan petitioner son of the late Nawab Malik Amir Muhammad Khan filed a constitutional petition being W. P. 4195/79 challenging the vires and validity of the aforesaid order and notification but without any success as the same was dismissed by a learned single Judge of the Lahore High Court On 4th August, 1979,
3. The petitioner filed an Inter-Court Appeal (being I. C. A. No, 264/ 79) which also met the same fate and was dismissed by a learned Division Bench of the Lahore High Court on 4th September, 1979. The petitioner has come up in a petition for special leave to appeal against the same to this Court, which is being heard after issuing notice to the learned Advocate-General.
4. The first point argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner was that the West Pakistan Tribunals of Inquiry Ordinance II of 1969 (hereinafter called the Ordinance) was promulgated on 14th April, 1969 A during the Martial Law of General Agha Muhammad Yaha Khan, the then President and Chief Martial Law Administrator. The said Martial Law according to the learned counsel came to an end on 20th April, 1972, with the issuance of the "Proclamation of withdrawal of Martial Law" wherein it was laid down that the Martial Law was "hereby" withdrawn which according to the learned counsel meant w. e. f. 20th April, 72,-the date of that proclamation as distinct from the date of the relevant Gazette which was 22nd April, 1972. According to the learned counsel the result of this withdrawal was that all laws including the above Ordinance made during the regime of General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan who in Miss Asma Jilani v. Government of the Punjab and another (I) had been declared to be a usurper lapsed automatically. The Interim Constitution, however, came into force from the commencing day i.e,, 21st April, 1972 with the result that laws which had lapsed on 20th April, 1972 were not existing laws which could have continued under Article 280 of the Interim Constitution. The contention has no merit and was squarely dealt with in Mehreen Zaid-un-Nisa v. Land Commissioner, etc. (2) to which one of us was a party. Para. 5 of that judgment which dealt with this subject reads as follows :- "At this state, learned counsel for the petitioners advanced another plea. They submitted that assuming, without conceding, that Martial Law Regulation 128 came into force with effect from 20th April, 1972, then its very coming into force is illegal because the Martial Law itself ceased to be operative with effect from zero-hour of the night between 19th and 20th of April, 1972, as laid down in the Promlamation of Withdrawal of Martial Law hereinbefore quoted. This is not correct. If the Proclamation of Withdrawal of Martial Law reproduced in Para. 2 (b) earlier is carefully perused, it shows, as it recites, that, The Chief Martial Law Administrator and \president of Pakistan promised to withdraw the Martial Law on the enforcement of the Interim Constitution." The date of enforcement of the Interim Constitution being the night between 20/21st April,1972-(spoken generally as 21st April 1972)-the Martial Law came to an end at zero-hour on the night between 20th/21st April, 1972. Learned counsel for the petitioners laid emphasis on the words "hereby withdrawn" occurring in Proclamation of Withdrawal of Martial Law and submitted that it meant withdrawal of and with effect from 20th April, 1972. This plea has no force. The word "hereby" has reference to date, time and terminus quoted in Para 2 of the Preamble and connects only fulfilment of the promise recited therein. In other words it means "hereby withdrawn" in accordance with the promise made that is with effect from the commencing day. At this stage, it is furthecto point out that date
(1) PLD 1972 SC 139 (2) PLD 1974 Note 115 at p. 168 ' 20th April, 1972 of Proclamation of Withdrawal of Martial. Law has been corrected by a Corrigenda published in Extraordinary Gazette of Pakistan dated 21st May, 1973 so as to read 21st April, 1972. This shows that the publication of date as 20th April, 1972 at the most was, if at all, a printing and clerical mistake. This is also clear from Article 280 (2) of the Interim Constitution as well, where it is written that, "the proclamation made on the twenty-fifth day of March, 1969, is revoked with effect as from the commencing day." Any argument on any other assumption is based on simple miscalculation and cannot be accepted for the simple reason that it will lead to holding that for one day there was a complete vacuum and the Country was without any lawful Order, System or Constitutional pattern. Obviously we cannot endorse such a destructive approach."
' The aforesaid judgment was maintained by this Court in Mehreen Zaibun Nisa v. Land Commissioner, Multan and others (1). The following passage on page 440 of the judgment is instructive to be reproduced :-- "It was contended at the Bar that as the Chief Martial Law Administrator had withdrawn Martial Law with effect from the midnight between the 19th and 20th of April, 1972, by means of. a Proclamation made on the 20th of April, 1972, there was no longer any authority in him to issue Martial Law Regulations on the 20th of April, 1972. This contention was also raised in the High Court, but was rightly repelled. In the first place, by a corrigendum published in an Extraordinary Gazette of Pakistan, dated the 21st of June, 1973, the date of the Proclamation of Withdrawal Martial Law has been corrected so as to read 21st April, 1972. In the second place, the opening words of this proclamation itself make it clear that it was being issued in implementation of the promise made by the Chief Martial Law Administrator and President of Pakistan to withdrawal the Martial Law on the enforcement of the Interim Constitution. That Constitution came into force on the 21st of April, 1972, and not on the 20th of April, 1972. The proclamation was, therefore, clearly intended to withdraw Martial Law with effect from the 21st of April, 1972. Finally, as pointed out by the learned Judges of the Sind & Baluchistan High Court in Asad Ali v. Settlement & Claims Commissioner, Karachi (2), the Proclamation of withdrawal of Martial Law was issued ex-abundanti cautele as the Proclamation of Martial Law made on the 25th day of March 1969 stood revoked with effect from the commencing day of the Interim Constitution by clause (2) of Article 280 thereof. Even if, therefore the Chief Martial Law. Administrator had not issued a Proclamation of withdrawal, Martial Law would have in any case come to an end on the commencing day with the enforcement of the Interim Constitution. It is, therefore, not correct to say that there was no power in the Chief Martial Law Administrator to make Martial Law Regulation 128 on the 20th of April, 1972."
