1. SABIHUDDIN AHMED, C.J.--Through this petition, the petitioner has called in question part of the judgment of the learned Accountability Court No,1, whereby apart from convicting and sentencing the petitioner to five years' R.I. And pay a fine of Rs,1,42,41,022 certain properties belonging to her were directed to be confiscated. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner she had, while assailing the judgment of conviction in appeal, moved an application for suspension of the part of the judgment directing confiscation of properties. However, he was persuaded to withdraw the application and moved this Court separately under Article 199 of the Constitution for the desired relief. Both learned D.A.-G. And D.P.G.A. Have questioned the maintainability of this petition on the ground that once appellate Court was seized of an appeal against the entire judgment it could, always, grant the relief claimed in appellate proceedings. Learned D.A.-G. Relied upon the well- settled principle reiterated by the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Sindh Employee's Social Security Institution v. Adamjee Cotton Mills PLD 1975 SC 32 to the effect that the power to grant interim relief by suspending wholly or partially, the operation of the order appealed against is always incidental or ancillary to the main appellate jurisdiction. Indeed the same view has been, consistently, followed even thereafter. No doubt, in the case of Khan Asfand Yar Wali and others v.
2. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2001 SC 607 their Lordships held that constitutional jurisdiction could be invoked for seeking bail but with all respects it appears that this was done because the power to grant bail at the relevant time had been, specifically, taken away in terms of section 9(b) of the NAB Ordinance. Cases for grant of bail, therefore, proceed on entirely different principle and in the absence of any fetter on the judicial power of the Court to grant interim relief of the kind prayed for we are clearly of the view that such power is always available to the Appellate Court and in the presence of statutory remedy a petition could not, strictly speaking, be maintainable.
3. ' We are also conscious of the fact that for seeking suspension of one part of the judgment an appraisal of the merits of the case will have to be undertaken :apart from hearing of the main appeal and work might be unnecessary duplicated. Nevertheless, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that there was a certain amount of urgency in the matter as petitioner's properties were threatened and even if he was to move a miscellaneous application in the appeal it would be required to be heard on urgent basis. Learned D.P.G.A., on the other hand, undertook that no measures for dispossession of the petitioner or disposal of the property were under way and such apprehension was misconceived.
4. In the circumstances, we would record statement of learned D.P.G.A. And dispose of this petition by directing, that an appropriate application be made to the Appellate Court and in case the respondent wishes to take any measure relating to the C property it will do so after serving at least two weeks notice upon the petitioner who may thereafter, apply to the Appellate Court for interim relief. The petitioner, however, will not create any third party interest in the property.
5. ' The petition stands disposed of in the above terms.