' The petitioner in this case is aggrieved by the registration of F. I. R. No, 44 dated 3-2-1979 at Police Station, Saddar Sialkot, whereby he is accused to have deprived his former employer Messrs Him.a Trading & Contracting Company, Musqat-Oman of a sum equivalent to Pak. Rs, 1,38,000.
2. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner was serving as an Accountant with Messrs Hima Trading and Contracting Company, Musqat. Having completed two years service with the company he came over to Pakistan on a month's leave, returned to Musqat in January, 1979, took over the charge of his post on 16-1-1979 and drew several cheques on the account of his employer with the bankers at Musqat equivalent to Pakistani Rs, 1,38,000 in the aggregate which he is accused to have embezzled. An F. I. R. Was lodged at. Police Station, Saddar Sialkot, on the complaint of one A. H. Malik for an offence under section 408, P. P. C.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn my attention to the provisions of section 188, Cr.
P. C. To contend that a citizen of Pakistan is liable to stand trial in Pakistan in respect of an offence which he may have committed without and beyond the limits of Pakistan as if it had been committed at any place in Pakistan. He, however, contends that the first proviso to section 188, Cr.
P. C. Limits the operation of the substantive clause by providing that no charge as to any such offence shall be "enquired into" in Pakistan unless the political Agent, if there is one, for the territory in which the offence is alleged to have been committed certifies that in his s opinion the charge ought to be enquired into in Pakistan. However, in respect of a place where there is no Political Agent the sanction of the Federal Government shall be necessary.
4. The learned counsel in the first instance asserted that the consent of the Federal Government having not been obtained, the registration of the case was ab initio, illegal and unjustified. However, he later conceded that the proviso will apply only when any "charge as to any offence has to be "enquired into" by the State will have no application to the registration of a case by the Officer Incharge of a Police Station in terms of section 154, Cr. P. C.
5. The learned counsel for the respondent asserted that the expression "no charge as to any such offence shall be enquired into" used in the first proviso to section 188, Cr. P. C. Would cover cases of an "inquiry" by a Magistrate within the meaning of clause (k) to subsection (1) of section 4, Cr. P. C.
And would not for that reason place any embargo on investigations. According to the learned counsel an "inquiry" is to be essentially conducted by a Magistrate and investigations by the, police do not for that reason constitute, actions falling within the purview of prohibitions contemplated by section 188, Cr. P. C. He, therefore, argued that the prosecution shall have the right to proceed against the accused and to complete the investigation but the case cannot be sent up for trial before the sanction of the Federal Government is received. The provisions of clause (k) of subsection (1) of section 4, Cr. P. C. Read as under:- "Inquiry" includes every inquiry other than a trial conducted under this Code by a Magistrate or Court."
' A bare reading of the definition leaves no manner of doubt that it has the effect of enlarging the ordinary meaning of the word "inquiry". There is nothing in this clause to restrict the ordinary meaning of the word "inquiry" in the manner suggested by the learned counsel: To suggest that the word "inquiry" which under clause (k) of subsection (1) of section 4, Cr. P. C. Has an enlarged meaning has been used in a rather restricted sense would be a contradiction in terms. There is nothing in the language of the first proviso to section 188, Cr. P. C. To restrict its scope to trial or judicial inquiry by a Magistrate. The argument does not find support from any other provision of law for the time being in force.
6. For the forgoing reasons I am unable to agree with the learned counsel that the expression "no charge as to any offence shall be enquired into in Pakistan" refers to trials or inquiries conducted by a Magistrate under Chapter XVIII. If that were the intention of the Legislature there was nothing to prevent it from making the prohibitory provisions applicable to trials alone. To my mind the language is suggestive of the anxiety of the Legislature to protect the citizens against vexatious proceedings.
' I have no doubt that in a case like the present even if two interpretations) were possible the one favourable to the subject shall have to be adopted. 'c Thus I am of the view that while an F. I. R.
Might be recorded the charge levelled cannot be "enquired into" in Pakistan without perior permission of the Political Agent or the Federal Government as the case may he. I am unable to agree with the learned counsel that when police investigates it does not enquire into the charges against the accused in Pakistan.
7. For the foregoing reasons I am of the view that the expression "no charge as to any such offence shall be enquired into" has not been used in the restricted sense in which the learned counsel for the respondent would like me to interpret. The prosecution would, therefore, need the sanction of the Federal Government before they can enquire into the charges against the petitioner. Under the circumstances while I decline the prayer for cancellation of the F. I. R. The petition is allowed to this extent that the prosecution shall not proceed to investigate the case before obtaining the sanction from the Federal Government under the first proviso to section 188, Cr. P. C.
3. The petition is allowed as indicated above but there shall be no order as to costs.