' KHALILUR RAHMAN, J.-As common questions of law and facts arise, I propose to dispose of Criminal Miscellaneous No, 727-Q/78 and Criminal Miscellaneous No, 728-Q/78 by a single order. Both are for abashment of proceedings pending against the petitioner in the Court of Special Judge, Anti- Corruption, Lahore-I.
2. Facts relevant to the disposal of this petition, briefly stated are, that in the year, 1963 petitioner Mirza Abdul Karim and Muhammad Idrees, were holding charges in Kanganpur Sub-Division as Sub-Divisional Officer, Executive Engineer and Overseer, respectively. On the statement of Ghulam Mohyuddin, Sub-Divisional Clerk, District Montgomery (presently Sahiwal) after some preliminary inquiry by a local Magistrate, ordered the registration of the case under various sections of the Pakistan Penal Code read with section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act II of 1947. Sanction to prosecute was accorded by a competent authority on 18-10-1968. Matter remained under investigation for about 10 years and ultimately two separate challans, viz., 136/1 (subject-matter of Cr. Misc. 727-Q/78) relating to the embezzlement of a sum of Rs, 4,044 and the other 137/1 (subject- matter of Criminal Miscellaneous 728-Q/78) regarding tampering of the record and embezzlement of Rs, 1,645 were submitted in the Court of Special Judge, Multan, on 11-2-1973. Under order of this Court dated 22-10-1973, cases were transferred to the file of Special Judge, Anti-Corruption, Lahore and are thus pending before him.
3. Two main grounds : firstly that time is of the essence of the competency of a criminal prosecution and that delay of about 16 years in the disposal of these matters amounts to abuse of the process of the Court and perversion of purpose of law and, therefore, time has reached that this Court, in its inherent jurisdiction should bring these proceedings to a close and secondly that perusal of the evidence collected during the investigation shows that no case as alleged by the prosecution is made out and there is no probability of the petitioner's being convicted of any offence, the proceeding need to be quashed even on the merits raised at the hearing.
4. Taking up the second point first, I find no merit in the same. I have perused various annexures annexed to this petition and find no difficulty in arriving at a finding that it cannot be said that no case for trial is made out. This Court in its inherent jurisdiction cannot take upon itself the task of a trial Court and appreciate the evidence collected by the Police during the investigation. This aspect of the case, therefore, does not detain me any more.
5. First contention raised, however, needs consideration. On this aspect of the case, I even sent for a report from the learned trial Judge. It has been disclosed that the files were received in the Court for the first time on 8-12-1973 The petitioner and co-accused. Muhammad Idrees were on bail.
Mirza Abdul Karim Beg was reported to be dead. (The petitioner has however, controverted this fact and in the event the proceedings are not quashed the learned trial Judge may look into this aspect). It took about six months before the presence of the petitioner and co-accused Muhammad Idrees could be procured. Both the accused for the first time appeared on 6-3-1969.
Copies of the prosecution witnesses were given to them and they were formally charge-sheeted on 26-3-74. At the request of the petitioner his personal attendance was dispensed with vide order dated 17-7-74. He was directed to appear in person on 28-8-74 but he remained absent on a number of occasions and case had to be adjourned on each occasion. His bail bonds were ultimately forfeited vide order of the trial Court dated 21-3-75 and the surety was asked to show cause as to why the confiscated amount be not realized from him. The surety then moved this Court in a revision questioning the correctness of the order dated 21-3-75. File was summoned by this Court and sent back only on 18-6-78. Before the proceedings could restart, petitioner moved the present applications. I sent for the record with a view to appreciate the circumstances under which such an inordinate delay had occasioned in the disposal of the cases. As facts noticed above would show the delay with effect from the submission of the challah in the Courts is mainly due to the manipulation of petitioner. Petitioner. Therefore, cannot seek abashment of the proceedings on the ground of delay that has occasioned due to his own fault. The aspect, therefore remains to be seen is if the delay caused during the investigation of a case can be made basis for quashment of proceedings pending in Court. With the help of the learned counsel for the parties, I have gone through some of the reported cases. In Ghulam Qadir Khan v. The State (1) a Division Bench of this Court after surveying the case-law at some length has taken the view that delay at investigation stage and delay during trial cannot be distinguished. Proceedings instituted after eight years of the registration of the case were accordingly quashed. It was observed:- "In view of all these circumstances it seems to us that the institution of criminal proceedings in Court, after nearly eight years of the registration of the cases, constitutes a clear abuse of the process of the Court and this Court will be failing in its duty if it did not intervene to stop this abuse."
