' JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, J.---The respondent Market Committee has been served. None, however, has appeared on its behalf. It is, therefore, proceeded against ex parte.
2. This revision petition impugns the appellate judgment and decree dated 8-7-1996, whereby the suit of the petitioner, namely, Yasrib Traders, seeking declaration and permanent injunction, was dismissed.
3. The facts of this case are straightforward. The respondent Market Committee demanded market fee from the petitioner/plaintiff alleging that the petitioner had purchased wheat from the Food Department and was, therefore, liable to pay the market fee on the said purchase. The petitioner availed his remedies under the Agricultural Produce Markets Ordinance, 1978. The appeal before the Assistant Commissioner was partly allowed on 27-7-1989. A revision before the Commissioner Gujranwala Division was decided on 23-1-1990, whereby further relief was given to the petitioner/plaintiff. It was held that the petitioner was liable to pay the amount of market fee of Rs,91,200.60 plus two times the said amount.
4. Both orders, mentioned above, were impugned by the petitioner through a suit filed on 12-3-1990, out of which the present revision petition arises. The case of the petitioner was that the Food Department never sold the wheat to the petitioner. The wheat was merely supplied to it for the purpose of grinding the same. It was also asserted by the petitioner/plaintiff that the petitioner received the grinding charges from the Food Department but never paid any amount to the said department.
5. The parties led evidence. The learned trial Court held that the petitioner/ plaintiff was not a purchaser of the wheat, but was merely a miller of the same. As such, it was held that no market fee was payable by the petitioner to the respondent Market Committee. The learned lower appellate Court, however, reversed the aforesaid finding.
6. I have gone through the impugned appellate judgments as well as the evidence on record. It is clear from the available evidence that the petitioner/plaintiff has been able to establish that it was a miller of wheat supplied by the Food Department and not a purchaser thereof. The learned lower appellate Court has placed reliance on the impugned orders dated 27-7-1989 and 23-1-1990 passed by the Assistant Commissioner and the Commissioner, respectively. The portions of the aforesaid orders, reproduced by the learned lower appellate Court, do not contain a discussion of any evidence to establish that the petitioner was a purchaser of wheat rather than a miller thereof.
7. The four witnesses produced by the B petitioner/plaintiff, including an employee of the Food Department, namely, Younus Masih Gill (P.W.2), have deposed that the Food Department used to supply wheat to the petitioner for milling and not by way of sale. The other witnesses have also testified to the same effect. On the other hand, the Market Committee (respondent/defendant) has not produced any record, either from the Food Department or any other agency, to show that the petitioner/plaintiff had made any payment to the Food Department for wheat purchased by it.
8. In the foregoing circumstances, I am not in any doubt that the petitioner was able to establish its case that it was not a purchaser of wheat and was, therefore, not liable to pay any amount by way of market fee. Consequently, the impugned appellate judgment and decree dated 8-7-1996 are set aside. As a result, the decree of the learned trial Court dated 21-2-1994 stands restored.