1. ' DORAB PATEL, ACTG. C. J.-These two review applications have been filed against a judgment of this Court dated 28th November, 1969 by which the Court had dismissed the appeals of the petitioners.
2. However, before the review applications could be heard, the petitioner, in Civil Review 1 of 1970, informed his learned counsel Mr. Naazar Khan that he did not wish to press his review application, therefore this review application is dismissed as withdrawn and we could turn to the other review application filed by Mr. A. M. K. Leghari.
3. ' Mr. A. M. K. Leghari joined the Indian Civil Service (later named the Civil Service of Pakistan) in 1938 and completed twenty-five years of service on 24-10-1963. On 19-3-1964 he received a notice from the Establishment Secretary, as Chairman of the Review Committee for C. S. P. And P.C.S. Officers, requiring him to show cause why he should not be retired under the Governmant Servants (Further Usefulness in Public Service) Rules, 1963. He submitted his reply to this notice and advanced legal and factual objections and he also appeared before the Review Committee and challenged its jurisdiction. Then, on 18-6-1964, he received another notice informing him that it was considered expedient and in the public interest to retire him on his completing twenty-five years service in accordance with the Note 1 to Article 465 of the Civil Service Regulation, and he was called upon to show cause within ten days against the action proposed to be taken against him. He immediately challenged this notice by filing a writ petition in the Lahore Seat of the West Pakistan High Court in which his submission was that Article 465-A was not applicable to I.C.S./C.S.P. Officers and that even if it was assumed that this rule was applicable to him (an assumption which he denied), the rule stood repealed by the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958, the Efficiency and Discipline Rules, 1960 and the Government Servants (Further Usefulness in Public Service) Rules, 1962 and 1963. These pleas were accepted by a Full Bench of the High Court which set aside the impugned notice of 18-6-1964, therefore, the Government of Pakistan filed a petition for special leave in this Court. But this petition was pressed not on the ground that the judgment of the High Court was incorrect, but on the ground that the law had been changed since the pronouncement of the High Court judgment on 5-1-1965 by the amendment of Article 178 of the 1962 Constitution by the Constitution (Third Amendment) Act XV of 1965. Leave, however, was refused on the ground that the change in the law did not validate transactions past and closed and that even under the amended law consultation with the Public Service Commission was a pre-condition which had not been satisfied in the case of Mr. A. M. K. Leghari.
4. ' Although it was the Government of Pakistan which was unsuccessful in this Court, the petitioner filed another writ petition in the Lahore Seat of the West Pakistan High Court in which he challenged the validity of the fourth and sixth amendments to the Constitution, and he submitted that the Government intended to retire him under these amendments as an act of victimisation, therefore, his case had been singled out for reference to the Public Service Commission under Article I78(4)
5. (a). Now, the legality of the fourth and the sixth amendments to the Constitution was challenged by Mr. M. A. K. Leghari on the ground that persons, who were disqualified from being members of the National Assembly, had participated in the deliberations of the Assembly which had led to these two amendments in the Constitution. But, as such persons could not participate, because of their disqualification, in the proceedings of the Assembly, their votes in favour of the amendments could not be counted, and, therefore, the further submission was that if these votes were excluded, the amendments had not been passed by the majority prescribed under the Constitution. Next, on the facts, Mr. A. M. K. Leghari's contention was that he had an unblemished and meritorious record of service in the administration, therefore, his compulsory retirement was not in the public interest and he also alleged with some details, mala fides on the part of the Civil Servants, who were trying to bring about his compulsory retirement, and he filed documentary evidence in support of these allegations of mala fides.
6. ' By its judgment dated 26-10-1966, the High Court held that it could not examine the eligibility and disqualifications of the members of the National Assembly who had passed the third, fourth and the sixth amendments, and it held that these amendments were valid. Next, as to the petitioner's contention that his retirement was not in the public interest, the learned Judges of the High Court were of the view that the petitioner's grievance was- "premature inasmuch as admittedly a reference has been made to the Central Public Service Commission. The possibility cannot be ruled out that the Public Service Commission may take a different view than the competent authority."
7. ' Finally, the learned Judges also held that they had "no power to enquire as to whether the (petitioner's) retirement was in public interest or not".
8. ' The petitioner filed a petition for leave in this Court against this judgment, and leave was granted.
