' MUHAMMAD RAZA KHAN, J.---Through this judgment, I propose to decide the following connected civil revision petitions Nos:--
(1) C.R. No,452 of 2006 Dilbad Shah v. Syed Rehmat Shah.
(2) C.R. No,405 of 2006 Sahibzada Ubaidur Rehman v. Saibzada Mujeeb Awan;
(3) C.R. No,109 of 2006 Muhammad Maqsood v. Munsif Khan;
(4) C.R. No,55 of 2007 Government v. Shah Haneef;
(5) C.R. No,89 of 2004 Miss Afia Shehzad v. M. Riaz Awan;
(6) C.R. No,491 of 2006 Mst. Bibi Khatoon v. Abdul Sattar; (1) C.R. No,169 of 2006 Baghwaney v. Gul Fareen;
(8) C.R. No,425 of 2006 Muhammad Riaz v. Muhammad Ayub;
(9) C.R. No,96 of 2002 Government v. Syed Mudassar Shah;
(10) C.R. No,39 of 2003 Muhammad Fareed Khan v. Government;
(11) C.R. No,66 of 2007 Sher-ur-Rehman v. Aslam; and
(12) C.R. No,151 of 2003 Haji Shah Jehan Khan v. Muhammad Imran, and
(13) C.R. No,152 of 2003 Haji Shah Jehan Khan v. Mohammad Imran etc.
2. In all these revision petitions the following questions of law are involved:--
(a) Whether section 5 of the Limitation Act is attracted to condone the delay in filing civil revision?
(b) Whether the period consumed for getting the certified copies of the impugned judgments, and other documents, can be excluded while computing the period of 90 days under section 115 of C.P.C.?
(c) What shall be the effect of the delayed delivery of the certified copies by the Court or the copying agency?
(d) What procedure has to be adopted in case of non-availability of certified copies?
(e) Whether the suo motu jurisdiction of the Court for Civil Revisions can be invoked after the expiry of the period of 90 days?
3. In all these civil revisions (and some others which have been excluded from operation of this judgment), the petitions were filed beyond the period of 90 days prescribed under section 115, C.P.C.
It was argued on behalf of the petitioners that the period was consumed in getting the certified copies of the impugned judgments, and other relevant documents required to be submitted along with the revision petition in compliance with section 115, C.P.C., therefore, (under the law and prevalent practice) such period should be excluded from computing the period of limitation. It was argued that, in any case, the petitioners should not be penalized for the delay or default by others because the Courts were required to have provided the certified copies within three days but in most of the cases there was delay in the delivery of files to the copying agency, due to the reason that the impugned order/judgment was not drafted/finalized. It was also added that the delays have been frequently condoned, if sufficient and reasonable cause justifying the delay is disclosed.
4. On behalf of the respondents it has been argued that the law has to be followed in letter and spirit and the period prescribed in terms of days should be considered to be obligatory and no concession could be granted by exceeding the limits settled by the statute, because thereby the right accrued to the other party shall be defeated.
5. In view of the far-reaching effects of the legal provisions involved in these revision petitions, the detailed arguments were heard and comprehensive list of precedents, for and against of the respective contentions, were considered in detail.
6. The condonation of delay can be allowed only by invoking powers under section 5 of Limitation Act. In view of the availability of a clear provision of statute, the possibility of exercising the inherent powers of the Court is excluded. Section 29 of the Limitation Act provides that:-- "29. (1)...........................
(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application the period of limitation different from the period prescribed there for by the First Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were prescribed therefor in that schedule, and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law:-- (a): The provisions contained in section 4, sections 9 to 18 and section 22 shall apply only insofar as--- (b): The remaining provisions of the Act shall not apply".
7. The bare reading of the said section would indicate that since the period of limitation has been prescribed in section 115 of C.P.C. For filing of revision petition, therefore, being a special law the said subsection (2) of the section 29 of Limitation Act shall be applicable and for the determination of the period of limitation all the provisions (except section 4, sections 9 to 18 and section 22) shall not apply. Section 5 of Limitation Act, therefore, does not apply to the civil revisions.
8. This clear provision of the law has been further elaborated and strengthened by the case law which is summarized in the following paragraphs.
(a) The principle was initially laid down in the case of Allah Dino v. Muhammad Shah 2001 SCM R 286 by holding that:-- "There is no cavil with the argument that if the statute governing the proceedings does not prescribe period of limitation, the proceedings instituted thereunder shall be controlled by the Limitation Act as a whole. But where the law under which proceedings have been launched prescribes itself a period of limitation like under section 115, C.P.C. Then benefit of section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be availed unless it has been made applicable as per section 29(2) of the Limitation Act."
(b) It was followed subsequently in these words:-- "Respondent No,1 did not move an application for condonation of delay which was, otherwise not permissible in view of judgment in the case of Allah Dino v. Muhammad Shah 2001 SCM R 286. The respondent No,2 of his own on the basis of self-styled imaginary calculations concluded that the revision petition is within time but in view of my above observations, these calculations are not only contrary to law, but also factually incorrect and on this basis the respondent No,2 could not entertain a time-barred revision petition for making any interference in the order dated twenty first May, 2003 lawfully passed by the learned Judge, Rehana Kausar and others v. Faqir Muhammad 2004 CLC 1202.
