' JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, J.---The appellant-defendant impugns the appellate judgment and decree, dated 11-2-2004 whereby the decree of the learned trial Court, dated 10-9-2002 was set aside and suit filed by the respondent-plaintiff seeking possession of the suit property through pre- emption was decreed. The facts of the case have been duty noted and discussed in the judgment of the learned trial Court and need not, therefore, be reproduced in extenso.
2. The issue dis-positive of this appeal is as to whether the respondent-plaintiff had succeeded in proving the talabs required under section 13 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act. Since the judgments of the learned Courts below were at variance, I have gone through the testimony of the witnesses with the assistance of the learned counsel for the parties. The admitted position is that the vendors, namely, Mst. Shakila, Mst. Sajida and Mst. Khalida are the sister of the respondent-plaintiff. When the respondent (P.W.1) appeared as a witness, he acknowledged that the suit-land was being calculated by a tenant, namely Mirza. Mirza was produced by the appellant as D.W.2. He stated that respondent himself had approached him (Mirza) and expressed the suspicion that the land had been sold. Mirza (D.W.2) stated that he had also heard that the land had been sold. In the circumstances, the story setup by the respondent that he was informed of the sale much later on 25-11-1999 by Tanvir Ahmad (P.W.2) who was a moeen, does not ring true. Furthermore, when Tanvir Ahmad appeared as a witness, he stated that when he informed the respondent of the sale, the respondent remained silent for about 10/15 minutes and thereafterexpressed his desire to pre- empt the sale. This fact is also sufficient to show that no immediate jumping demand was made by the respondent-plaintiff. Moreover, there are serious discrepancies in the testimony of the P. Ws.
From which it can be easily seen that they were not being truthful.
3. Unfortunately the learned appellate Court has not attended to the material aspects of the evidence discussed above and nor has it met the reasoning which prevailed with the learned trial Court.
4. In the foregoing circumstances, I find that the learned appellate Court has seriously misread the evidence on record. Consequently, the impugned judgment and decree are set aside and the decree of the learned trial Court, dated 10-9-2002 is restored.