' SABIHUDDIN AHMED, C.J.--- This appeal is directed against a judgment and decree of the learned 3rd Additional District Judge, Karachi Central, dated 12-11-2005, whereby appellant's Suit No,1172 of 2002 was dismissed.
2. One of the principal grounds for dismissal of the suit appears to be that it was barred by limitation, which in such cases is six months from the date of publication or circulation of the defamatory material. From the contents of the plaint, it appears that the appellant was aggrieved by three applications, stated to be addressed by the respondent (1) to the S.P. Liaquatabad dated 29-7-2001, (2) to the S.H.O. Ajmer Nagri dated 7-8-2001 and (3) to the S.H.O. Nazimabad allegedly dated 3-8-2002. Indeed, no suit on the basis of the first two applications would lie. Learned counsel, however, argued that the suit was filed in December, 2002 and within time for the purpose of the third application. I have seen a copy of the application, which prima facie conveyed the date of 3- 8-2001 beneath the signature of the respondent. I invited the learned counsel to refer to any other material on the basis of which it could be said that the application was made in August,. 2002 but there seems to be nothing on record in this context. The appellant did not even assert that the application was made in August, 2002, therefore, the findings of the trial Court that the suit was barred by limitation seems unexceptional .
3. In any event, if it is assumed that the application has been made in August, 2002, the question would be whether making such an application could amount to defamation in terms of the requirement of law. The explicit allegations of the respondent against the appellant, who is her former husband, contained in this application are, "whenever I come to Nazimabad my ex- husband swears at me and threatens me on the road. He has done the same thing today and I as well as my family members apprehend grave danger to our lives. This application is furnished for information with request to kindly take appropriate action".
4. Prima facie, the application is made to a person and authority for protection of the respondent's own interest and it is highly doubtful whether the same could amount to defamation.
5. Indeed, the appellant had stated in evidence before the trial Court that the allegations complained were false and could not be proved but beyond that nothing was said. Section 3 of the Defamation Ordinance makes a false statement causing injury to the reputation of a person or to bring him in ridicule, unjust criticism and dislike. In this context, however, a distinction needs to be drawn between the statement, which is not proved and one which is explicitly found to be false for the purpose of this Ordinance. Under the criminal law all benefits of doubt is to be granted to an accused and the prosecution must establish its case beyond a reasonable doubt. In a suit for damages, however, a very strong burden of proving a statement to be false is to be discharged by the plaintiff and the mere fact that it could not be proved does not necessarily show that it was false. If this distinction is obliterated, perhaps every accused granted the maximum benefit of doubt may upon acquittal bring an action for, defamation, which does not appear to be the intention of law.
6. For the foregoing reasons, I find no substance in this appeal and dismiss the same.