9. However, before the petitioner's appeal could be heard, he was compulsorily retired by an order passed on 22-4-1967, which reads :- "In exercise of the powers conferred by paragraph (a) of clause (4) of Article 178 of the Constitution the President, after consulting the Central Public Service Commission, is pleased to direct in the public interest that Mr. A. M. K. Leghari C. S. P. Shall retire from service on the 1st of May, 1967 or, if he intends to avail himself of any leave admissible to him upon the expiry of such leave commencing on that date."
10. ' This appeal was heard with other appeals in which similar points of law and fact were involved, and all those appeals were dismissed by this Court's judgment dated 28-11-1969. Hamoodur Rehman, C. J. Who pronounced the judgment of the Court held that the superior Courts were not debarred from examining the contention of the petitioners that the third, fourth and the sixth amendment of the Constitution were, illegal, because persons disqualified from attending the National Assembly had participated in its proceedings and voted for these amendments. He, however, held that notwithstanding the disability from which some of the members, who had participated in these amendments, suffered, the impugned amendments were valid, because of sub-clause (d) of clause (1) of Article 110 of the Constitution and the de facto doctrine of the exercise of public power. Next, as to the petitioner's contention that he could not be retired in the public interest, Hamoodur Rehman, C. J., held that the question of retirement in the public interest "must of necessity be left to the subjective satisfaction of employing authorities", and that there was "nothing before us which would lead us to the inference that the action (against the petitioner) was necessarily mala fide or the result of any conspiracy". He, however, clarified that the Court could set aside a mala fide order, but he rejected the allegations of mala fides advanced by the petitioner with the observation :- "There is no allegation that anyone in particular was ill-disposed towards him or had any special personal reason for getting rid of him. Nor did he state as to what was nature of the conspiracy against him or who were the alleged conspirators, general allegation of hostility against all senior officers from even before partition was not sufficient to establish mala fides of those who were ultimately responsible for the decision to compulsorily retire him. Mala fides has to be alleged with particularity and a mere assertion of a general malice cannot be sufficient for this purpose."
11. ' Mr. Leghari argued the review application in person and submitted that the premature retirement of a public servant amounted to his civil death, therefore, if we upheld the validity of the sixth amendment, it would totally demoralize the services, and according, to him, the judgment in his case, of which he sought a review, has been the first step in the road to the total destruction of the morale and integrity of the administration. In our humble opinion, the problem is somewhat more complicated. Administration after all means the art of working together, and, howsoever honest and able a officer be, he may not be a successful administrator, if, for example, he suffers from an excess of self-righteousness, or, from the delusion that he alone is honest. Therefore, the question is one on which two opinions are possible. In any event, it was for the Legislature to decide the manner, in which public 4 servants could be retired, and it has given its decision in the most solem manner possible, namely, by the method of Constitutional amendments. Therefore, as the Courts are bound by the Constitution, the validity of the impugned amendments could have been challenged only on the ground that they had not been validly enacted, and not, on the ground that they were against public policy. And, it is significant that the learned counsel, who had argued the appeals of the petitioners ten years ago, had criticised the validity of these amendments only on the ground that they had not been validity enacted. However, after a careful examination of the arguments advanced, the Court had rejected them, and a review will not lie on the ground that it would have been better if the Court had taken a different view.
