SYED ASGHAR HAIDER, J.---This appeal is directed against the order dated 17-1-1996, whereby a rectification application filed by the respondent Hitachi Limited Japan made under section 41 of the Copyright Ordinance, 1962 directing the appellant to expunge the word "Hitachi" from the Registration No.3286 was granted. The dispute pertains to the use of word "Hitachi", the applicant/appellant filed an application under the Copyright Act/Ordinance for registration of Hitachi Filter, this application was initially allowed by the Registrar, a representation was filed against it by the respondent before the Board, after contest it was allowed and the word Hitachi was ordered to be expunged from the Registration of the appellant, aggrieved thereof the appellant has filed the present appeal.
2. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the impugned order suffers from a patent illegality, the respondent has no cause of action, the order is not in consonance with the Copyright Act and Ordinance the application for rectification is malicious and mala fide, the initial application made by the appellant was granted after examining all aspects and law but the decision was illegally reversed without appraising the relevant material or law. Further the appellant has been registered under the Trade marks Act, but the proceedings have been challenged by the respondent and are pending adjudication in the High Court of Sindh and any decision in the present controversy is likely to impact the outcome of those proceedings, therefore, the present proceedings be adjourned sine die.
3. Contrarily, the learned counsel for the respondent has vigorously defended the impugned order, according to the learned counsel, the order is well reasoned, just and in consonance with law and facts, further the application under the Copyright Ordinance, 1962 was misconceived, the appellant does not fall within the parameters of section 2 of the Ordinance, as it does not fall in the definition of work, thus it does not qualify for Registration under the Copyright Law. He also adverted to section 10 of the Copyright Ordinance, 1962 and pleaded that only Original work could be made basis of the application, the word Hitachi is in use in Japan since 1910, it was registered as a trade mark and is also in use in Pakistan since 1954, therefore, the Registrar of Copyrights exceeded jurisdiction, by granting the appellant's application which was rightly corrected by the Board by reversing the decision.
4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and also appraised the impugned Order.
5. The Order has adverted in detail to the contentions raised by both parties. The core dispute is whether the appellant qualified to be registered under the Copyright Laws or not. The word copyright has been defined under section 3 of the Copyright Ordinance, 1962 and it means:- "For the purposes of this Ordinance, "copyright' means the exclusive right, by virtue of, and subject to. The provisions of this Ordinance":--
(a) in the case of literary, dramatic or musical work, to do and authorize the doing of any of the following acts, n am ely"- -
(i) to reproduce the work in any material from;
(ii) to publish the work;
(iii) to perform the work in public;
(iv) to produce, reproduce, perform or publish any translation of the work;
(v) to use the work in a cinematographic work or make a record in respect of the work;
(vi) to broadcast the work, or to communicate the broadcast of the work to the public by a loudspeaker or any other similar instrument;
(vii) to do in relation to a translation or an adaptation of the work any of the acts specified in relation to the work in sub-clauses (i) to (vi).
(b) In the case of an artistic work, to do or authorize the doing of any of the following act, namely:--
(i) to reproduce the work in any material form;
(ii) to publish the work;
(iii) to use the work in a cinematographic work;
(iv) to show the work in television;
(v) to make any adaptation of the work:
(vi) to do in relation to an adaptation of the work any of the acts specified in relation to the work in sub-clauses (i) to (iv).
(c) In the case of a cinematographic work, to do or authorize the doing of any of the following act, namely:--
(i) to make a copy of the work;
(ii) to cause the work in so far as it consists of visual images, to be seen in public and, in so far as it consists of sounds, to be heard in public;
(iii) to make any record embodying the recording in any part of the sound track associated with the work by utilizing such sound track;
(iv) to broadcast the work.
(d) In the case of a record, any of the following namely:-
(i) to make any other record; to do or authorize the doing of acts by utilizing the record, record embodying the same
(ii) to use the recording in the sound track of a cinematographic work:
(iii) to cause the recording embodied in the record to be heard in public;
(iv) to communicate the recording embodied in the record by broadcast. The word "work" has also been defined in section 2(z-f) of the Ordinance:-- "work" means any of the following works, namely.--
(i) a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work;
(ii) a cinematographic work;
(iii) a record. Work has again be segmentized into three parts section 2(c) defines "Artistic Work".
Section 2(p) defines "Literary work".
Section 2(c) reads:--"Artistic Work" means:--
(i) a painting, sculpture, a drawing (including a diagram, map, chart or plan), an engraving or a photograph, whether or not any such work possesses artistic quality;
(ii) an architectural work of art; and
(iii) any other work of artistic craftsmanship; Section 2(p) reads:- "Literary work" includes work on humanity, religion, social and physical sciences, tables compilations of data or other material in any form and computer programmes, that is to say programmes recorded on any disc, tape, perforated media or other information, storage device, which, if fed into or located in a computer or computer-based equipment is capable of reproducing any information]."
' Thus, it reflects that only these qualify to be registered under the Copyright Act/Ordinance. Section 10-a further qualifies the word work for the purposes of copyright. According to section 10-a of the Ordinance, even literary, dramatic, musical and artistic work has to be original to qualify for Registration. The procedure for registration is provided under section 39 of the Ordinance, it lays down the parameters, conditions and modalities for registration. Thus, if work falls within the definition ascribed, it would qualify for registration, it is in this background that the controversy is to be reviewed.
6. The appellant's application for Registration of Hitachi Filter only carries one word which qualifies for registration under the Copyright Act i.e. "Hitachi". Both parties have accepted this position before this Court and the Board. Now question arises can be appellant's application qualify on the touchstone of section 10-a, the answer is in negative, "Hitachi" is a household name even in Pakistan, it originated in Japan and there is historical background to it. It was initially registered as a Trade Mark in 1910 and was later also registered in Pakistan under the Trade Mark Act, 1964 thus the word is not original, therefore, the appellant does not qualify on this yardstick.
7. Now adverting to the controversy whether the appellant falls within the language of the word "work" the answer is clear and un-ambiguous, it does not fall in the definition of section 2(z-f), it is neither an artistic work nor literary work or even work. Section 2(4, 2 (c) and 2(p), therefore, it does not qualify for registration. Thus, the application made under section 39, did not qualify to be registered under the Copyright Ordinance, 1962 and the registration made therein was not in consonance with law. The Board appraised meticulously the law and rightly reversed the decision.
The learned counsel for the respondent relied on the following precedents:- Pakistan Drug House (Pvt.) Limited v. Rio Chemical Company and another 2003 CLD 1531; Abbas Hussain Farooqui v.
Messrs Royal Printing Press and Ali Printing Service, Karachi and 10 others PLD 1970 Karachi 551. The precedents cited by the learned counsel for the respondents are fully applicable to the present matter and support his viewpoint. The contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant qua the present decision impacting the proceeding in High Court of Sindh is misconceived, as both acts, the Copyright Act and the Trade Marks Act are different statutes, enacted for different purposes. Likewise no element of mala fide has been proved, the order dated 17-1-1996 is in consonance with law and warrants no interference. Resultantly, this appeal has no merits and is dismissed. No order as to costs.