1. ' RAHMAT HUSSAIN JAFFERI, J.---The facts giving rise to the present appeal are that on 21-7-1991 appellant moved an application before the Mukhtiarkar 1st Class Magistrate for obtaining Domicile Certificate and P.R.C. The application was allegedly supported by School Leaving Certificate. The Magistrate conducted enquiry and found that the School Leaving Certificate was forged therefore, he reported the matter to the District Magistrate who directed the P.W.4 Mukhtiarkar to lodge report hence the P.W.4 lodge the F.I.R. On 21-7-1991. The police after usual investigation challaned the appellant and his father acquitted accused Faiz Muhammad in the Court of law.
2. ' The learned IInd Addl. Sessions Judge Kandhkot tried, convicted the appellant for offences punishable under sections 468, 471, P.P.C. And sentenced him to suffer various terms of imprisonment under the impugned judgment, dated 26-6-1999. The co-accused Faiz Muhammad was acquitted on 7-5-1997 under section 265-K, Cr.P.C.
3. I have heard the Advocate for the appellant, A.A.-G for the State and perused the record of this case very carefully the latter has not supported the impugned judgment.
4. ' In order to prove the case the prosecution produced the application allegedly moved the applicant along with School Leaving Certificate and affidavits through P.W.4. The prosecution examined P.W.3 SDEO (Boys) Kandkot who deposed that the certificate was not issued by his office as such it has been established that the certificate Exh.23 was forged. Now the question arises as to whether the appellant had forged the said certificate and moved the application before P.W.4.
5. There is nothing on the record which can show the direct involvement of the appellant in forging the certificate norany witness was examined to show that he saw the appellant preparing forged certificate. Even the prosecution did not obtain spicemen writing and signatures of theappellant for comparing the same with the forged certificate so as to establish that it was the appellant who had forged the certificate. Without' such evidence available on record on the above subject it cannot be held that the appellant is responsible for forging the certificate. Therefore, the prosecution has failed to establish this aspect of the case.
6. ' As regards using the forged certificate the prosecution relied upon P.W.4 Mukhtiarkar who categorically stated that for the first time he saw the appellant in the Court and before that he did not see him. He also stated that the application can be moved by anybody and it is not necessary that the applicant himself should move the application. Even in the Court he did not identify the appellant to be the person who had filed the application. Thus the prosecution has failed to establish that the appellant was the person who had used the forged certificate. The prosecution also relied upon the evidence of P.W.5 Assistant Mukhtiarkar who deposed that the affidavits Exhs.
7. 26 and 27 were sworn before him by the appellant, the application form and questioner form also bears his signature and signature of appellant. A perusal of these documents reveals that the alleged signatures of the appellant on these documents are in Sindhi whereas the identity card of the appellant shows his signature in English. However the perusal of the affidavits reveals that the person who sworn the affidavit was not known to the P.W.5 but the said person was identified by one Supervising Tapedar Kandhkot. In order to establish that the person who was produced before the P.W.5 was the appellant, the prosecution should have examined the Supervising Tapedar who had identified the appellant. Non-examination of the Supervising Tapedar who had identified the appellant adversely affect the evidence of P.W.5. Thus no implicit reliance can be placed on such type of evidence. Furthermore his evidence does not show that the forged certificate Exh.23 was produced before him by the appellant nor the said certificate bears any endorsement or signature of P. W.5.
8. ' Thus the prosecution has failed to prove the case against the appellant, hence he is entitled to the benefit of doubt which was accordingly given to him while passing the short order.
9. ' Above are the reasons of my short order, dated 8-9-2006 by which I had allowed the appeal.