' This is an Intra-Court Appeal preferred against the order of learned Single Judge dated 4th August, 1979 passed in Writ Petition No, 4195 of 1979.
2. The facts leading to this appeal are that the Government of the Punjab appointed Mr. Khalid Paul Khawaja, District and Sessions Judge, Rawalpindi as a Tribunal for the purpose of making an inquiry into the affairs of Kalabagh and Baghochi Muhaz of Mianwali. The terms of reference of inquiry are contained in Annexure 'A' to the writ petition which need not be enumerated here.
3. The appellant filed the aforementioned writ petition challenging the appointment of the Tribunal on the ground that under section 3 of the West Pakistan Tribunals of Inquiry Ordinance, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as Ordinance II of 1969, the appointment can be made only by a notification published in the official Gazette for the purpose of making an inquiry into any definite matter of public importance and performing such functions and within such time as may be specified in the notification. It was also contended that since no notification, as required by section 3, was issued or published in the official Gazette, the Tribunal nominated by the Government could not be deemed to have been appointed as such and could not proceed with the inquiry.
4. The learned Single Judge in his order dated 4th August, 1979 has held that the argument of the learned Counsel for-the appellant was correct to the extent that unless a notification was published in the official Gazette, the Tribunal could not be treated to have been properly and legally appointed and could not, therefore, start the inquiry. Learned Advocate-General appearing for the respondents before the learned Single Judge agreed that no notification was issued as yet, although respondent No, 3 had been nominated to hold the inquiry. The writ petition was dismissed with the above observation and, thus, in a way the grievance of the appellant was redressed.
5. In view of the position taken up by the appellant in his writ petition, the Government of Punjab on 5th August, 1979 issued the requisite notification as contemplated by section 3 of Ordinance II of 1969.
6. The present appeal has now been filed against the order dated 4th August, 1979 of the learned Single Judge on altogether a different ground which was neither raised in the grounds of writ petition nor during the arguments before the learned Single Judge. Raja Muhammad Anwar, learned counsel for the appellant has contended that since the new ground pertains to jurisdiction he can legally raise it even at the appeal stage because the appeal is the continuation of the same proceedings. The point being raised in the appeal is that Ordinance IT of 1969 was promulgated on 10th April, 1969 by Governor of West Pakistan in pursuance of Martial Law Proclamation of 25th March, 1969 read with the Provisional Constitution Order which was made in pursuance of Proclamation of 25th March, 1969 and came into force on the said date. It is contended that though the abovesaid Ordinance II of 1969 was not subject to limitation, as laid down in the Constitution of 1962 with regard to Ordinance, within the meaning of Article 4 of the Provisional Constitution Order yet the Proclamation of 25th March, 1969 having been withdrawn on 20th April, 1972, the Ordinance also died along therewith on the said date. It is further contended that since the Ordinance II of 1969 had died on 20th April, 1972, it was not an existing law and being dead law, not on. The statute book, the Government of the Punjab had no authority under the said Ordinance to appoint Tribunal or Committee of Inquiry, etc., because the proceedings taken thereunder would be coram non judice.
7. The general rule of law is that a party cannot be allowed to file an appeal when the order or decree of the lower Court was not against him and it is also the requirement of law that if a party wishes to appeal against a finding, he should first get it embodied in the order or the decree. There are, however, recognized exceptions to the above rule, for example, where there is objection as to jurisdiction apparent on the face of record or a plea going to the root of the case or a question of law or a constitutional issue raised for the first time upon fact either admitted or proved beyond controversy. In such circumstances, it is not only expedient but also essential in the interest of justice to entertain such pleas. 'Though objection was raised by the learned Advocate-General appearing on behalf of the respondents, yet we have permitted the appellant to raise the above constitutional issue in the interest of justice. Moreover, Court can allow a new point to be raised when there is no real prejudice to the opposite party and B the point is one on which now evidence is necessary.
8. The Intra-Court Appeal was not admitted. However, before the admission, the learned Advocate- General of Punjab was called upon to argue the case on behalf of the respondents. We have treated the appeal as having been admitted and the same will be disposed of as such, as both parties were represented before us.
