' AJMAL MIAN, C.J.--- By this common judgment, we intend to dispose of the above three petitions which are directed against the same judgment passed by the learned Federal Service Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal) in Appeals Nos.1407(L) of 1998, 1408(L) of 1998 and 1414(L) of 1998, filed by the petitioners against the respondents' letter. Dated 27-8-1997 termination of their Management Trainee Agreement, dismissing the same on the ground of limitation as well as on merits.
2. The brief facts are that the respondents floated a Talent Pool Scheme and started inter alia Management Trainee Course. The petitioners were selected for the above Course in terms of the respondents' letter dated 29-9-1996. It may be pertinent to reproduce paras. 1 and 2 of the above letter which read as follows:-- "(1) Under the Talent Pool Scheme you shall undergo training for a maximum period of two years as per the Company requirements at one or more locations/departments.
(2) During the training period you shall receive a fixed stipend of Rs,5,000 (Rupees five thousand only) p.m. Please note that your induction in Talent Pool Scheme does not entitle you for a regular job/service in the company. Your appointment as a regular employee in the company's service shall depend entirely on the discretion of the company and subject to your performance evaluation during the stipulated training period of two years, and availability of suitable vacancy.
Kindly note that your employment may be terminated at any time without any notice, should your performance during the training period be considered unsatisfactory by the company."
' It seems that before the completion of the above training the petitioners were served with the termination orders dated 27-8-1997 as follows:-- "You were selected in our Talent Pool Scheme vide our Letter No,SA/7010/FH, dated 29-8-1996 as Management Trainee on a fixed stipend of Rs,5,000 per month for the purpose of acquiring training.
It has been decided to terminate your training/ assignment with immediate effect. You may collect your stipend and amount due if any, on any working day within 7 days of the receipt of this letter from paymaster after depositing company's identity card or any other company's property in your possession.
' We wish you every success in your life."
' Upon receipt of the above termination orders the petitioners filed writ petitions in the Lahore High Court in September, 1997 and obtained status quo order, but eventually the above petitions were dismissed on account of the fact that section 2A was incorporated with effect from 10-6-1997 in the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 to cover the employees of any Authority/Corporation/Body/Organization established by or under a Federal law which is owned or controlled by the Federal Government or in which the Federal Government had controlling interest, for the purpose of the jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal. After that the petitioners filed above Service Appeals which were dismissed in the above terms. The petitioners have, therefore, filed the present petitions for leave to appeal.
3. Mr. Riyasat Ali Chaudhry, learned Advocate Supreme Court appearing for the petitioners, has vehemently contended that since the petitioners had been prosecuting their grievance before the High Court through the aforesaid writ petitions, the learned Tribunal erred in not condoning the delay in filing of the above service appeals. In support of the above submission he has relied upon the case of Sherin and 4 others v. Fazal Muhammad and 4 others 1995 SCM R 584, in which inter alia it has been held that the criterion of "due diligence" for enlargement of time is prescribed by section 14 of the Limitation Act, which upon its terms applies only to the suits and applications and not to the appeals. It has also been held that filing of appeal in a wrong Court on account of mistaken advice tendered by the council would not attract section 5 of the Limitation Ac for condonation of delay, but when the litigant and the counsel had acted with due care and caution and their conduct did not smack of negligence, the institution of appeal in the wrong forum could constitute a "sufficient cause" within the meaning of section 5 for condonation of the delay. The ,above case has no application as in the instant case section 2A in the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 was incorporated in June, 1997 whereas the above writ petitions were filed by the petitioners in September, 1997.
' Furthermore, under section 7 of the Service Tribunals Act the provision of sections 5 and 12 of the Limitation Act have been made applicable in the proceedings under the above Act and not section
14. Additionally it has been held by this Court in the following cases that prosecution of a wrong remedy in a wrong Court is not sufficient B ground for condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act:--
(1) Khan Muhammad v. Senior Superintendent of Police, Rawalpindi and others 1989 SCM R 589 and
(2) Syed Haji Abdul Wahid and another v. Syed Sirajuddin 1998 SCM R 2296.
' In this view of the matter, the learned Tribunal was justified in dismissing the above appeals on the ground of limitation.
4. As regards the merits of the case Mr. Riyasat Ali Chaudhry is unable to demonstrate that in view of the above conditions Nos.1 and 2 of the training contract, how it can be urged that the impugned termination letter is illegal. The impugned judgment of the Tribunal seems to be in consonance with the view taken by this Court in the leave refusal order dated 25-1-1999 in Ghiasuddin Shaikh and others v. Federation of Pakistan, Civil Petitions Nos.507-K to 513-K of 1993.
5. Then lastly it was urged by Mr. Riyasat Ali Chaudhry that the respondents' action is mala fide inasmuch as they have retained some of the under-trainees and some of them have been inducted. In support of above submission, he has invited our attention to a list of 12 employees (at page 38 of the paper book of Civil Petition 2049-L of 1998). On the other hand, Raja Haq Nawaz, learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that not a single under-trainee has been re- inducted.
6. Be that as it may, the above petitions have no merit. Leave to appeal is refused and the above three petitions are dismissed.