' FAQIR MUHAMMAD KHOKHAR, J.--- The petitioner was a Senior Headmaster (BS-18) at Narowal. He was transferred and posted as Deputy Director in the Office of Director (Elementary Education)
Gujranwala. He handed over and assumed the charge on 3-3-1999. A criminal case F.I.R. No,2199 dated 17-3-1999 under sections 161, P.P.C. Read with section 5(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 was registered at Police Station, Anti-Corruption Establishment, Narowal, against him at the instance of respondent No,2, who was Director Public Instruction (Elementary Education) Punjab, Lahore. He filed Writ Petition No,17313 of 1999 for the quashment of the aforesaid F.I.R. Which was allowed by a learned single Judge of the Lahore High Court, Lahore, vide judgment dated 24-1- 2000, wherein certain adverse remarks were also recorded against the respondent No,2. Therefore, the respondent No,2 filed C.M.A. No, I of 2001 under section 151, C.P.C. For expunction of the adverse remarks which was allowed by the High Court, vide impugned order dated 10-12-2001. Hence, this petition for leave to appeal.
2. The learned counsel vehemently argued that despite having notice the respondent No,2 did not bother to defend the writ petition of the petitioner. He did not file any petition for review or for grant of leave to appeal against the adverse remarks. He contended that the inherent power under section 151, C.P.C. Was not available in the presence of specific provisions providing for review of a judgment as well as a petition for leave to appeal before this Court. Reliance was placed on the cases of Mrs. Mehar Sultan Jung v. Qurban Hussain 1972 SCM R 73 and Roazi Khan and others v.
Nasir and others 1997 SCM R 1849. He lastly submitted that the remarks made by the High Court against respondent No,2 were justified.
3. On the other hand, the learned Additional Advocate General, Punjab, submitted that the procedure of handing and taking over the charge prescribed by the Civil Services Rules (Punjab)
Volume 1 was not observed by the petitioner. He handed over the charge at Narowal and took over at Gujranwala at the same time i,e, on 3-3-1999 (forenoon). Not only that the petitioner passed some unusual orders on the very first day of his posting as Deputy Director (Education) in Gujranwala falling within the mischief of Rule 15 of the Punjab Government Servants (Efficiency and Disciplinary) Rules 1975. It was further argued that there was no or personal malice of the respondent No,2, against the petitioner, who acted bona fide in the discharge of his official duties.
4. The learned counsel for the respondent No,2 contended that no notice was given by the High Court before recording the adverse remarks against the respondent No,2. Therefore, the High Court had rightly expunged the same from the judgment dated 24-1-2000. It was next contended that the respondent No,2 being the Director Public Instruction (Elementary Education), Punjab had acted bona fide in getting the criminal case registered against the petitioner.
5. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties as well as the learned Additional Advocate- General, Punjab at length. We find that no notice was served upon the respondent No,2 before recording the adverse remarks nor the same were justified in the facts and circumstances of the case. There is nothing on record to show that respondent No,2 was, as a matter of fact, served with a notice of hearing of the writ petition. The respondent No,2 seems to have acted in good faith in getting a criminal case registered against the petitioner. The High Court possessed the plenary jurisdiction to expunge the remarks. Reference may usefully be made to the cases of Muhammad Ashiq v. Allah Bakhsh and another PLD 1957 SC 293; Malik Firoz Khan Noon, Prime Minister's House, Karachi v. The State PLD 1958 SC 333 and Aman Ullah Khan and others v. Federal Government of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Finance, Islamabad and others PLD 1990 SC 1092. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the impugned order of the High Court is plainly correct to which no exception can be taken.
' For the foregoing reasons, we do not find any merit in this petition which is dismissed and leave to appeal is refused accordingly.