9. Mr. Muhammad Arif, Advocate-General, appearing on behalf of the respondents has on the other hand argued that Ordinance II of 1969 was not subject to any limitation as to its duration under Article 4 (1) of the Provisional Constitution Order and in view of the provisions of Articles 280 and 281 of the Interim Constitution, all laws existing immediately before its commencing day were saved and provided with a blanket of validation. He has further contended that by the Validation of Laws Act, 1975 (Act LXIII of 1975), the laws mentioned in its Schedule were declared to have been validly made by competent authority and the questioned Ordinance II of 1969 is appearing at Serial No, 1 of West Pakistan Ordinances. Thus, according to him, Ordinance II of 1969 is not a dead law and is very much alive on the statute book and the point raised on behalf of the appellant is, therefore, misconceived.
10. In order to appreciate the points raised by the parties, it shall be necessary to examine various provisions of law. A. M. Yahya Khan by a Proclamation of Martial Law, published in the Gazette of Pakistan, Extraordinary, 4th April, 1969, had declared to have taken powers as Chief Martial Law Administrator and assumed the office of President of Islamic Republic of Pakistan since 25th March, 1969 and had taken upon himself to exercise the said powers and all other powers enabling him in that behalf. Proclamation of Martial Law on 25th March, 1969, published in the Gazette of Pakistan, Extraordinary of the same date, declared that the whole of Pakistan shall be under Martial Law with immediate effect and A. M. Yahya Khan assumed the powers of Chief Martial Law Administrator and the command of all the Armed Forces of Pakistan. By this Proclamation, the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan was also abrogated. Provisional Constitution Order was promulgated on 4th April, 1969 in pursuance of Proclamation of 25th March, 1969.. The relevant Article of this Order is Article 4 which will be discussed later.
11. West Pakistan Tribunals of Inquiry Ordinance (II of 1969) was promulgated in pursuance of the Proclamation of Martial Law of 25th March, 1969 read with the Provisional Constitution Order. This Ordinance was promulgated on 10th April, 1969 and was published in the Gazette of West Pakistan Extraordinary, 14th April, 1969. Ordinance II of 1969 provided particularly for the appointment of a Tribunal, Commission or Committee of Inquiry for the purpose of making an inquiry into any definite matter of public importance. Under the provisions of the 1962 Constitution, the Ordinances were valid only for certain duration and thereafter they were required to be placed before the Assembly, but Article 4 of the Provisional Constitution Order provided that an Ordinance promulgated by the President or by the Governor of a Province shall not be subject to limitation as to its duration prescribed in the said Constitution. Thus. Ordinance 11 of 1969 was not required to be placed before the Assembly and was of indefinite duration.
12. In the case of Miss Asma Jilani v. Government of the Punjab and another (1) the Supreme Court of Pakistan examined the question relating to the nature of Martial Law. Its validity, etc. The judgment in the cited case was announced on 20th April. 1972 and it was held that A. M. Yahya Khan was a usurper and all laws made by him were illegal in that case, question arose whether everything (legislative measures and other acts) done during his illegal regime, whether good or bad, can be treated in such a manner and branded as illegal and of no legal effect. It was held "Grave responsibility, in such circumstances, rests upon Courts not to do anything which might make confusion worse confounded or create a greater state of chaos if that can possibly he avoided consistently with their duty to decide in accordance with law. Acts done by those actually in control without lawful authority may be recognized as valid or acted upon by the Courts within certain limitations, on principles of necessity. There is no doubt that a usurper may do things both good and bad, and he may have during the period of usurpation also made many Regulations or taken actions which would be valid if emanating from a lawful Government and which may well have, in the course of time, affected the enforcement of contracts, the celebration of marriages, the settlement of estates, the transfer of property and similar subjects. All these cannot be invalidated and the country landed once again into confusion? Such a principle, has also been adopted in America in various cases which came up after the suppression of the rebellion of the Southern States and the American Courts too adopted the policy that where the acts done by the usurper were "necessary to peace and good order among citizens and had affected property or contractual rights they should not be invalidated", not because they were legal but because they would cause inconvenience to innocent persons and lead to further difficulties.
' Recourse therefore has to be taken to the doctrine of necessity where the ignoring of it would result in disastrous on sequences to the body politic and upset the social order itself but one has to disagree with the view that this is a doctrine for validating the illegal acts of usurpers. This doctrine can be invoked in aid only after the Court has come to the conclusion that the acts of the usurpers were illegal and illegitimate. It is only than that the question arises as to how many of his acts, legislative or otherwise, should be condoned or maintained, notwithstanding their illegality in the wider public interest. This principle would be called a principle of condonation and not legitimization."
