1. ' SAHIB KHAN, J.--- The facts giving rise to the present writ petition are that the petitioners/accused are charged in F.I.R. No,392 of 2005 of Police Station City Gilgit, registered on 6-8-2005 under section 324/34, P.P.C. Read with sections 6/7 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. After completion of investigation challan was submitted before Anti-Terrorism Court, Gilgit, and trial of the case against the accused/petitioners commenced. During the trial of the case, petitioners moved an application claiming themselves to be underage and within the purview of Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000. They maintained that they could only be tried by a Juvenile Court constituted under the said Ordinance. The application of the petitioners was denied by the learned Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court vide his impugned order, dated 17-12-2005. Petitioners/accused feeling aggrieved from the impugned order, have assailed through the instant writ petition.
2. ' We have heard the counsel for the petitioners and learned Advocate-General for the respondent at some length and have carefully attended their submissions. The record to the case perused.
3. ' The learned counsel for the petitioners argued that since the Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000 has especially been enacted and enforced throughout the country including Northern Areas is a special law giving effect to trials against juvenile accused. Moreover, it being a later law having overriding effect on the previous law i.e. Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, therefore, the trial against the accused below the age of 18 years is exclusively triable by the Court especially constituted under Ordinance, 2000, and Courts established under Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 having no jurisdiction to try a case against juvenile accused. He in support of his contentions cited case-law reported in 2005 MLD 1028.
4. ' The learned Advocate-General while opposing the contentions of the opposite counsel took plea that the impugned order having legal force is tenable as the learned Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court, has very rightly appreciated the issue. The charges of 6/7 of Anti-Terrorism Act are exclusively triable by the Court constituted under Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. Trial under these provisions of law cannot take place before a Court constituted under Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000 is barred. He referred section 2(d), section 32 and case-laws reported in PLD 2004 Lah. 779 and 2000 PCr.LJ 1418 (Karachi).
5. ' After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and going through the record it is not difficult to observe that by virtue of provisions of sections 12, 19(3) and 21-G of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 and Anti-Terrorism Court constituted under the said Act has the exclusive jurisdiction to try any offence of terrorism, whereas, by virtue of provisions contained in section 4(3) of Juvenile Justice System Ordinance has the exclusive jurisdiction to try a juvenile accused for commission of any offence.
6. Thus, the former Court has an exclusive jurisdiction to try cases pertaining to terrorism etc. While, the former Court has an exclusive jurisdiction to try offences committed by child accused (underage of 18 years). Petitioners claim to be juvenile/children but they are being accused of committing terrorism acts etc. The question arises as to which Court will have jurisdiction to try the case against the petitioners. We feel that the point involved in case is although complicated but not unsolvable for the reason that an offender cannot be tried by a Court having no jurisdiction over the offence committed by such offender and offence of terrorism can be tried only by Anti- Terrorism Act, 1997 (amended 2001) and the age of offender has no relevancy to the Court of such jurisdiction. The expressed provisions of sections 2(d), 21-C(5), 21-C(7)(e), 21-C(7)-F and 21-F of the Act 1997 clearly give the picture that a child below the age of eighteen years can validly be tried by an Anti-Terrorism Court constituted under the said Act of 1997. Our view is further strengthened by the provision of section 32 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 which unambiguously provides that the provisions of the said Act are to have overriding effect over all other laws as against that the provisions of section 14 of Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000 expressly provide that the provisions of the said Ordinance shall be in addition to and not in derogation of any other law for the time being in force. Section 32 of the Anti-Terrorism Court, 1997 and section 14 of the Ordinance, 2000 are reproduced below:-- ' Section 32 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 "32. Overriding effect of Act.--- (1) The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the Code or any other law but, save as expressly provided in this Act, the provisions of the Code, shall so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, apply to the proceedings before a Anti-Terrorism Court shall be deemed to be a Court of Sessions."
7. ' Section 14 of Ordinance, 2000 "14. Ordinance not to derogate from other laws.
8. "The provisions of this Ordinance shall be in addition to and not in derogation of, any other law for the time being in force."
9. ' The contentions of the learned counsel for petitioners are that the Ordinance, 2000, being a later law having an overriding effect on other laws is already in force. We feel it that this contention lacks weight for the reason that undoubtedly, Juvenile Justice System Ordinance was introduced when the Act, 1997, was already enforced containing all its provisions especially provisions relating to a trial of child by an Anti-Terrorism Court. We believe that the law-makers were quite conscious of the said fact despite that the juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000 was not given overriding effect by the Legislature on the other laws including Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, hence, the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner does not have any force that the Ordinance, 2000, being a later law was to have precedence over the Act, 1997. If the Legislature had so intention, then, it could have expressly been provided in the Ordinance, 2000 or could have omitted the relevant provisions of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 pertaining to a child's trial by Anti-Terrorism Court. The bare reading of section 14 of the Ordinance, 2000 strengthens our opinion that the later law does not curtail or limit the power of Anti-Terrorism Court pertaining to child's trial but further B regularize it with the provisions of this Ordinance shall be in addition to and not in derogation of any other law for time being in force.
10. ' This provision of law, if taken into consideration with section 32 of the Anti-Terrorism Court there remains no ambiguity to determine the legal position of the case through providing both the provisions in the under consideration laws, one should not confuse himself for the trial of the child who is involved in the case of terrorism. This aspect may not be forgotten that after promulgation of Juvenile Justice System Ordinance in 2000, the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 was drastically changed in 2001, rather one can say that this Act was rewritten by the Legislature through the Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Ordinance (XXXIX of 2000) promulgated on 15-8-2001, but even on that moment, the relevant provisions contained in the original Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 pertaining to a trial of a child by Anti-Terrorism Court, constituted under Anti-Terrorism Act were not taken away by the Legislature, could easily be presumed that Legislature practically reinforced the relevant provisions relating to trial of a child accused committed any offence triable by the Anti-Terrorism Court or Act defined in the Anti-Terrorism Act as act of terrorism.
11. Thus, we in the light of above discussions are clear in mind that the trial of a child as defined in Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000 involved in a case of terrorism as defined in Anti- Terrorism Act, 1997 can legitimately be tried by a Court established under Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 and provisions contained in Juvenile Justice System Ordinance, 2000, does not affect the trial of a child before a Court established under Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997.
12. ' We have noticed that the view expressed by the learned brother Judges in a reported case-law 2005 MLD 1028, is different from the view taken above by us, but we observe with profound respect that the learned Judges of Lahore High Court might not have properly been assisted in the matter.
13. For the reason what has been discussed above, this writ petition found having no legal force, is dismissed. The impugned order dated 17-12-2005, passed by the Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court, Gilgit, is upheld.