12. ' The law on the scope of our review jurisdiction was declared by this Court in Lt.-Col. Nawabzada Muhammad Amir Khan v. The Controller of Estate Duty (I) and Kaika us, J., observed :- "It appears quite obvious that if there is to be an end to litigation (and an end there has to be) the more incorrectness of a conclusion reached can never be a ground for review. It was, the Court would be bound when an application for review was submitted to consider de novo whether the conclusion reached was correct and against the order which it passed on the review application, whatever the nature of that order, a review petition could be filed and this procedure will
(1) PLD 1962 SC 335 ' continue ad infinitum. Nor can it be said that while mere incorrectness is not a good ground if the judgment appears to the Bench that hears the review petition to be clearly erroneous there is a ground for review. Difference of opinion in the views of different Benches is but natural and different Benches may be quite clear as to the conflicting views which they take. I could, if need be, quote cases where of two eminent Judges sitting side by side one said the matter was quite simple and admitted of no doubt at all and the other who took the contrary view said he was unable to see how any other view could be taken. To permit a' review on, the ground of incorrectness would amount to granting the Court the jurisdiction to hear appeals against its own judgments or perhaps a jurisdiction to one Bench of the Court to hear appeals against other Benches ; and that surely is not the scope of review jurisdiction. No mistake in a considered conclusion, whatever the extent of that mistake, can be a ground for the exercise of review jurisdiction. On a proper consideration it will be found that the principles underlying the limitations mentioned in Order XLVII, rule 1, Civil Procedure Code, are implicit in the nature of review jurisdiction. While I would prefer not to accept those limitations as if they placed any technical obstruction in the exercise of the review jurisdietion of this Court I would accept that they embody the principles on which this Court would act in the exercise of such jurisdiction. It is not because a conclusion is wrong but because something obvious has been overlooked, some important aspect of the matter has not been considered, that a review petition will lie. It is a remedy to be used only in exceptional circumstances,"
13. ' As we respectfully agree with this statement of the law, the petitioner referred us to an observation of Hamoodur Rehman, C. J., that compulsory retirement "carries with it no stigma" and submitted that this observation amounted to an error apparent, the more so, because it was inconsistent with the view taken by this Court in Ghulam Sarwar v. Pakistan (1). We have examined Ghulam Sarwar's case, but, we regret to say that it has no relevance to the petitioner's argument. Next, as to the contention that this observation about compulsory retirement contains an error apparent, the question turns on whether a civil servant should be retired in the public interest, even though he has a record of honesty and ability, as we indicated earlier, this is a difficult question on which two views are possible. Therefore, it follows that two views are possible on the question whether compulsory retirement carries a stigma and, so it cannot reasonably be contended that the observations of the Chief Justice contained an error apparent. They merely reflected a point of view by which the petitioner is aggrieved.
14. ' The petitioner then criticised the finding of the Chief Justice that the question whether a retirement was in the public interest was not justiciable, and submitted that the learned Judge had erred in relying on Indian Judgments instead of following the judgments of his own Court. The argument is fallacious, because Hamoordur Rehman, C. J., has relied on a judgment of this Court in Zajarul Ahsan v. Republic of Pakistan (2), in any case, it is clear that the learned Chief Justice reached his conclusion, after a careful examination of the arguments_ of the petitioner's learned counsel. We respectfully agree with this view, but even if the petitioner's arguments are assumed to be correct, it would only mean that a different view could have been taken. But this does not mean that there is any error apparent in the impugned judgment.
(1) PLD 1962 SC 142 (2) PLD 1960 SC 113 ' The petitioner then criticised the judgment of the Chief Justice on the basis of his recollection of what the learned Judges had observed about his case during the hearing of the appeal. Now a litigant's recollection of observations made by Judges in a case may be quite different from what was actually said by the Judges. Secondly, the observations made by the Judges in the course of arguments in a case are part of the dialogue between the Bench and the Bar in order to ascertain the true facts and the correct law. Theiefore, those observations are necessarily of a tentative nature and have no significance whatsoever, especially when a judgment is reserved. We have to observe with regret that plea of the petitioner is against reason and does not merit examination, therefore, we will ignore it.
15. ' Finally, after the case had been reserved for orders the petitioner, who is a layman, requested one of us (Dorab Patel, J.) for permission to submit written arguments in addition to the arguments advanced by him in Court. Permission was given, and written arguments were first sent at the end of the month of May, 1980. But, as they were incomplete, the petitioner sent his complete written arguments to us on the 15th of June, 1980, and we now turn to some of the points taken by him in his written arguments, ' The position taken by the petitioner in these written arguments is that the construction placed by the Court on Articles 110 and 209 of the Constitution was not correct. Now, the proper construction of these Articles is a question, which is not free from difficulty, and after examining the arguments of Mr. Manzoor Qadir and of the Advocates, who had appeared for the other appellants, this Court bad rejected the arguments of the appellants, and the petitioner is merely trying to persuade us to take a different view. But, assuming only for the sake of arguments that the construction placed by him on these Articles is correct, this would be no ground for reviewing our order, because a review does not lie merely because D the imgugned judgment contains an error, and for the same reason, it is not necessary to examine the other submissions made by the petitioner in his written arguments: ' However, both in his arguments in Court and in his written arguments, the petitioner had made a submission which has the merit of novelty. He referred us to this Court's judgment in Mian. Asma Jilani v. The Government of the Punjab and another (1) and submitted that this case was a landmark in our jurisprudence. When we enquired about the relevance of this case to his review petition, the petitioner's answer was that just as this Court had in Miss Asma Jilani's case overruled the view taken fourteen years earlier in The State v. Dosso and another (2), he invited us to review the judgment of the Chief Justice, in the instant case, in the public interest, because, by setting side this judgment, we would revive the morale of the administration throughout the country. The submission implies that this Court is not bound by its own judgments and the submission is correct, to the extent that this Court may review the law previously declared by it But, in the first place, it exercises this power very, very seldom. Secondly this power cannot generally be exercised in a review petition, because as explained by Kaikaus, J. In Muhammad Amir Khan's case, a review does not lie because a judgment is wrong but only because something obviously has been overlooked, some important aspect of the matter has not been considered. "And, the petitioner has not been able to show us any obvious
(1) PLD 1972 SC 139 (2) PLD 1958 SC (Pak.) 533 ' error in the judgment of the Chief Justice, nor has he been able to show that any important provision of the Constitution or that any law had been overlooked by the Chief Justice, whilst dismissing his appeal.