(1) PLD 1972 SC 139 ' The period of Martial Law under A. M. Yahya Khan was from 25th March, 1969 to 20th December, 1971 on which date he had passed on the power to Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the leader of the majority party in West Pakistan who had assumed the office as Chief Martial Law Administrator and then promulgated the Interim Constitution.
13. Mr. Zulfigar Ali Bhutto as Chief Martial Law Administrator and President of Pakistan promulgated the Proclamation of withdrawal of Martial Law which was published in the Gazette of Pakistan, Extraordinary, 21st April, 1972. The Interim Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan was adopted and enacted by the National Assembly of Pakistan in its meeting held on 17th April, 1972 and the assent to this Constitution was also given on the same day. However, the Constitution came into force on 21st April, 1972 which, according to clause (2) of Article I, is referred to as the commencing day. The relevant provisions of this Constitution are Articles 280 and 281, clauses (1) and (2) of Article 280 provide :- "(1) Except as provided by this Article, all existing taws shall, subject to this Constitution, continue in force, so far as applicable and with the necessary adaptations, until altered, repealed or amended by the appropriate Legislature. (2). The Proclamation made on the twenty-fifth day of March, 1969, is revoked with effect as from the commencing day, and the Orders specified in the Sixth Schedule and any Orders amending those Orders are repealed with effect as from that day, but this clause shall not affect any existing laws made under those Orders."
' Clause (8) of Article 280 is also important for the purpose of this appeal, which reads : "(8) In this Article, "existing laws"' means all laws (including Ordinances, Orders-in-Council, Orders, rules, bye-laws, regulations and Letters Patent constituting a High Court, and any notifications and other legal instruments having the force of law) in force in Pakistan or any part of Pakistan, or having extra-territorial validity, immediately before the commencing day."
Article 281 (1) of the Interim Constitution provided that "all Proclamations. President's Orders, Martial Law Regulations, Martial Law Orders, and all other laws made as from the twenty-fifth day of March, 1969, are hereby declared, notwithstanding any judgment of any Court, to have been validly made by competent authority, and shall not be called in D question in any Court". It is, thus, clear from the above provisions that Ordinance H of 1969 was declared, notwithstanding any judgment of any Court, to have been validly made by competent authority, and shall not b.: called in question in any Court. It will be pertinent to point out that Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who assumed the powers from A. M.
Yahya Khan on 20th December, 1971, acted as such till 21st April, 1972 when he was accepted as President under the Interim Constitution.
14. The Interim Constitution was replaced by the permanent Constitution which was passed by the National Assembly on 10th April, 1973 and authenticated by the President of the National Assembly on 12th April, 1973. It came into force on 14th August, 1973. The relevant provisions of this Constitution for the purpose of this appeal are Articles 268, 269 and 270. Clauses (1) and (7) of Article 268 are synonymous to clauses (1) and (8) of Art. 280 of the Interim Constitution reproduced above. Article 269 has provided a blanket of validation td laws made between 20th December. 1971 and 20th April, 1972 (both days inclusive) notwithstanding any judgment of any Court. Article 270 provided temporary validation of certain laws made between 25th March. 1969 and 19th December, 1971 and clause (2) of this Article provided that notwithstanding a judgment of any Court. a law made by Parliament under clause (1) shall not be questioned in any Court on any ground, whatsoever.
Clause (3) of this Article provides that "notwithstanding the provisions of clause (I) and a judgment of any Court to the contrary, for a period of two years from the commencing day. The validity of all such instruments as are referred to in clause (1) shall not be called in question before any Court on any ground whatsoever." In pursuance of the provisions of Article 270 of the 1973 Constitution, the Parliament validated the laws made between 25th March, 1969 and 19th December. 1971 by enacting Validation of Laws Act. 1975 (Act LXIII of 1975), section 2 whereof provides-"The laws mentioned in the Schedule are hereby declared to have been validly made by competent authority." Ordinance of 1969 appears at Serial No, 1 in Chapter V of West Pakistan Ordinances. The Validation of Laws Act came into force on 24th July, 1975 and was published in the Gazette of Pakistan, Extraordinary, 29th July, 1975. This date falls within the period of two years from the commencing day of the 1973 Constitution, i,e,, 14th August, 1973, as provided by clause (3) of Article 270.
