' ABDUL HAMEED DOGAR, J.--- This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment dated 9-9-2000 passed by the learned Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad (hereinafter referred to as "The Tribunal") whereby appeal filed by respondent Gohar Riaz was allowed and he was reinstated in service.
2. The background leading to the filing of the instant petition is that respondent was appointed as, Deputy Central Intelligence Officer (DCIO) in BS-17 in Intelligence Bureau (hereinafter referred to as "The Bureau") with effect from 25-3-1990 vide Notification dated 7-4-1990. He was placed on probation for a period of two years, extendable either before or after its termination for further period not exceeding one year. However, vide order, dated 13-2-1991, his services were terminated treating him as a temporary employee. He was reinstated in service vide Notification dated 12-12- 1993 issued by Bureau, Government of Pakistan under Cabinet decision. Having completed successful period of his probation, the competent authority terminated' the same with effect from 15-12-1994 vide. Notification dated 7-2-1995. It was also notified vide Office Memorandum dated 14- 12-1995, that respondent was appointed on regular basis in 1990, as such, the question of regularization of his service after reinstatement did not arise. Respondent was promoted as Deputy Director in BS-18 on the recommendations of Departmental Promotion Committee and with the approval of Establishment Division vide Notification dated 26-9-1995, he was placed on probation for a period of one year. He was required to qualify the prescribed advance intelligence course to which he was nominated on 13-1-1997. However, he was recalled from the course on 13-3-1997. It was on 2-12-2000, that he was intimated by the petitioner-Bureau that he being an ad hoc Assistant Director in BS-17 should appear before Federal Public Service Commission (hereinafter referred to as "the FPSC") for regularization of his appointment. On the same date, he was offered contract employment as Assistant Director (BS-17) for a period of two years. According to the petitioner, he was an ad hoc appointee. Respondent resisted and preferred representation against the order, dated 11-12-2000 and 18-12-2000 claiming that he being a regular appointee as Deputy Director (BS-18) was not supposed to accept the contract employment as Assistant Director or to appear before FPSC for regularization.
3. Accordingly, a show-cause notice was issued to him on 25-6-2001 under section 3 of the Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance, 2000 as amended by Removal from Service (Special Powers) (Amendment) Ordinance, V of 2001 (hereinafter referred to as "The Ordinance") on the grounds of misconduct and exercising political influence to get himself employed in the Bureau. Finding the reply furnished by respondent in response to the show-cause notice unsatisfactory, a major penalty of removal from service was imposed upon him vide order, dated 1'0-10-2001. Respondent represented against the said order but without any response, hence he invoked the appellate jurisdiction of the Tribunal and filed appeal under section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, which is allowed vide impugned judgment.
4. We have heard Ms. Nahida Mehboob Elahi, learned Standing Counsel for petitioners and Messrs Hafiz S.A. Rehman, learned Senior Advocate Supreme Court and Sh. Riazul Haq, learned Advocate Supreme Court for respondent and have gone through the record and the proceedings of the case in minute particulars.
5. Learned Standing Counsel for petitioners contended that appointment of respondent was ad hoc and purely on temporary basis as is evident from letter of appointment dated 18-3-1990 and was liable to be terminated at any time without assigning any reason. According to her, Notification dated 7-4-1990 was procured by respondent by exercising political influence. Even letter, dated 14-12-1995, issued from Bureau and addressed to Establishment Division on the subject of regularization of intervening period between termination and reinstatement of respondent in which it was maintained by the Bureau that respondent was a regular employee was based on wrong facts being manipulated_ Learned counsel vehemently argued that respondent was actually an ad hoc appointee and was never regularized and also did not appear before FPSC for regularization of his service for the post of Assistant Director (BS-17) as directed by the Bureau. She mainly emphasized that since the initial order of appointment was illegal being in violation of prescribed rules of recruitment, all subsequent orders, including the order of regularization and promotion to BS-18 were void.
