' JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, J.--- Khizar Hayat petitioner-defendant impugns the appellate judgment and decree dated 1-7-2006 whereby the decree of the learned A trial Court dated 31-1-2006 has been set aside with the result that the suit for preemption filed by Ali Muhammad respondent- plaintiff has been decreed.
2. The trial Court while deciding issues Nos.1 and 6, held that the respondent-plaintiff had failed to prove the talbs required under section 13 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act. The findings on these issues have been reversed by the learned appellate Court. Learned counsel for the petitioner has taken me through the testimony of the respondent-plaintiff who himself appeared as P.W.1. And his witness Nazar Muhammad (P.W.3). In material particulars these two witnesses have contradicted each other. In his examinationin-chief, the plaintiff did not state as to who had informed him of the sale and nor did he state the time and place at which he was informed of the sale. He simply deposed that on 4-6-2001 he came to know of the sale. However, in cross-examination he stated that Noor Muhammad, Lumberdar, had informed him that the sale had been effected for a consideration of Rs,1,50,000. Nazar Muhammad (P.W.3), however, claimed that he had informed the plaintiff of the same. According to learned counsel this by itself is a material discrepancy in the evidence led by the respondent-plaintiff and had rightly been relied upon by the learned trial Court while dismissing the suit of the respondent-plaintiff. It was pointed out that Noor Muhammad, Lumberdar, who had allegedly informed the respondent, of the sale, was never produced as a witness.
3. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent-plaintiff submitted that Noor Muhammad, Lumberdar, had only informed the respondent of the amount paid as consideration and he was not the person who gave intimation of the sale to the respondent. Even if this submission is accepted, it was acknowledged by learned counsel that the respondent had not given the name of the informant in his testimony. This circumstance also shows that the respondent was not been truthful. In this view of the matter, it was not possible for the petitioner-defendant to cross-examine the respondent in relation to talb-emuwathibat and to impeach his credibility.
4. Unfortunately, the learned appellate Court has not taken note of the material shortcomings in the testimony of the respondent-plaintiff and nor has it met the reasoning of the learned trial Court for deciding issues Nos.1 and 6 against the c respondent-plaintiff.
5. Learned counsel for the respondent referred to the case titled Yar Muhammad Khan v. Bashir Muhammad (PLD 2003 Peshawar 179) to argue, firstly, that minor discrepancies in the evidence of the witnesses were not sufficient for discrediting such witnesses. In the present case, however, the failure of the respondent to name the person who had informed him of the sale is a material lapse.
The respondent, therefore, must suffer its consequences. The cited precedent, therefore, does not advance the case of the respondent-plaintiff.
6. In view of the foregoing discussion, the impugned appellate decree dated 1-7-2006 is set aside and the decree of the learned trial Court dated 31-1-2006 is affirmed.