15. After enumerating the relevant provisions of various laws and the Interim as well as the permanent Constitutions, now we propose to deal with the arguments raised by the learned counsel for the appellant. The precise point raised by Raja Muhammad Anwar, learned counsel for the appellant is that the Proclamation of Martial Law having been withdrawn on 20th April, 1972, Ordinance. II of 1969 having been made thereunder also died on the said date and the Interim Constitution having come into force on 21st April, 1972 could not, by the provisions of Articles 280 and 281, save this Ordinance because there was a gap of one day and a dead law could not be revived. The argument, in view of various provisions of law which will be just discussed, is fallacious and misconceived. The general law is that where an enactment is expressed to come into force on a particular day, it shall be construed to have come into force on the expiration of the previous day ; and where an enactment is expressed to expire, lapse, withdrawn or otherwise cease to have effect on a particular day, it shall be construed as ceasing to have effect upon the commencement of the following day. The above statement of law is based upon the principle that law takes no cognizance of a fraction of a day. Keeping in view the above principle of law, the Proclamation of 25th March, 1969 and the Provisional Constitution Order having been withdrawn on 20th April, 1972, these laws shall be construed to have ceased upon the commencement of the following day, i,e,, 21st April, 1972. Likewise, the Interim Constitution shall be construed to have come into force on the expiration of the previous day, i,e,, 20th April, 1972. Thus, there was no overlapping and gap of one day as suggested by the learned Counsel for the appellant. We are supported in our view by a Supreme Court ruling in the case of Khalid M. Ishaque. Ex-Advocate General, Lahore v.
The Hon'ble Chief Justice and the Judges of the High court of West Pakistan, Lohore (1) wherein it was held :- "A proper answer to the difficulty brought out in the questions from the Bench probably lay, not in any reference to the facts as to the moment of signing of the different orders or the moment of notification, but on a legal foundation developed by analogy to section 5 (3) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, which provides that unless the contrary be expressed, a Central Act shall be construed as coming into operation immediately on the expiration of the day preceding its commencement'. Thus, if the commencement be declared to take effect on a particular day, say the 6th January 1964 the Act would be deemed to come into force immediately after the stroke of midnight of the 5th January, 1964. Equally, if the Act were expressed to come into effect on the granting of assent thereto, then if that assent was given on the 6th January 1964, the operation of the order would still commence from mid-night on the 5th January 1964. The analogy lies in this, namely, that an order made under section 1 (2) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908, applying that law, to a place where it previously had not applied, is substantially an act of legislation, which would take effect from the earliest moment of the day on which the order is made, in the same way as an Act of a legislative authority takes effect from the earliest moment of the day which is the day of its commencement. If authority be sought on this point, it may be found in the judgment of the Federal Court in this case of Sobho Gyanchandani (PLD 1952 FC 29)."
' Similar view was earlier expressed in In re : Court Fees (2) as follows "The distinction appears to me to be vital and reconciles all the cases referred to in the argument. I think the rule that emerges is this. Where a statute fixed only the terminus a quo of a state of things, which is envisaged as to last indefinitely, the common law rule obtains that you ought to neglect fractions of a day and the statute or regulation or order takes effect from the first moment of the day on which it is enacted or passed, that is to say, from mid-night of the day preceding the day on which it is promulgated where, on the other hand, statute delimits a period marked both by a terminus a quo and a terminus ad quem the former is to be excluded and the latter to be included in the reckoning. This notification clearly falls within the former class and must be taken to have come into force on the first second of the 5th May, that is to say from mid-night of the 4th May. It follows that the plaints filed on the 5th May are liable to the enhanced fees laid down by the Regulation."
16. The argument of the learned counsel can also be repelled on the interpretation of the provisions of Proclamation of withdrawal of Martial Law made on 20th April 1972 which was published in the Gazette of Pakistan, Extraordinary, 21st April 1972. The preamble of this declaration will make .The intention of its maker obvious and clear. It says : "Whereas the Chief Martial Law Administrator and President of Pakistan promised to withdraw the Martial Law on the enforcement of the Interim Constitution".
(1) PLD 1966 SC 628 (2) AIR 1924 Mad. 257 ' The words "on the enforcement of the Interim Constitution" are significant in this context. The withdrawal of Proclamation of 25th March 1969 would be construed to cease to have effect on the enforcement of the Interim Constitution. Thus, there was no gap as contended by the learned counsel.
