On 21.12.1954 Makhdoom Hussain Bakhsh, the predecessor in interest of the respondents filed a suit against the appellants. It was stated in the plaint that the Darbar Hazrat Hafiz Muhammad Jamal Ullah Sahib (hereinafter to be referred to as the said shrine) is located in Daulat Gate, Multan City. It is a sacred place where the disciples of the saint used to visit. The Darbar is in an Ihata where there is the Mazar of the said saint, there are Kothris, Verandas, Majlis Khana, a graveyard and adjacent towards the North of the Khanqah is a Sarai and then there is a Mosque. All this property is fully described in the heading of the plaint. All this property is a private Waqf. The Waqf is administered by a Sajjada Nashin who is also the Matwali who manages the same. The first Sajjada Nashin and Matwali was Makhdoom Ghulam Sarwar son of Mian Mehr Ali and thereafter the office is continuing in his generation inasmuch as the son of the Sajjada Nashin assumes the office on his death, Makhdoom Ahmad Yar, Sajjada Nashin and Matwali, was the, father of the said plaintiff who died on 14.9.1953 and the plaintiff became the Sajjada Nashin and has been accepted as such by the respectables and the disciples and is performing his duties as such and is in control of the said property. It was then stated that the several items of the shrine detailed in para-4 of the plaint, are in the house where Ahmad Yar used to live with Defendant No. 3, his widow. However, when the defendants were called upon to return the said items, they refused. It was then explained that Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 were the consanguine brothers of the plaintiff while Defendant No. 3 is a step-mother while Defendants Nos. 4 and 5 are the brothers of Defendant No. 3. They have started denying that the plaintiff is the Sajjada Nashin and Matwali and have started interfering with the affairs of the shrine. With these averments, a declaration was sought that the plaintiff is the Sajjada Nashin and Matwali of the said shrine and is entitled to remain in possession and control of the same and to receive the income of the shrine and the defendants be restrained from interfering with his said functions. The Defendant No. 1, on the one hand and the remaining defendants, on the other, filed separate written statements in which it was objected that the plaintiff is not in possession whereas the defendants are in possession except the Mosque. The plan of the property was stated to be incorrect. On merits, it was stated that the saint was not a collateral of the defendants. He was married in their family and died issueless. He was accordingly buried in the property owned by them defendants. The land underneath the shrine is personal property of all the parties and in their possession. In the same breath, it was stated that income of the shrine is received by them. Similarly, it was stated that the Sarai is their personal property. Regarding the Mosque, it was stated that it has no connection with the shrine. It was then stated that there is no Sarai. The Sajjada Nashin is appointed by the brotherhood and the Sajjada Nashin in office. The shrine and the other property is in possession of the defendants and they are receiving the income while the Sajjada Nashin supervises their functions. Now it was admitted that Mian Ahmad Yar was the Sajjada Nashin but it was stated that he appointed Defendant No 1 as a Sajjada Nashin and the brotherhood endorsed the said decision and as such he is performing the functions of the Sajjada Nashin. The items mentioned in para-4 of the plaint were also stated to be personal property and not Waqf property. Issues were framed. Evidence of the parties was recorded. The learned trial Court partly decreed the suit inasmu ch as a decree for possession of shrine, Majliskhana, Tajjar, and Hujras of the Mosque, a Shamyna and a Ghilaf was passed in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants who were also restrained from interfering with the rights of the plaintiff to manage the shrine and other property attached to it and also receiving offerings at the Shrine. This was done vide judgment and decree dated 13.10.1958. Both the parties filed first appeals which were heard together by a learned Additional District Judge, Multan. Vide judgment and decree sated 14.2.1996 appeal filed by the plaintiff was allowed while the one filed by the petitioners was dismissed. The result was that the suit was decreed as prayed for.
2. Learned counsel for the appellants contends that the evidence on record has been mis-read by both the learned Courts below while passing the impugned judgments and decrees. According to them, there was no Waqf and no Waqf property ensued. They particularly draw my attention to documents Ex. P. 26 and 28 to urge that the entire suit property was the private property of the parties and not Waqf property. The learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, contends that, admittedly, the entire property is within the Ihata of the said shrine and preponderance of the evidence on record rather admitted position is that the same is being used for purposes of shrine, particularly with reference to the Sarai and the Langarkhana while the remaining property comprises of the Mazar, Mosque and the graveyard. According to him, no question of law arises in this R.S.A.
3. I have gone through the records as noted by me in order dated 19.7.2006. With agreement of learned counsel for both the parties, this appeal has been heard on the basis of paper book printed under the orders of this Court while the initial first appeal was filed here.
4. Now Ex.PW-13/1 available at pages 234 to 271 of the said paper book is the Fard Intikhab Jamabandi of Village Tarf Khalsa. Now I find that the said parties are recorded in the column of ownership. However, so far as the suit property is concerned, it is recorded to be Ghair Mumkan Ihata Khanqah Qabristan, Ghair Mumkan Sarai, Ghair Mumkan Rasta, Ghair Mumkan Arazi Qabal-i- Tameer, Ghair Mumkhan Masjid and Ghair Mumkan Qabristan. Now Ex. P. 26 is an application filed by the said Makhdoom Ahmad Yar before the Nazim Auqaf. The learned counsel for the appellants refers to para-2 of the said application to urge that there was no Waqfnama and that it is a private Waqf. Now nothing turns on the same for the reason that the said Makhdoom stated in the said application filed in the year 1952 that he is the Sajjada Nashin which, in any case, is an admitted fact and that the said office is coming since generations in the progeny of Makhdoom Mehr Ali for more than hundred years. If at all the contents of the said application support the plaint. Similarly, so far as Ex.P. 28 is concerned, this is also a statement of said Makhdoom Ahmad Yar. The learned counsel points out that Makhdoom stated that no house, shop or land is Waqf in the name of he said Khanqah. However, I find that the said' statement is to be read as a whole. Now the said Makhdoom while stating that there is no written Waqf but he explained that the Ihata of Khanqah measures 2 kanals whereas there is a Roza, Majliskhana, graveyard, Veranda, courtyard, four Kothris for the visitors, a Sarai towards North on one Baigha and that there are 15 Kothris and 3 Verandas, Kothris and these are used by the visitors without paying any charges. To my mind, this document also fully supports the judgment recorded by the learnpd Additional District Judge.
5. This Court also appointed a Local Commissioner who inspected the site and filed a report with a plan and according to the said report as well " all that property is within the bounds of the said shrine.
6. Now I have also gone through the evidence and I find that the same has been properly read by the learned Additional District Judge, while modifying the decree passed by the learned trial Court.
There is no denial on record that the said property is not being used for the purposes of the said C shrine since time immemorial. Having, thus, gone through the records, I do not find any question of law arising in this R.S.A. while the learned counsel for the appellants failed to point out any mis- reading or non-reading of the evidence on record by the learned Additional District Judge.
Needless to state that the matter of the appointment to the office of Sajjada Nashin had been decided in favour of the respondents by both the learned Courts below concurrently and they have held the respondents to be entitled to receive the income of the shrine. The R.S.A. accordingly is dismissed but without any orders as to costs.