' MIAN SAQIB NISAR, J.---The ejectment application brought by Muhammad Khalil Dar, the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents, against the appellant on the ground of default in the payment of rent was allowed by the learned Rent Controller vide order dated 23-1-2002. The appeal of the appellant has failed on 14-10-2003. Hence this second appeal.
2. At the very outset, Dr. A. Basit, learned counsel for the respondents, has raised a preliminary objection that the present appeal is incompetent, because the property in question is a residential bungalow and the second appeal under the law has only been provided for the nonresidential property. The objection has no force and is hereby repelled because in the present case, even according to the averments of the ejectment application, the property was rented out to the appellant for the commercial purpose, therefore, in terms of section 2(d) of the Punjab Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, it is non-residential building regarding which, the second appeal can be competently filed.
3. Now coming to the merits of the case, the brief facts are:-- ' That the demised property known as 20 Masson Raod, Lahore measuring 7-1/2 Kanals was owned by Begum Akbar Jahan alias Mir Jan Begum wife of Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah (Ex-Chief Minister of Occupied Jammu and Kashmir); the property was rented out to the appellant by Muhammad Khalil Dar, her attorney in the year 1983. On 30-3-1998, Mr. Dar brought the present ejectment petition stating that the appellant, on account of the amendment in the Rent Laws, was bound to increase the rent to the extent of 25% after every three years, but he has failed and thus, defaulted in the payment of rent due. The appellant denied the relationship of tenancy and stated that the property in question is owned by Mir Jan Begum and not the respondent/ejectment petitioner, who has only rented out the property to the appellant as an agent for the lady. Resultantly, the learned Rent Controller framed the issue about the existence of the tenancy and the parties were put to trial.
4. The respondents examined Muhammad Iqbal Dar (attorney of Muhammad Khalil Dar) as A.W.1, Muhammad Shakil Zubair as A.W.2 and Falak Sher as A.W.3. Besides, the Cheque issued by the appellant in the name of Muhammad Iqbal Dar for the payment of the rent was brought on the record as Exh.A.3; the bank slip about the dishonour of the above Cheque as Exh.A.2 and the letter written by Akbar Brothers/appellant dated 5-1-1997 as Exh.A.4. It may be pertinent to mention here that despite availing the opportunities, the statements of the A.Ws. Were not subjected to cross- examination and ultimately, the appellant's right in this regard was closed by the learned Rent Controller vide order dated 8-3-2000 and this order has not been challenged by the appellant in appeal. Therefore, the testimonies of all the A.Ws have gone un-rebutted. Conversely, the appellant examined Safdar Hussian as R.W.1, who has deposed that the property in question was owned by Mir Jan Begum widow of Sh. Muhammad Abdullah and that Muhammad Khalil Dar was not the owner of the property. He also stated that some power of attorney in favour of Muhammad Farooq Abdullah, her son, by the lady and also the power of attorney in favour of Muhammad Khalil Dar by Muhammad Farooq Abdullah, are forged and fabricated. However, in the cross-examination, R.W.1 has admitted that the appellant had been making the payment of rent to Muhammad Khalil Dar and for the last 4/5 years, it is being deposited in the Court, but in the name of Mir Jan Begum.
Shahid Hamid/R.W.2 has also deposed to the same effect A.W.3 Akbar Ali Bhatti, has appeared for the appellant and deposed in corroboration of the contents of the written reply to the ejectment application, but in the cross-examination, in a very categorical terms he has accepted that he has been making the payment of rent to Muhammad Khalil Dar and his son till 1996-97 and from 1997 has been depositing the rent in the Court in the name of Mir Jan Begum. Upon the conclusion of the trial, the learned Rent Controller accepted the ejectment application and the appeal of the appellant has failed.
5. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that the property in question is owned by Mir Jan Begum and Muhammad Khalil Dar was only acting as her attorney; the property was rented by the attorney for and on behalf of the lady and the relationship of landlord and tenant only exists between the appellant and Mir Jan Begum and not with the respondent/ejectment petitioner.. It is further stated that the documents, even now placed on the record by Dr. A. Basit, learned counsel for the respondents, along with the application (C.M.No,1410-C/2006) envisages that the owner/landlady Mir Jan Begum in fact gave the general power of attorney in favour of her son Muhammad Farooq Abdullah with the power to rent out the property and the said general attorney gave the special power of attorney to Muhammad Khalild Dar and it is on the basis of this special power of attorney that the property was rented out to the appellant, therefore, for all intents and purposes, factual or legal, it is Mir Jan Begum, who was the landlady and not the respondent/ejectment petitioner. It is also stated that after the demise of Muhammad Khalil Dar, his legal heirs/representatives moved an application to be impleaded as party which was objected to by the appellant that they are not the legal representatives, because the property was owned by Mir Jan Begum and she was the landlady and the legal heirs of the attorney cannot be so arrayed. This objection has been left open and should be decided along with this appeal.
6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. The evidence of the respondents is very clear that the property in question was rented out by Muhammad Khalil Dar to the present appellant; the physical possession was handed over to the appellant by Mr. Dar and till 1997 it is Mr. Dar to whom, the rent was being paid by the appellant. No document has been produced by the appellant to show that the tenancy B was in the name of Mir Jan Begum and it was she who was entitled to receive the rent from the appellant. The appellant throughout had been making the payment of rent to Muhammad Khalil Dar in his own name; even the Cheque (Exh.A.3) was issued in the name of his son towards the said rent, which was dishonored through Exh.A.3. Above all, in the letter dated 5-1-1997 (Exh.A.4), addressed by the appellant to Muhammad Iqbal Dar, it is clearly mentioned that:-- "We may inform you that the cheque for the advance rent from January, 1997 to December, 1997 for your premises known as 20 Masson Road, Lahore at Rs,15,000 p.m. Totaling Rs,1,80,000 was got prepared by the Organization but you did not turn up to collect the same. However, we have sent you the said amount through Money Orders No, 4683--4700 dated 5-1-1997."
' The above documentary evidence is sufficient to establish that the tenancy was created by Mr. Muhammad Khalil Dar; the appellant was put in physical possession of the property by Mr. Dar and the rent was being paid to and in the name of Mr. Dar. Besides, A.W.1 and A.W.3, who in clear terms have stated that the appellant was the tenant under Mr. Muhammad Khalil Dar; despite availing the opportunities their statements have not been crossed. Likewise, A.W.2, who is the Ahlmad of the Court of a Civil Judge at Lahore has deposed that the appellant had moved an application against Muhammad Khalil Dar for seeking permission to deposit the rent in the Court in the name of Mr. Dar, but this application was dismissed on 31-5-1997 for the non-deposit of the process fee. This statement too has not been subjected to cross-examination. It is settled law that any deposition made in the examination-in-chief, if not subjected to cross-examination, shall be deemed to have been admitted. Obviously, such statements once admitted by the appellant, no stance could be maintained by the appellant about the lack of tenancy with Mr. Dar. As far as the evidence of the appellant is concerned, it is all stereotype in nature. The affidavits seem to have been prepared by someone else and contain the same language; these are also even beyond the scope of the pleadings set out in the written reply. The only emphasis in the affidavits is that the property in owned by Mir Jan Begum, but when these statements are read in conjunction with the cross- examinations, the plea of the appellant stands defeated, because in the cross-examinations it is admitted by the appellant himself and his witnesses that the property was procured on rent from Muhammad Khalil Dar and that the rent was being paid to him. The appellant has never brought on record, as mentioned earlier, any document to show that Muhammad Khalil Dar was not the agent for the lady at the time the premises was put under tenancy to the appellant. These facts, when taken in totality, are quite adequate to establish the tenancy and on the face of it, the denial seems to be contumacious and was propounded to take the advantage of the absence of the actual owner of the property from Pakistan.