17. The next argument of the learned Counsel was that Ordinance If of 1969 was not an existing law on 21st April 1972 as the Proclamation of 25th March 1969 had ceased to have effect on 20th April, 1972 and the said Ordinance, therefore, also died with it. Learned Counsel has also, in the same strain, taken objection to the commencing day and has argued that the commencing day, according to Article 1 (2) of the Constitution was 21st April, 1972. This argument is also not tenable.
Article 280, clause (2) of the Interim Constitution will be helpful in discovering the intention of the Legislature. With regard to the revocation of Proclamation of 25th March 1969 and its effect, clause
(2) lays down that the Proclamation made on 25th March 1969 is revoked with effect as from the commencing day, which would clearly mean that the Proclamation ceased to have effect on 21st April, 1972. Here, we may refer once again to the preamble of the Proclamation of withdrawal of Martial Law which provides "Whereas the Chief Martial Law Administrator and the President of Pakistan promised to withdraw the Martial Law on the enforcement of the Interim Constitution".
Reading these provisions together, it is clear that the intention of the Law-maker was that the Proclamation of 25th March 1969 would cease to have effect on the commencing day of the Interim Constitution, i. e., 21st April, 1972. Reverting to the question of existing law, we may refer to clause (8) of Article 280 of the Interim Constitution which provides that existing laws mean "all laws-in force in Pakistan or any part of Pakistan or having extra-territorial validity immediately before the commencing day" to which a cover was given by clause (1) of Article 280 providing that all laws shall, subject to this Constitution, continue in force. So, Ordinance II of 1969 has got the force of law and under the provisions of this Article shall be considered to be a valid and existing law. Article 280 when read with Article 281 of the Interim Constitution will further make the point clear. Article 281 had given a blanket of validation to all laws made from 25th March 1969 till the commencing day of the. Interim Constitution to have been validly made by competent authority and also provided that they shall not be called in question in any Court. In view of these provisions, no objection can be taken to the validity of Ordinance II of 1969. Proclamation of withdrawal of Martial Law should be read alongwith Articles 280 and 281 of the Interim Constitution in order to know the true intention of the law-maker. It is elementary rule of construction that effect must be given to every part and every word of the Constitution and it is the duty of the Court to consider the entire provisions for ascertaining the true intention and meaning of any particular provision .
18. Moreover, the nature of the Proclamation of withdrawal of Martial Law if considered in the context of political happenings and the findings of the Supreme Court in Asma Jilani's case, is nothing but a mere declaration of Chief Martial Law Administrator having no legal sanction. The Constitution, even though interim, adopted and enacted by the National Assembly of Pakistan on 17th April, 1972, must be placed on a high level than a mere proclamation made on 20th April, 1972 by Chief Martial Law Administrator and which proposed to do nothing but merely proclaimed, the decisions and actions already made and taken by the Interim Constitution on 17th April, 1972. In this regard, reference to Article 280 (2) of the interim Constitution will shed light on the nature and legal value of the Proclamation of withdrawal made on 20th April, 1972. Article 280 (2) provides: "the Proclamation made on the twenty-fifth day of March, 1969 is revoked with effect as from the commencing day-". The commencing day according to Article 1 (2) of the Interim Constitution was 21st April, 1972. Some of the principles of interpretation applying to a Constitution are a follows:
(a) The Constitution is a fundamental or organic or supreme law standing on a somewhat higher position than other laws of the country.
(b) The Constitution is the source from which all governmental power emanates and it defines its scope and ambit so that each functionary should act within his respective sphere.
(c) The Constitution has to be construed like any other document reading it as a whole and giving to every part a meaning consistent with the other provisions of the Constitution.
(d) As far as possible, each provision should be construed so as to harmonize with all the other.] ' Applying the above rules of interpretation, we hold that the Proclamation of withdrawal of Martial Law made on 20-4-72 by the Chief Martial G Law Administrator was a mere proclamation having no legal basis. Even if it is treated as legal document, it cannot be treated as supra-constitutional.
