SHAH ARDUR RASHID (CHAIRMAN).-The appellant Khurshid Alam, who was employed as a Postal Clerk was retired from service by the Deputy Postmaster-General vide his order dated 4th November, 1976, under clause (ii) of section 13 of the Civil Servants Act, 1973. His appeal to the Postmaster-General was rejected on 9th June, 1977. Against the rejection of appeal, the appellant approached the Review Board constituted under M. L. O. 23, but his petition for review was dismissed on 18th June, 1978. From this order he has come in appeal before this Tribunal.
2. Under section 4(1) of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 a civil servant aggrieved by any final order whether original or appellate made by a "Departmental Authority" in respect of any of the terms and conditions of his service can approach the Tribunal by way of appeal within thirty days of the communication of the order. The departmental authorities in this case were Deputy Postmaster- General who passed the original order on 4th November, 1976 and the Postmaster-General who passed the final order on 9th June, 1977. According to section 4(1) ibid the appellant should have come to this Tribunal at the latest by 9th July, 1977. He has however filed the appeal on 11th July, 1978, one year after the expiry of the period of limitation. When this position was brought to the notice of Mr. Tariq Mahmood, Advocate, counsel for the appellant be contended that the final order for the purposes of section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, is not the order of the Postmaster- General but it is the order of the Review Board which was passed on 18th June, 1978 under M. L. O. 23 and that the appeal having been filed within a period of 30 days was well within time. The learned counsel has specifically referred to the Explanation to section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 which reads as follows :- "Explanation.-In this section, `Departmental Authority' means any authority other than a Tribunal which is competent to make an order in respect of any of the terms and conditions of Civil Servants."
3. The fact to be examined is whether the Review Board, constituted under M. L. O. 23 is a departmental authority for the purpose of Civil Servants Act, 1973, and the Civil Service Tribunals Act, 1973. In the scheme of these two enactments terms and conditions of a civil servant are enumerated in different sections of the Civil Servants Act, 1973 and the procedure for departmental action is provided for in the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973, In rule 10 it is provided that a person on whom penalty is imposed shall have such right of appeal as may be prescribed under the Civil Servants (Appeal) Rules, 1977, which have succeeded Part XIII of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. The appellant's case is that he has not been retired in accordance with the spirit of section 13 of the Civil Servants Act, 1973 and in fact a punishment has been imposed upon him and that section 13 of the Civil Servants Act, 1973 has been mentioned to give the real intention a different colour. In other words his case is that the retirement of the appellant has been made in colourable exercise of jurisdiction under section 13 .Of the Act and that in fact he had been penalised for certain reasons without giving him a chance of clearing his position.
4. Whatever the case may be, it is clear that the departmental authority referred to in section 4 is not the Review Board constituted under M. L. O.
23. That is a distinct forum having separate jurisdiction and separate line of remedy. It is pertinent to note that paragraph 3(2) of M. L. O. 23 specifically provides that no person can invoke its provision unless he withdraws his petition or appeal pending in a Court or with the Service Tribunal. Though the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 does not; provide that a person approaching the Tribunal by way of appeal under section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 must first withdraw his appeal from the Review Board constituted under M. L. O. 23 yet the position is clear enough to indicate that the Review Board does not find its place in the hierarchy of the departmental authorities whose orders are subject to appeal before the Tribunal. Martial Law Order 23 provides a separate procedure and a person approaching direct to the Board cannot claim any arrears of pay by virtue of a proviso to para. 5 thereof. It is thus clear that the scope M. L. O. 23 and the powers of the Review Board constituted under it are distinctly different and the Service Tribunal. This Tribunal is not the authority which can sit over appeal on orders of the Review Board, It is pertinent to note that M. L. O. 23 was enacted on 22nd October, 1977 long aster the passing of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 and therefore the later Act did not envisage any appeal from the order of the Review Board constituted thereunder. If the law maker had intended that the order made by the Review Board under M. L. O. 23 shall be subject to scrutiny by the Service Tribunal, then necessary provisions could have been made in the Civil Servants Act, 1973 and the Service Tribunals Act, 1973. We are, therefore, firmly of the view that appeal against the order of Review Board does not lie to us.
5. The appellant could come up in appeal to us from the order of Postmaster-General made by him on 9th June, 1977 within a period of one month which expired on 9th July, 1977. The appeal having been filed a year after that is barred by time and as such is dismissed in limine.
6. Parties to be informed accordingly.