16. ' We have, further, to observe with regret that the petitioner's arguments are based on a total misconception of the narrow review jurisdiction of this Court, and this is reflected even in the relief which he has sought in his written arguments, which was assumed have been submitted after careful deliberation. Thus, for example, the petitioner has claimed in his written arguments a sum of Rs, 61,500 from Mr. Moinuddin and Mr. Masood Mahmood, because, according to him, they were responsible for his illegal retirement. But, although he has alleged mala fides against Mr. Moinuddin and Mr. Masood Mahmood, he has not impleaded them either in the High Court or in this Court, therefore, we are, unable to understand how we can in a review petition pass a decree against persons, who have not been impleaded before us as respondents.
17. ' We now turn to the petitioner's arguments in support of his contention that his retirement was mala fide. He took us through his annual confidential reports and criticised Mr. Moinuddin's observations in his letter dated 26th March, 1964, As Mr. Moinuddin has drawn the petitioner's attention in this letter to remarks in the petitioner's annual confidential reports which were considered to be adverse, the petitioner submitted that Mr. Moinuddin's observations were based on a misreading of his annual confidential reports and proved Mr. Moinuddin's mala fides. The submission that Mr. Moinuddin has not correctly appreciated the remarks in the petitioner's annual confidential reports is not without force, but it is unnecessary to examine the petitioner's arguments on this aspect of the case. We will assume that he had a record of unblemished integrity and service, because on the whole, this claim is supported by his service records. But, merely because he was an officer of ability and honesty, does it follow that his compulsory retirement was illegal.
18. Hamoodur Rehman, C. J., answered this question in the negative, and we respectfully agree with his answer.
19. ' However, according to the petitioner, the impugned judgment contained an error apparent, because it stated that the petitioner had not supplied particulars of his allegations of mala fides, and in support of this plea, the petitioner took us through the allegations made by him against Mr. Moinuddin and Mr. Masood Mahmood in his statement of particulars, which is Annexure B to his writ petition in the High Court. The petitioner's contention that he has made allegations of mala fides against Mr. Moinuddin and Mr. Masood Mahmood is correct, but these allegations were relevant to the action taken against the petitioner under Government Servants (Further Usefulness in Public Service) Rules, 1963 and under Article 465-A of the Civil Service Regulations. However, the petitioner was successful in his challenge to these proceedings and what he is now challenging is the order passed for his retirement on 22-4-1967 by the President of Pakistan acting in consultation with the Chairman and Members of the Public Service Commission. Therefore, he had to allege and prove mala fides on the part of the President of Pakistan and the Members of the Public Service Commission. But, if it was the President of Pakistan and the Members of the Public Service Commission, who had passed the mala fide order of retirement, the allegations of mala fides against Mr. Moinuddin and Mr. Masood Mahmood had no relevance to the petitioner's case, except on the etsumption that Mr. Moinuddin and Mr. Masood Mahmood had influenced the President of Pakistan and the Members of the Public Service Commission into passing an illegal order for the petitioner's retirement. But the petitioner has not even attempted to refer us to evidence which could prove that Mr. Moinuddin and Mr. Masood Mahmood had influenced the President of Pakistan and the Members of the Public Service. Commission into passing the order of 22-4-1967, nor was that the petitioner's case when his appeal was heard ten years ago by this Court, Additionally, and this is more important, petitioner has not made any allegations of mala fides whatsoever in his writ petition in his grounds of appeal in this Court, or even in this review petition in this Court against the President of Pakistan and the Members of Public Service Commission. However, we will presently review the question of mala fides against the President of Pakistan.