It shall take effect only as sub-constitutional document to be used in aid of interpretation of constitution. For giving effect to the provisions of Article 280 (2) of the Interim Constitution, the Proclamation of withdrawal of Martial Law shall be treated as subordinate to the Interim Constitution or can only be used in aid for the interpretation of the Interim Constitution. In Asma Jilani's case, the Supreme Court has held A. M. Yahya Khan as a usurper and that he had no authority to make laws and the argument of the learned Counsel for the appellant, if accepted, would lead us to hold. That Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto assumed power from a usurper on 20th December. 1971 and remained his successor till the commencement of the Interim Constitution on 21st April, 1972, which period is known as civilian Martial Law, and, therefore, the laws made during this period also will be treated as illegal as in the case of A. M. Yahya Khan. Be that as it may, the fact remains that in view of the authority of the Supreme Court in Asma Jilani's case holding Yahya Khan as a usurper and all laws enacted by him as illegal, Article 281 of the Interim Constitution has given a blanket of validation to all laws made as from 25th March, 1969 which shall be construed to have been validly made by competent authority, thereby nullifying the effect of the Supreme Court judgment in Asma Jilani's case. The question of interpretation of Articles 280 and 281 of the Interim Constitution and the effect of Asma Jilani's case came up before the Supreme Court in the case State v. Zia-ur-Rehman (1) and it was held :- "As I read the provisions of Article 281, it seems to me that it was designed to achieve a three-fold purpose. The first clause thereof was intended to give a blanket validation to all legislative measures enacted on and from the 25th day of March 1969, when General Yahya Khan usurped power, to the 21st of April 1972, when the
(1) PLD 1973 SC 49 ' Interim Constitution came into force. This clause not only validates all such measures but also nullifies the effect of the judgment of this Court in Asma Jilani's case by using the words 'notwithstanding any judgment of any Court' and further completely ousts the jurisdiction of the Courts to question either the validity of these measures or the competence of the authorities enacting them. As a result of this clause, it is no longer possible for any Court to declare any legislative measure enacted or promulgated between the 25th day of March 1969 to the 21st of April, 1972, to be void or invalid, on account of it having been made or enacted by a person or authority having no power to do so."
If the argument of the learned Counsel for the appellant that Ordinance H of 1969 is not a valid and existing law is accepted, a number of Ordinances will become invalid and there will be a chaos, confusion and uncertainty, which cannot be allowed to prevail in view of the dictum of the Supreme Court in Zia-ur-Rahman's case. The interpretation of a statute should be to prevent a provision from being unintelligible, absurd or totally unreasonable, unworkable or totally irreconcilable with the rest of the statute. Another rule of interpretation be kept in mind, as observed by Hamoadur Rahman, J. As his Lordship then was, in the case of the Province of East Pakistan v. Sirajul Haq Patwari (1)-"One of the cardinal principles of law of interpretation is that law should be saved rather destroyed. Court leans in favour of upholding constitutionality of a legislation. The power to strike down a law as unconstitutional must be exercised only when absolutely necessary." Apart from the above-accepted rules of interpretation, the legislature itself ' wanted to avoid chaos,, uncertainty and state of confusion created by the historical development and pronouncement in Asma case by the Supreme Court. Thus, a blanket of validation was duly provided by the Interim Constitution to the legislative measures enacted and promulgated between 25th March 1969 and 21st April 1972. Furthermore, Article 270 of the 1973 Constitution gives power to the Parliament to make laws validating all Proclamations, President's Orders, Martial Law Regulations, Martial Law Orders and other laws made between 25th March 1969 and 19th December 1971 and by clause (2) of the same Article, again, the effect of Asma Jilani's case on such laws was nullified and any such law having been validated by the Parliament shall not be questioned in any Court on any ground whatsoever. The validation law was to be made within a period of two years from the commencing day of the Constitution, i. e., 14th August 1973. As earlier pointed out, the Parliament passed the Validation of Laws Act, 1975 which has validated Ordinance II of 1969 which appears at serial No, 1 of the West Pakistan Ordinances. Thus, the objection relating to Ordinance II of 1969 is of no force and the same having been validated within the prescribed period by the Parliament cannot be called in question in any Court on any ground whatsoever.
19. In view of the above discussion, we hold that Ordinance II of 1969 is a valid and existing law and the notification issued under section 3 of the said Ordinance on 5th August 1979 appointing Mr. Khalid Paul Khawaja, District and Sessions Judge, as one man Tribunal has been validly issued and the above-said Tribunal has the lawful powers to proceed with the inquiry in accordance with law.
This appeal, therefore,, fails and is hereby dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
(1)P LD 1966 SC 885 revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.