6. On the other side Mr. Hafiz S.A. Rehman, learned Senior Advocate Supreme Court and Sh. Niaz-ul- Haq learned Advocate Supreme Court for respondent vehemently controverted the above contentions and argued that respondent was appointed as regular employee with effect from 25- 3-1990 after being interviewed by a Committee headed by the Director-General and two other Officers of the Bureau on 17-3-1990. The recommendations of the Committee were approved by Establishment Division and appointment was notified on 7-4-1990 with effect from 25-3-1990 and he was appointed on probation for a period of two years. According to them, the factum of regularization of service stood confirmed vide Office Memorandum dated 14-12-1995 issued by petitioner-Bureau whereby it was maintained that respondent was appointed on regular basis in 1990. In seniority list of Deputy Director (BS-18) issued on 4-9-2001 respondent's name appeared at Serial No,58 which further confirmed the regular appointment of respondent. The said list was circulated after show-cause notice was issued to respondent. They lastly contended that petitioners had failed to bring on record that the appointment of respondent was made in violation of relevant rules or on political influence. In support they placed reliance on the case of Secretary to Government of N.-W.F.P. Zakat/Social Welfare Department, Peshawar and another v. Sadullah Khan 1996 SCM R 413 and Water and Power Development Authority through Chairman, WAPDA House, Lahore v. Abbas Ali Malano and another 2004 SCM R 630.
7. This case has a chequered history. Respondent was appointed vide Notification dated 7-4-1990 with effect from 25-3-1990 by the petitioner-Bureau after having been interviewed by a Committee headed by Director-General and two Senior Officers of the Bureau. He was admittedly appointed and was placed on probation for a period of two years which clearly established the regular nature of his initial appointment. It would be relevant to refer section 6(1)(2) of the Civil Servants Act, 1973, which clarifies the position. The same is reproduced as under:-- "6. Probation.--- (1) An initial appointment to a service or post referred to in section 5, not being an ad hoc appointment, shall be on probation as may be prescribed.
(2) Any appointment of a civil servant by promotion or transfer to a service or ,post may also be made on probation as may be prescribed."
8. On bare perusal, it is manifest that only a person appointed by initial appointment, promotion or transfer shall be placed on probation. Whereas appointment on ad hoc basis has been expressly excluded. The circular of the seniority list of Deputy Directors (BS-18) issued on 4-9-2001 by the petitioner-Bureau, after issuing show-cause notice to respondent further fortifies the claim of respondent of his being a permanent employee. There is no cavil to the proposition that seniority list is prepared only in the cases of regular or permanent employees. The contention of petitioner's counsel that initial appointment of respondent was made in violation of rules by asserting political pressure is without any substance as petitioners had not been able to establish on record that respondent lacked requisite qualification and was not appointed by the competent authority. Even otherwise respondent could not be punished for any act or omission of petitioners. They cannot be allowed to take benefit of their lapses in order to terminate the service of respondent merely because they had themselves committed irregularity by violating the procedure governing the appointment. On this aspect, it would be relevant to refer the case of Secretary to Government of N.-W.F.P. Zakat/Social Welfare Department referred (supra) wherein this Court has candidly held that department having itself appointed civil servant on temporary basis in violation of rules could not be allowed to take benefit of its lapses in order to terminate services of civil servants merely because it had itself committed irregularity in violating procedure governing such appointment.
Similarly in the case of Water and Power Development Authority referred (supra), it has been held by this Court that where authority itself was responsible for making such appointment, but subsequently took a turn and terminated their services on ground of same having been made in violation of the rules, this Court did not appreciate such conduct, particularly when appointees fulfilled requisite qualifications. This action on the face of it transpires that petitioners were bent upon to remove the respondent from service in any case. In this case only a show-cause notice dated 25-6-2001 was issued against respondents under the Ordinance and no fall-fledged inquiry as contemplated under section 5 of the Ordinance was conducted. It is well-settled principle of law that in case of awarding major penalty, a proper inquiry is to be conducted in accordance with law where a full opportunity of defence is to be provided to the delinquent officer. Section 5 of the Ordinance also clearly stipulates that in case of charge of misconduct as defined in section 3 of the Ordinance, a full-fledged inquiry is to be conducted which admittedly has not been done in this case. This Court in the case of Pakistan International Airlines Corporation through Managing Director, PIAC, Head. Office, Karachi Airport, Karachi v. Ms. Shaista Naheed 2004 SCM R 316, has dealt with similar aspect of the matter and has held that in case of awarding major penalty of dismissal under the Ordinance, a full-fledged inquiry is to be conducted in terms of section 5 of the Ordinance.
9. For what has been discussed above, we are of the considered opinion that the impugned judgment is based 'on valid and sound reasons and is entirely in consonance with the law laid down by this Court. Neither, there is misreading or non-reading of material evidence, nor misconstruction of facts and law. Moreover, no question of general or public importance as contemplated under Article 212(3) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, is involved in this case warranting grant of leave.
10. Resultantly, the petition is dismissed and leave to appeal refused.