20. ' The petitioner pointed out that his order of retirement was passed during the pendency of his appeal in this Court. That is true, but if he wanted to challenge this order on the ground of mala fides, then he should have amended his writ petition by supplying particulars of the mala fides on the part of the President of Pakistan and the Members of the Public Service Commission, and pleaded any other grounds on which he challenged his order of retirement. Not only did he not do so, but although he filed his review petition more than three years after his order of retirement, he has not made any allegations, whatsoever, in his review petition against the President of Pakistan or the Members of the Public Service Commission. Therefore, there is no error in the observations of the Chief Justice that the petitioner had not given proper particulars of the allegations of mala fides in his appeal.
21. ' However, there was a development in the interval between the admission of the petitioner's review petition and its hearing. On one ground or another, the petitioner had managed to obtain adjournments in the hearing of his review application. Then, more than ten years after he had filed his review petition, he filed on 17-4-1980 an application for summoning scores of files and documents, and amongst the files which he wanted to be produced were the files of the Establishment Division and the Federal Public Service Commission relating to the reference of his case to the Commission, including the correspondence with the Commission on the subject. This application had been put up to one of us (Dorab Patel, J.) in Peshawar and the following order was passed on 20th April, 1980.
22. "Notice of the stay application to the respondent, who should be informed that the application will be heard and decided with the review application on 3rd May, 1980. The respondent is, therefore, directed to produce in Court on the 3rd of May, 1980, the documents specified in paragraph 15 (a) of the application and to make them available for inspection to the petitioner three days earlier.
23. This, however, is without prejudice to the respondent's right to object to the production of these documents. The petitioner is permitted to place on record the documents specified in paragraph
(15) (b) of his application, and the question of the admissibility of these documents will be decided with his review application. The petitioner is, however, directed to apply copies of the documents which he wishes to produce to the respondent at least three days before the hearing of the review application."
24. ' As this application is now to be disposed of, at the outset we would observe that the petitioner has no case for summoning the files of the Federal Public Service Commission, because he has not made any allegation of mala fides against the Public Service Commission, and, further because he was retired on the orders of the President acting in consultation with the Public Service Commission.
25. ' Next, as to the scores of other files and documents sought to be requisitioned, it is the petitioner's case that except for items 11 and 12, all the other files and documents of which he seeks production through this application, had been produced before this Court at the hearing of his appeal.
26. Therefore, except for the aforesaid two items, the petitioner's application must be dismissed on the short ground that a review is not a rehearing of the appeal. The files had been examined by this Court when the petitioner's appeal was heard, therefore no case has been made out for summoning them afresh. Secondly, a review lies only for an error apparent in the judgment, and as was explained by us in Sajjad Nabi Dar & Company v. The Commissioner of Income-tax, Rawalpindi
(1) an order would be reviewable only when it suffers from a mistake which can be established without any elaborate argument. But, as the petitioner seeks the production of scores of files and documents, it is obvious that the errors which he seeks to prove in the impugned judgment are errors which can only be established, if at all, by elaborate arguments. Therefore, it follows that such errors would not be errors within the meaning of Order XXVI, rule 1 of this Court's Rules, and it is clear that the petitioner is merely trying to reargue his appeal.
27. ' However, according to the petitioner, there are two files which were not before this Court at the time of the hearing of this appeal. These files are Items Nos. 11 and 12 of his application. They relate to the service records of his enemy Mr. Masood Mahmood. As we explained, the petitioner's allegation against Mr. Masood Mahmood had relevance to the action taken earlier against him, but they have absolutely no relevance to his retirement under the sixth amendment, because there is neither any allegation nor any evidence to show that Mr. Masood Mahmood, who was a very junior official, had influenced the President of Pakistan or the Public Service Commission in persuading them to retire the petitioner illegally. Therfore, no case has been made out for summoning these tiles.
