' MUHAMMAD NAWAZ ABBASI, J.--- This direct appeal under Article 185(2)(d) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan has been preferred against the judgment, dated 8-12-2003 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Civil Revision No,372 of 2000 whereby the concurrent findings of two Courts on the question of performance of Talbs in a suit for pre-emption, have been reversed and the decree passed in the suit has been set aside.
2. The essential facts leading to the filing of instant appeal are that Nadar Khan, respondent herein, filed a suit for pre-emption against the petitioner in respect of sale of land measuring 10 Kanals, 15 Marlas situated in Seeray Tehsil Phalia District Mandi Bahauddin, which took place on 13-12-1994.
The pre-emptor, as per averments of the plaint claimed that he having come to know about the sale at 7 p.m. On 20-2-1995 through Muhammad Yar, announced for exercising the right of pre- emption and having fulfilled the requirement of Talb-iMuwathibat, sent notice of Talb-e-Ishhad to the vendee on 26=2-1995. The suit was contested by the vendee and learned trial Judge in the light of pleadings of the parties and evidence led by them, decreed the suit vide judgment, dated 5-11- 1996. The decree was further maintained by the learned Additional District Judge vide judgment, dated 10-2-2000 passed in appeal tiled by the appellant which was set aside by the High Court in revisional jurisdiction by reversing the concurrent findings of the two Courts on the question of performance of Talb-i-Muwathibat and dismissed the suit.
3. The contentious issue before us in the present appeal is whether Talb-i-Muwathibat was or was not performed by the pre-emptor in accordance with the requirement of law. Learned counsel for the appellant has contended that the pre-emptor immediately on corning to know about the transaction of sale there and then, opted for exercise of right of pre-emption in presence of witnesses and mere fact that in the plaint the time of making Talb-i-Muwathibat was mentioned as 7-00 p.m. Whereas the pre-emptor as well as the witness in their statements before the Court have stated that Talb-i-Muwathibat was made at Magharbwela, would have no material effect to be considered a valid ground to defeat the suit. Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, has argued that requirement of the law is that pre-emptor must make a jumping demand for exercise or right of pre-emption on coming to know about the sale but in the present case, there is material contradiction in the statements of the pre-emptor and witnesses in respect of the time of making Talb-i-Muwathibat given in the plaint which would lead to an inference that pre- emptor has not fulfilled the requirement of Talb-iMuwathibat in the spirit of law and thus, the High Court has rightly non-suited the pre-emptor.
4. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record with their help we are not persuaded to agree with the conclusion drawn by the High Court. There is ample evidence on record to show that the pre-emptor immediately on coining to know about the sale, announced for exercise of the right of pre-emption and mere fact that in the plaint instead of giving time of making Talb-i-Muwathibat "Maghrabwela" it was mentioned 7 p.m., would not be sufficient to negate the claim of pre-emptor of making jumping demand for exercise of right of pre-emption.
Magharbwela in general terms is not confined only to the Maghrab prayer time rather it continues till start of Ishawela and thus, the difference of time, pointed out by the learned Judge in the High Court would be of no significance, to non-suit the pre-emptor. The careful examination of evidence would show that High Court having A misread the evidence, reversed the concurrent finding of two Courts on the question of performance of Talb-i-Muwathibat in revisional jurisdiction. This is settled principle of law that interfere= in the revisional jurisdiction in the concurrent finding of fact even if erroneous on a question of fact or mixed question of law and facts through reappraisal of evidence is beyond the scope of this jurisdiction. The High Court in the present case, having misconception of the factual position regarding the time of performance of Talb-i-Muwathibat, while travelling on wrong premises, has drawn the conclusion contrary to law and facts of the case.
5. We having heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record with their assistance, have not been able to find out any defect of misreading or non-reading of evidence or any other legal or factual infirmity in the conclusion of the evidence drawn by the Court of first instance and the Appellate Court to justify interference of the High Court in revisional jurisdiction.
6. In the light of foregoing reasons we are constrained to hold that High Court was not correct in reversing the concurrent findings of the two Courts on the mixed question of law and fact in revisional jurisdiction through reappraisal of evidence and consequently, we while setting aside the judgment of the High Court restore that of the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court and affirmed by the Appellate Court. This appeal is accordingly allowed with no orders as to costs. .