' In the case of M. S. Khawaja v. The State (2), the Supreme Court considered Ghulam Qadir Khan's case and also an earlier case titled as Fazal Karirn v. The State (3) and took somewhat different view. It was held:- "The impression is gained from these quotations that in the learned Single Judge's view time was of the essence for the competency of a criminal prosecution, and to that extent, we must observe that his views cannot be accepted as of universal application. Limitation does not apply to criminal prosecution, and it is also inappropriate to examine questions of delay through the actions of the Government, or the prosecution authorities, as if they gave rise to equities on the same footing as in a civil matter inter partes. Every prosecution for a criminal offence is to be deemed to have been commenced and continued in the public interest, as a duty of the State. It can only be in a very rare case that a superior Court acting under its inherent power "to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice", would deem it appropriate to act so as to place an alleged offence outside the operation of the criminal law, on incidental grounds such as that of delay, or for any reasons other than reasons going to the question whether the allegation is sufficient to constitute an accusation of offence in law."
' The view taken by this Court in Ghulam Qadir Khan's case was approved as besides delay certain other factor were also considered by this Court quashing the proceedings. Rule for guidance was laid thus:- "These circumstances are certainly of weight to support the abashment ordered in that case. We say so in order to emphasise that each case of the present kind must rest on its own peculiar facts and circumstances."
' Supreme Court reaffirmed the view taken in M. S. Khawaja's case in Ghulam Muhammad v.
Muzarnmal Khan and 4 others (4). It was observed :- "The High Court, as has repeatedly been pointed out in a number of decisions, should be extremely reluctant to interfere in a case
(1) PLD 1963 Lab. 32 (2) PLD 1965 SC 287
(3) PLD 1957 Lab. 837 (4) PLD 1967 SC 317 ' where a competent Court has after examining the evidence adduced before it come to the view that a prima facie case is disclosed and has framed charges or summoned the accused to appear, unless it can be said that the charge on its face or the evidence, even if believed, does not disclose any offence."
6. The learned Single Judge in the case of Muhammad Nasim v. The State (I), in the circumstances that 10 years had passed between the committal of the offence and the decision of the petition before him was pleased to observe:- "It was last') urged that ten long years had passed between the committal of the alleged offence and the decision of this petition resulting in heavy expect se and agonizing suspense for him so the commencement of his trial after such an inordinate delay would amount to the abuse of the process ,of the Court, but delay howsoever long and languishing caused by the manoeuvres of the petitioner himself cannot be adopted as a ground for quashing these proceedings in a case involving such a moral turpitude."
' Supreme Court in a recent case reported as Rahmat All and another v. State (.), on the facts somewhat similar to the case in hand has held:- "It is true that the offences with which the appellants are charged allegedly took place in 1975 but the delay by itself does not furnish a proper ground for discharging the accused of such serious offences."
' The view taken in M. S. Khawaja's case was followed. In Naseem Haider Jafry and 4 others v. The State (3), Supreme Court was not persuaded to quash the proceedings 'merely' on the ground of lapse of long period since institution of the case.
8. The view that preponderates is that mere delay in the disposal of criminal case cannot be accepted as a ground for abashment proceedings C These petitions, therefore, have no merit and are dismissed accordingly. Office to send back the record to the trial Court immediately.
(1) PLD 1975 Lah. 651 (2) 1976 SCMR 204
(3) PLD 1977 SC 49 revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.