28. ' Finally, the petitioner has prayed in paragraph 15 of his application that he should be permitted to produce copies of the documents specified in clause (b) of this paragraph. Although the petitioner was to produce copies, he has not . Cared to serve the usual notice of production on the respondent, therefore, as he was a layman, this Court directed him in its order of 20th April, 1980 "to supply copies of the documents which he wishes to produce to the respondent", and if the petitioner had complied with this order, Mr. Bhatti would have been able to inform us whether the copies relied upon by the petitioner are true copies or not. But the petitioner deliberately failed to comply with our order. He said that he did not comply with the Court's order, because Mr. Bhatti had not, in accordance with the Court's order, given him inspection of the documents in the respondent's possession. In the first place, even if the respondent did not comply with this Court's orders, this would not entitle the petitioner to flout it. Secondly, the petitioner assumed that he had only to make an application for summoning scores of files, and they would immediately become available for his inspection. But, Mr. Bhatti stated that the respondent had not been able to send him the files and documents listed in the petitioner's application of 17-4-1980, because the notice was very short. As the petitioner's application was placed before one of us in Peshawar on 20th April, 1980, we accept
(1) PLD 1977 SC 437 ' Mr. Bhatti's explanation and hold that the respondent was not in breach of this Court's order. And, on the other hand, it is clear that the petitioner has wilfully disobeyed this Court's order. We would, however, refrain from commenting further on this painful aspect of the case, because the result of the petitioner's refusal to comply with the Court's order is that Mr. Bhatti is not able to state whether the copies relied upon by the petitioner are true copies and, therefore, these copies cannot be allowed to be produced.
29. ' In the result, the petitioner's belated application of 17th April, 1980, is without merit and is dismissed.
30. ' Before parting with this order, we have to refer to an argument advanced orally by the petitioner on the question of mala fides which appears, prima facie, to be inconsistent with his allegations of mala fides against Mr. Moinuddin and Mr. Masood Mahmood, because mala fides were alleged against the then President of Pakistan, who is now dead, and against another person who is also now dead. This argument had reference to the Presidential elections of 1964, and, according to the petitioner, as an honest and upright officer, he had refused to help in the rigging of elections in the President's favour, therefore, he had been singled out for premature retirement.
31. ' Now, if this plea be true, the allegations of mala fides against Mr. Moinuddin and the other person were, prima facie, an abuse of the qualified privilege enjoyed by litigants. Therefore, we are disturbed by the manner in which the petitioner has been making allegations of mala fides.
32. ' He, however, relied on documentary evidence, and he said that he had not been able to discover this evidence earlier, despite due diligence, therefore, these documents amounted to the discovery of new and important evidence within the meaning of Order XLVII, rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code.
33. He has, however, not explained what steps he had taken before the hearing of his appeal to trace out the evidence which he now claims to have discovered, and no Court can go by the ipse (Exit of a petitioner that he has suddenly discovered new and important evidence. In any case, even if we assume that the petitioner was not in possession of this documentary evidence earlier, despite his best efforts, as his review petitioner does not contain any allegation of mala fides against the then President of the ether deceased person, when he vehemently criticised in his arguments before us, it would be monstrous to allow a review on allegations of mala fides not contained in the review petition, the moreso as these allegations are against persons who are dead.
34. ' However, on going through the files of this case, we found that the petitioner had filed an application on 30th of March, 1970, for bringing on record this document evidence about the resolution of the Pakistan Muslim League, etc., and the last paragraph in this application for producing and summoning documents reads :- "It is respectfully prayed that the application may be permitted to add a new ground on the basis of discovery of new material as important evidence."
35. ' If this prayer be a prayer for the amendment of the review application, then it had to state the precise amendment which the petitioner wanted to make in his review application and it is not irrelevant to recall here that in dismissing his appeal ten years agos Hamoodur Rehman, C. I. Had observed mala fides has to be alleged with particulars and a mere assertion of a general malice cannot be sufficient for this purpose." It is, there are clear if this application of 30-3-1970 was also intended to be an application for amending the grounds of the review petition, it was not fit to be accepted under the law declared in the very judgment of which the petition seeks a review.
36. Secondly, this application is dated the 10th March, 1970 but was filed twenty days later. These facts speak for themselves. Thirdly, after filing this application, the petitioner took no steps whatever to follow it up. As his learned counsel did not even obtain an order of notice on this application from the Court, it was neither served on the respondent nor put up for hearing in Court, and it must be dismissed. In these circumstances, we cannot allow the petitioner G to press his review petition on allegations of mala fides not raised in the petition.
37. ' The petition is devoid of merit and is dismissed.