' IJAZ-UL-HASSAN KHAN, J.--- By virtue of sale Mutation No,1112 attested on 9-8-2001, suit-land, owned by Muhammad Ajmal, vendor was purchased by Javed Ahinad and his brother Saeed Ahmad, vendee-defendants, for a consideration of Rs,1,30,000. Syed Amir Khan, plaintiff on 7-11- 2002, filed a suit for possession of the said land by preemption. According to him, the land, had, in fact been sold for Rs,20,000, but the amount over and above it was inserted in the suit mutation in order to frustrate his right of pre-emption. It was claimed that plaintiff acquired knowledge of the sale of the land on 26-10-2001 in the village mosque after "Juma" congregation through one Misbahuddin son of Ghulam Yahya Qureshi. He immediately declared intention to preempt and thereafter in presence of Muhammad Sherin son of Muhammad Rahim and Badshah Gul son of Torbaz, issued registered notice of Talbi-Ishhad on the following day i,e, 27-10-2001, which was duly received by the defendants. It was averred that plaintiff being co-sharer, contiguous owner and participator in immunities and appendages of suit-land, possessed preferential right of pre- emption, qua defendants, who were not equipped with this qualification.
2. The suit was resisted by the vendee-defendants on various grounds legal as well as factual, superior right of pre-emption of the preemptor was denied and requirements of Talbs were stated to have not been fulfilled according to law. The parties were put to trial on the following issues:--
(1) Whether the plaintiff has cause of action?
(2) Whether the suit is incompetent and baseless?
(3) Whether the suit is time-barred?
(4) Whether the plaintiff has fulfilled the Talbs according to law?
(5) Whether the plaintiff is co-sharer and his property is attached and joint with the suit-land?
(6) Whether the plaintiff has easement rights in suit-land?
(7) Whether Rs,1,30,000 were actually fixed as sale consideration and were paid in good faith to the vendor?
(8) What is the actual price of suit-land?
(9) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the decree as prayed for?
(10) Relief.
3. At the conclusion of the trial, the learned Civil Judge, Kohat, seized of the matter, in view of his finding on Issue No,4, dismissed the suit by judgment and decree, dated 19-1-2004, holding that the evidence produced by the pre-emptor was discrepant and contradictory and requirements of Talbs had not been fulfilled. An appeal was preferred thereagainst before the learned District Judge, Kohat. The appeal was accepted, judgment and decree of the trial Court was set aside and suit was decreed on payment of Rs,1,30,000 by virtue of judgment dated 11-7-2005.
4. The petitioners, feeling aggrieved thereby, have filed instant civil revision, which is before me for consideration.
5. Mr. Atlas Khan Dagai, Advocate appearing for the petitioners strenuously contended that impugned judgment has been recorded in a mechanical manner without application of independent judicial mind and in total disregard to the material on file, which has resulted in manifest injustice. He also urged that the learned Appellate Court had no justification to accept the appeal and set aside a detailed judgment of the trial Court without assigning any reason.
6. On the contrary, Mr. Tasleem Hussain, Advocate, representing the respondent, refuted the arguments of learned counsel for the petitioners and supported the impugned judgment whole heartedly, maintaining that same is neither contrary to the evidence on record nor in violation of the principle of administration of justice, warranting interference of this Court in its revisional jurisdiction.
7. Truly, the standard for appraisal of evidence in civil cases is different from that applied in criminal cases, as both laws have laid down different standards of proof. In the instant case, in the plaint as well as in his statement recorded as P.W.5, the pre-emptor has fully established his case and stated that on learning about the sale on 26-10-2001 in the village mosque, after the Juma prayers, through Misbahuddin, he there and then declared his intention to pre-empt the sale and thereafter in presence of Muhammad Sherin and Badshah Gul of his village, issued registered notice of Talb-i-Ishhad on 27-10-2001, which was duly received by the defendants. Both the witnesses have testified the assertion of the pre-emptor and have demonstrated complete unanimity on all important facts of the case. Though they were subjected to lengthy and searching cross-examination, but nothing could be elicited to shake their credibility. Although it has been urged that the impugned judgment suffers from misreading and non-reading of evidence, yet the learned counsel for the petitioners despite his best efforts could not point out any portion of the evidence which has either been misread or non-read by the Appellate Court. The submissions of learned counsel for the petitioners that the reasons given by the trial Court on the basis of evidence on the record are well-founded and are weighty than the Court of appeal and that the Court of appeal without considering the material on record, in a sketchy and for unfounded reasons, by drawing illegal assumption of the fact, has recorded the finding which cannot be allowed to remain intact, does not carry weight. The contradictions and omissions highlighted are inconsequential and do not cause dent in the pre-emptor's case. In this regard reliance can be placed on a judgment of this Court titled Yar Muhammad Khan v. Bashir Ahmad PLD 2003 Pesh.
179. There is no good ground to hold that Talb-i-Muwathibat was not performed in accordance with law. Section 13(3) of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1987 contains the words "Making Talb-i- Ishhad by sending a notice in writing attested by two truthful witnesses under registered cover and the acknowledgement due to the vendee,.." It has never been the intention of law to compel the pre-emptor to prove that the notices were received by the vendees-defendants. The only duty of the pre-emptor is to prove that he/she sent the notices and that has been proved by the plaintiff- preemptor of this case. No efforts have been made by the vendeesdefendants to show that something else than the notices were sent to them through the registered A.D. Letters. Admittedly, respondent possesses superior right of pre-emption in respect of suit-land qua the petitioners, who are devoid of this qualification. Karachi Metropolitan Corporation and another v. Paheel Ghyas and 3 others 1995 M LD 141, Messrs Shafco International v. Chairman, Pakistan Telecommunication Corporation, Islamabad and 4 others 1995 M LD 146, Muhammad Ayub v. Mst. Nasim Akhtar and 7 others 2003 M LD 1349, Muhammad Ismail v. Maqbool Ahmad and 8 others 2001 CLC 252, Messrs Syed Tasnim Hussain Naqvi v. Federation of Pakistan through. Secretary/Chairman, Railway Board, Islamabad and 10 others 2001 CLC 256 and Muhammad Mubarik Ali v. Muhammad Abdullah 2002 M LD 1073.
8. In my view, as the impugned judgment is neither contrary to the evidence on record nor in violation of the principle of administration of justice, thus, the judgment of the learned Appellate Court should ordinarily be preferred. The judgment of the trial Court is not sustainable in law. The said judgment as compared to the learned Appellate Court's judgment suffers from grave legal errors, which have been rectified by the Appellate Court by reversing findings of the trial Court and substituting its own findings which are supported by reasons.
' In the ultimate analysis, I am of the firm view that the judgment of the Appellate Court does .Not suffer from any infirmity or jurisdictional defect within the contemplation of section 115, C.P.C., amenable to the interference of this Court in its revisional jurisdiction. The civil revision fails, which is hereby dismissed, with no order as to costs.