1. ' ANWARUL HAQ, C. J.-This petition seeks leave to appeal against the judgment of a learned Judge of the Peshawar High Court, dated the 29th of October, 1979, by which the revision petition filed by the petitioners Ikramullah, Shakirullah and Asmatullah, was dismissed..
2. ' The relevant facts may briefly be stated. By a mutation attested on the 3rd of August, 1973, petitioners Ikramullah and Shakirullah purchased 27 kauals and 18 marlas of agricultural land, comprised in Khasra No, 742 in village Sikandari in Tehsil Swabi of the Mardan district for Rs, 48,000 respondent Said Jamal filed a suit for pre-emption in respect of this sale, but in the plaint, he gave the name of the village as Dagai instead of Sikandari. However, no objection to this misdescription was taken by the petitioners as defendants, and the suit was decreed by the trial Court on the 12th of June, 1975, on payment of Rs, 41,582.16, holding that the preemptor had a superior right.
3. ' The vendees thereupon filed an appeal in the District Court, and while this appeal was still pending the plaintiff-respondent made an application in the trial Court on the 19th July, 1975, under sections 151 and 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure praying that the name of the village be corrected in the plaint, the decree sheet and the judgment of the trial Court. The petitioners objected to these amendments, but the plaintiff's application was allowed by the trial Court by its order dated the 12th of December, 1975.
4. ' The petitioners thereupon filed a revision petition in the District Court challenging the order of the trial Court allowing the amendments. This revision petition as well as the main appeal of the petitioners were dismissed by the District Judge, Bannu, by his judgment dated the 17th of March, 1976. The petitioners then invoked the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, but their revision petition has also been dismissed.
5. ' Leave to appeal is sought on the following grounds :
(a) that under section 152 of the Civil Procedure Code amendment could be made only in the decree sheet, but the pleadings could not be amended in a summary manner, and for this purpose the procedure contained in Order VI, rule 17 of the Civil Procedure Code had to be followed, and in case the amendments were allowed, there had to be a retrial ; but the Courts below have erred in failing to appreciate this aspect of the case ;
(b) that during the pendency of the appeal the land in dispute was sold to the third petitioner Asmatullah by the first two petitioners on the 19th of August, 1974, and as this petitioner had an equal right with the plaintiff, the lower appellate Court failed to give effect to the improvement in the status of the vendees in terms of section 16 of the North-West Frontier Province Pre-emption Act ; and
(c) that, in any case, the suit was bad for partial pre-emption as the plaintiff had not asked for the share in the Shamilat which was included in the mutation of sale.
6. We regret we do not see any merit in these submissions. It is true that section 152 of the Civil Procedure Code deals with corrections of clerical or arithmetical mistakes in judgments, decrees or orders or errors arising' therein from any accidental slip or omission, and does not concern itsefl with amendments in the pleadings of the parties, but in the present case the question of the validity of the amendments ordered by the trial Court was finally decided between the parties by the revisional order of the District Judge, and, therefore, the High Court was right in refusing to reopen the question. Even otherwise was find that in the written statement no objection at all was taken to. The misdescription of the name of the village in the plaint, apparently for a good reason, namely, that a copy of the mutation of sale had been appended with the plaint, which gave full particulars of the land situate in village Sikandari. The petitioners having failed to object to the misdescription, the trial Court as well as the District Court were clearly right in permitting the necessary amendments in the judgment and the decree sheet and the amendments in the plaint could be regarded only as consequential in nature or even as unnecessary. It appears to as that the objection now raised is nothing more than a mere technicality, and cannot be allowed to defeat the decree validly made by the trial Court and upheld in appeal and revision.
7. ' As to the contention that during the pendency of the suit the land was sold to petitioner Asmatullah who had an equal right with the plaintiff, and therefore, no decree for pre-emption could be made in favour of the respondent, it is to be noticed that the sale under pre-emption was made on the 3rd of August, 1973, and the sale in favour of Asmatullah was made on the 19th of August, 1974, i. e., after expiry of the limitation period of one year permitted by section 31 of the Pre- emption Act. It was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that although the sale in favour of Asmatullah was made after the expiry of one year from the date of the original sale in favour of the first two petitioners, yet it was within the period of limitation in terms of section 4 of the Limitation Act, as the Civil Court was closed on the 3rd of August, 1974, and the suit could only be filed on its re-opening on the 1st of September, 1974. In other words, the sale in favour of Asmatullah took place, according to the learned counsel for the petitioners, during the extended period of limitation as permitted by section 4 of the relevant statute.
8. It seems to us that the learned District Judge was right in observing that section 4 of the Limitation Act, does not extend the period of limitation prescribed under the law ; it simply permits a suit, appeal or application to be filed on the re-opening of the. Court, if the period of limitation expires on a day when the Court is closed. The language of section 4 itself speaks of the expiry of the period of limitation, and the principle underlying the section is that this plaintiff or the applicant should not be prejudiced by the act of the Court, namely, its closure on the day when the limitation expires. Section 4, therefore, does not extend the period of limitation, but merely provides a device to overcome the closure of the Court on the day the limitation expires. Such being the case, the sale made in favour of petitioner Asmatullah by the other two petitioners after the expiry of the period of limitation of one year would be of no avail to the vendees in terms of section 16 of the Pre- emption Act.
9. There is similarly no merit in the submission that the suit was for partial pre-emption. The Courts below have rightly noted that the preemptor had asked for all the area which had been sold or otherwise become due to him, and this would clearly include the rights to Shamilat. It is significant that here again no objection was raised in the written statement C regarding partial pre-emption.
10. It is clear that if any such objection has been taken, it could have been easily rectified by a minor addition in the plaint. It is also to be noticed that in the sale deed executed by the first two petitioners in favour of the third petitioner no separate mention was at all made of the share in the Shamilat. In the circumstances, the High Court was right in repelling the contention that the respondent's suit suffered from the defect of partial pre-emption.
11. ' For the foregoing reasons, the petition fails and is hereby dismissed.