' In the face of the above statement of law the plea raised by the learned counsel fails and is hereby repelled. The learned counsel was unable to point out any new factor or dimension warranting re-examination of that view.
(1) PLD 1975 SC 397 (2) PLD 1974 Kar. 345
5. The next point argued was that even though Ordinance II of 1969 was promulgated during the Martial Law of General Agha Muhammad Yaha Khan but as in its very nature it was an "Ordinance" therefore according to the very concept of that type of legislation such an Ordinance lapsed within six weeks of the next session of the Provincial Assembly under Article 135 (2) of the Interim Constitution and thereafter it ceased to remain operative in any form. The contention has no force.
The aforesaid Article applied to Ordinances made after the promulgation of the Interim Constitution whereas for the continuation of existing laws (i. e. Existing on 21st April, 1972 as was the present Ordinance) the relevant provision is Article 280 (1) which stated that "Except as provided by this Article, all existing laws shall, subject to this Constitution, continue in force, so far as applicable and with the necessary adaptations, until altered, repealed or amended by the appropriate Legislature." As it is not the case of the petitioner that the aforesaid Ordinance has been repealed therefore the plea raised fails. For the meanings of word "until" see Hashmat All v. Abdul Karim and another (1) where with reference to corresponding Article 225 (1) of 1962 Constitution and section 292 of the Government of India Act; 1935, it was laid down that when used with reference to authorising continuation of the old laws for example by. Saying "until" altered, repealed or amended, this word connotes and means that "so long as "they are not altered, repealed or amended they would continue in operation, and from that point of vies, if we can say so such a provision gives a new sanction for the continuation of such laws as aforesaid. At this place it may further be pointed out that Article 270 (1) of 1973 Constitution provided a new scheme for validating laws passed between 25th March, 1969 and 19th December, 1971 (the period of: Martial Law of General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan)-authorising the Parliament to validate them.
Consequently the Parliament passed a law known as the "validation of Laws Act LXIII of 1975" gazetted on 29th July, 1975. Section 2 whereof laid down that the laws mentioned in the schedule are hereby declared to have been validly made by a competent authority". The Ordinance in question figures at serial No, I of head "V-West Pakistan Ordinancess. This is to be read with Article 268 (1) of 1973 Constitution which is similarly worded as Article 280 of the Interim Constitution and sanctions continuation of "existing laws onward from the commencing day namely 14th August, 1973. In this way the Ordinance in question which was an "existing law" at the time of the Interim Constitution, continued to remain an "existing law" at the time of the promulgation of 1973 Constitution, and then was authorised to continue further thereunder, and was also validated as hereinbefore mentioned. There was thus no break in the continuity of this Ordinance from the date of its promulgation and it still continues to remain a valid law of the land as explained above.
6. Learned counsel then referred to section 3 of the Ordinance which is headed as Appointment of Tribunal, Commission or Committee of Inquiry" and so far as relevant lays down that "(1)
Government may if it is of opinion that it is necessary so to do, by notification in the official Gazette, appoint a Tribunal, Commission or Committee of Inquiry for the purpose of making an inquiry into any definite matter of public importance and performing such function and within such time as may be specified in the notification and the Tribunal, Commission or Committee so appointed
(I) PLD 1968 Lan. 188 ' Shall make the inquiry and perform the functions accordinlgy " It was submitted that this section purported to bestow very wide powers on the Tribunal, without any guiding or controlling principles and therefore suffered from the defect of "excessive 'delegation" which according to the learned counsel meant that legislation was essentially a function of the legislature, which could not abdicate the same in favour of any other agency or authority and nor could it in that respect bestow excessive and uncontrolled powers on them. Apart from the fact that this Ordinance whatever its form and shape was allowed by the Constitution to continue as stated earlier because it fell in the category of the relevant existing laws" under Article 280, even otherwise its aforesaid section has not been shown to us to suffer from any such defect as was being suggested by the learned counsel. In fact after raising the argument the learned counsel could not develop it any further to support his plea by pointing out as to in what form, shape or manner it suffered from any alleged infirmity. The objection raised consequently fails.
8. The last point argued was that if not section 3 at least the impugned notification purported to bestow excessive and uncontrolled powers and jurisdiction on the Tribunal and was not specific or definite on points of reference or authority of the Tribunal. This again is not correct. The! Notification as above reproduced clearly shows that it is confined to definite subjects or objects mentioned therein and the matters relevant thereto. The notification when read with the main Ordinance appears to he quite comprehensive and specific and within the scope of the said Ordinance.
Learned counsel did not point out any item to which he could legitimately take Objection.
9. No other point was argued before us.
19. The result is that learned counsel has not been able to make out any case warranting grant of leave to appeal. The petition has no merit and is dismissed.