7. It may be pertinent to state here that in order to be a landlord of the property, it is not necessary that the person should also be the owner, F rather he should be entitled to receive the rent for the time being. From the facts and the evidence, which has come on the record, it is clearly established that the property was physically rented out to the appellant by Muhammad Khalil Dar and it is he in whose name. The rent was paid by the appellant till 1997 and thus, was entitled to receive the rent.
The argument of Kh. Saeed-uz-Zafar, Advocate that the tenancy had been created on behalf of Mir Jan Begum, is not well-conceived because there is no proof in writing that the tenancy was created in the name of Mir Jan Begum and it is she, who was entitled to receive the rent and Mr. Dar was only an agent to collect the same for and in her name. According to the definition of the "landlord", which has been dealt with G in number of cases, it is clear that the word "landlord" is not limited to the true owner but includes an agent, trustee, guardian, receiver, executor and administrator receiving the rent on behalf of the owner and any person who may be entitled to receive rent for the time being on his own account. According to Rehmatullah v. Ali Muhammad and another 1983 SCM R 1064, it has been held:- "---S.2---Landlord---Definition of---Held: Definition of landlord being very wide, person, even if not owner of property, to be deemed to, be landlord in various capacities."
' Moreover it has been held in Nasim Khalid v. Ibrahim 1988 M LD 819, as follows:-- "Ss. 2(c), 13, 15---Attorney of landlady receiving rent from tenants who treating him as person to whom they were liable to pay rent---Falls within definition of "landlord"---Non-proof of power of attorney would in such a case be of no consequence-- Second appeal against eviction order passed on ground of default in payment of rent dismissed and eviction order upheld."
8. Thus, from the above, it is clear that even if Mr. Dar was not the owner of the property yet being entitled to receive the rent from the appellant, he was the landlord and could competently file the ejectment application against the appellant. The denial of the appellant, as stated above, was contumacious and thus, on the proof of the existence of tenancy by the respondents, by applying the principle of forfeiture, the appellant is lible to be evicted straightaway, and this has been rightly done by the learned Rent Controller and also upheld in appeal.
9. There was another application, which was moved by the appellant before the learned Rent Controller for producing the additional evidence, but it was dismissed vide order dated 24-1-2001 and this order has not been challenged in appeal. However, the appellant moved an application for the additional evidence before-the Court of first appeal, which was dismissed along with the appeal vide impugned judgment dated 14-10-2003. However, an independent application (C.M.
No,1-C/2005) has beep moved in this appeal through which, the appellant wants to bring on record the power of attorney in favour of Muhammad Khalil Dar by Muhammad Farooq Abdullah . But nothing hinges upon this power of attorney. As regards the other document, which is a photocopy of the rent note dated 4-12-1983, suffice it to say that there had been no attempt on behalf of the appellant to produce this document at any stage of the proceedings and on the face of it, the document seems to be in-genuine and fraudulent, because had it been with the appellant, they would have straightaway filed the same along with their reply to the ejectment application.
10. As regards the question that on account of the death of Mir Jan Begum, the general power of attorney in favour of her son Farooq Abdullah and the special power of attorney in favour of Mr. Dar by Farooq Abdullah stand revoked and therefore, Mr. Dar ceases to be the agent of the owner, thus, he could not sustain and pursue the ejectment application; that plea, in the facts and circumstances of the case, has no relevance, because I have already held, that it is Muhammad Khalil Dar who was the landlord of the property and, therefore, irrespective whether the power of attorney given to him had lost its efficacy or stood annulled on account of the death of the Principal, he continues to be the landlord of the property as far as the present tenancy was concerned.
11. For the other question, whether the legal representatives of Muhammad Khalil Dar can be brought on the record in his place, suffice it to say that when Mr. Dar has been held to be the landlord of the appellant, obviously, his legal representatives would be legally entitled to substitute after his death.
' In the light of above, I do not find any merit in this appeal, which is hereby dismissed with costs throughout