FAQIR MUHAMMAD KHOKHAR, J.--- The petitioner seeks grant of leave to appeal under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, against the impugned judgment, dated 4-12-2001, passed by a learned Division Bench of the Lahore High Court, in Writ Petition No,11085 of 1998.
2. The\petitioner lodged F.I.R. No,249 of 1989 (Exh.P.KK.) dated 18-5-1989 against Ilyas, Ashiq, Ansar, Khuda Yar and Yasin at Police. Station Arif ,Wala, District Sahiwal (now District Pakpattan) under sections 302,. 148, 149, P.P.C. For the murder of Ali Sher, Zulfiqar, Fiaz Ahmad and Muhammad Siddiq.
The Special Judge, Special Courts for Speedy Trials at Multan, vide judgment, dated 30-9-1991, convicted Khuda Yar,. Ansar and Yasin under section 302 and sentenced each of them to death on four counts and a fine of Rs,1,00,000 on each count. They filed Criminal Appeal No,9/SAC of 1991 before the Supreme Appellate Court, Lahore, which was dismissed to the extent of Ansar, and Khuda Yar. However, their death sentence was converted into life imprisonment on each count, vide judgment, dated 21-10-1991. The convict Yasin was acquitted. The respondent No,1 being father of convict Ansar and father-in-law of convict Khuda Yar filed Writ Petition No,11085 of 1998 seeking a direction that the sentence of imprisonment for life of the convicts on each count be ordered to run concurrently. A learned Division Bench of the Lahore High Court, vide impugned judgment, dated 4- 12-2001, allowed the writ petition.
3. The learned counsel argued that since four persons were done to death by the convicts, therefore, their sentence of life imprisonment, on each count, were required by law to run consecutively,
4. On the other hand, the learned Additional Advocate-General Punjab, argued that the High Court had justifiably ordered the sentences of the convicts to run concurrently. Reliance was placed on the case of Juma Khan and another v. The State 1986 SCM R 1573.
5. We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as the learned Additional Advocate-General, Punjab. The only question requiring examination is whether the sentences of imprisonment for life awarded to the convicts Ansar and Khuda Yar, on four counts, were to, run consecutively or concurrently. Section 57, P.P.C. Lays down that in calculating fractions of terms of punishment, imprisonment for life shall be reckoned as equivalent to imprisonment for 25 years.
However, the Provincial Government is empowered by section 401, Cr.P.C. To remit or commute the sentence. Rule' 140 of the Prison Rules also provides that the term of imprisonment for life would mean 25 years. If remissions-were to be calculated, the minimum period of substantive sentence of a lifer to undergo would be 15 years. Section 35 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, also deals with the question of maximum sentence of imprisonment in case of conviction for more than one offence at one trial. For facility of reference, the said provision is reproduced below:-- "35. Sentence in case of conviction of several offences at one trial.--(1) When a person is convicted at one trial of two or more offences, the Court may, subject to the provisions 'of section 71 of the Pakistan Penal Code, sentence him, for such offences, to the several punishments prescribed therefor which such Court is competent to inflict: such punishments when consisting of imprisonment to commence the one after the expiration of the other in such 'order as the Court may direct, unless the Court directs that such punishments shall run concurrently.
(2) In the case of consecutive sentences, it shall not be necessary for the Court, by reason only of the aggregate punishment for the several offences being in excess of the punishment which it is competent to inflict on conviction of a single offence, to send the offender for trial before a higher Court: Provided as. Follows:---
(a) in no case shall such person be sentenced to imprisonment for a longer period than fourteen years;
(b) if the case is tried by a Magistrate, the aggregate punishment shall not exceed twice the amount of punishment which he is, in the exercise of his ordinary jurisdiction, competent to inflict.
(3) For the purpose of appeal. The aggregate of consecutive sentences passed under this section in case of conviction for several: offences at one trial shall be deemed to be a single sentence."
6. It would be clear from reading of the above provision that aggregate of punishments of imprisonment for several offences at one trial were deemed to be a single sentence. Therefore, there could not be more than a life sentence at one trial. However, under section 397, Cr.P.C. The position of a person is different, who while' already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment for life, is subsequently, convicted and sentenced on another. Trial. His subsequent sentence would commence at' the expiration of imprisonment for life for which he has been previously sentenced.
But even in such cases, the said provision expressly enables the Court to direct that the subsequent sentence would run concurrently with the previous sentence. It is, therefore, abundantly A clear that there was nothing wrong in treating the sentences of imprisonment for life of the convicts on four counts w run concurrently.
7. This point was considered by this Court in some cases. In Javaid Shaikh v. The State 1985 SCM R 153; the trial Court imposed consecutive sentences of life imprisonment (25 years) under section 302, P.P.C. And 7 years' R.I. Under section 307, P.P.C. It was held that the sentence of 7 years' R.I. Under section 307, P.P.C. Would not run consecutively in view of section 35(2) proviso (a) as the same would exceed the maximum punishment of imprisonment for life. Therefore, both the sentences were directed to run concurrently. In the case of Juma Khan and another (supra), the sentences of imprisonment for life were imposed by the trial Court under section 302, P.P.C. On each count. This Court took the view that total period of imprisonment at one trial could not exceed 25 years. A somewhat similar view was taken in the case of Khan Zaman and others v. The State 1987 SCM R 1382 and Muhammad Ittefaq v. The State 1986 SCM R 1627. In Abdul Malik and others v. The State and others PLD 2006 SC 365, a larger Bench of this Court observed that the maximum sentence of a life convict was 25 years which could, however, be reduced to 15 years in view of Rule 140 of the Prison Rules. We were also informed by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the convicts had already been released after serving out their legal sentences. The impugned judgment does not suffer from any legal infirmity so as to warrant interference by this Court. This is not a fit case for grant of leave to appeal.
8. For the above reasons, we do not find any merit in this petition which is dismissed and leave to appeal is refused accordingly.