(c) "Intentional delay on the part of the petitioners in approaching the High Court for relief- High Court after carefully examining and analyzing the record found the revision petition to be hopelessly time-barred and on the point of limitation revision was dismissed. The judgment of the High Court entirely in consonance with law did not call for any interference by the Supreme Court.
"Haji Ahmad v. Noor Muhammad 2004 SCM R 1630"".
(d) In the latest judgment of the apex Court in the case of "City District Government v. Muhammad Saeed Amin "2006 SCM R 676" it was conclusively held that:-- "Provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act were not applicable to proceedings under section 115, C.P.C."
9. In view of the above precedents it can be safely and conclusively held that the delay in filing the revision petition, beyond the period of 90 days prescribed under section 115, C.P.C., cannot be condoned under section 5 of the Limitation Act as the operation of the said section is expressly excluded by section 29(2) of Limitation Act.
10. The exclusion of time consumed for getting the certified copies is regulated under section 12(2) of the Limitation Act which lays down:- "12. Exclusion of time in legal proceedings:--
(1) ............................
(2) In computing the period of limitation prescribed for appeal, an application for leave to appeal and an application for a review of judgment, the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced and the time requisite for the obtaining a copy of the decree, or order appealed from, or sought to be reviewed, shall be excluded". (The underlining is added for the purpose of interpretation by me.)
11. This is the only provision whereby period required for getting the copies of the impugned judgment etc. Can be excluded from computing the period of limitation. The said subsection is attracted only to three kinds of proceedings as underlined in the above extract. Firstly: the appeal, secondly: the application for leave to appeal and thirdly: the application for review of judgment.
The application for revision is not included in any of the said categories and therefore, it can be concluded that the said provision cannot be applied to revision petitions.
12. It has been argued that the scope of the said facility can be extended to the revision petitions as well, on the ground that when the law extends a benefit to a citizen for availing a remedy against a judgment it should not be restricted to certain categories but it should be extended generally to every type of remedial process. This argument is negated by the fact that nobody should be wiser than the law and the law givers. If the legislature had excluded a particular proceeding from the operation of a particular provision, the same could not be read between the lines because thereby the clear provisions of law shall be violated. The restriction of the facility contained in subsection
(2) of the section 12 of the Limitation Act to three categories only is by design and not by default.
Subsection (1) of section 12 of the Act mentions the categories of suits, appeals or applications.. The term application, in general, includes every application including the revision petition. However, the term an "application" in general has been excluded from the next subsection, i,e,, subsection (2) and therefore, it was intentional and not an accidental omission.
Moreover subsection (3) extends the benefit to "appeal" or "review" against the decrees and the application or revision is also not mentioned there. Similarly in subsection (4) the facility is extended to the "application against an award" but again the term revision is not stated there. Thus it will be clear from the said discussion that the legislature, in its wisdom, did not intend to extend benefit of exclusion of the time required for getting the certified copies to the categories of revision petitions hence, the said facility cannot be extended to the civil revisions by implication.
13. In this regard some of the supporting precedents are:-- ' Tahir Ali and others v. Chief Judge Small Causes Courts and others PLD 1960 Karachi 796 "Subsection (2) of section 12 of Limitation Act was not intended to apply to a revision petition. This subsection is available only in cases where there is an appeal, an application for leave to appeal or an application for the review of judgment. This subsection nowhere mentions revision application.
The expression "appealed from or sought to be reviewed" further clarifies the point. The omission of revision application from the subsection is not accidental. While subsection (1) employees the word "application" without any qualification, subsection (2) restricts it to merely two kinds of applications, namely an application for leave to appeal and application for a review of judgment.
Extending the provision of section 12(2) of Limitation Act to revision application will, therefore, amount to enlarging its scope for which there is no justification."
' Said Muhammad v. Sher Muhammad 2001 M LD 1546 "Subsection (2) of section 12 of Limitation. Act has restricted its application to filing of appeal and two kinds of applications namely the application for leave to appeal and an application for review of judgment only. Benefit of section 12(2) is not attracted to the revision applications as the section has nowhere mentioned revision applications. The time in case of filing a revision would start running from the date when the impugned judgment was passed."
' Muhammad Islam v. Amir Sher Bahadur 2004 M LD 1029 Peshawar.
"Benefit of S.12 (2) of Limitation Act, 1908 was available only in cases where there was an appeal, an application for leave to appeal or an application for a review of judgment. Subsection (2). Of S.12 of Limitation Act, 1908 had nowhere mentioned-revision applications--- Omissions of words 'revision application' in said subsection (2) of S.12 of Limitation Act, 1908 was not accidental, but said subsection had restricted its application to merely two kinds of applications, namely; application for leave to appeal and application for review of judgment only:--Benefit of subsection (2) of S.12 of Limitation Act, 1908 was not attached to revision application."
14. The justification for excluding the extension of the facility to the revision petition has been discussed by me in detail in the judgment "Abdul Waheed Khan and another v. Mst. Ruqia Bibi and 17 others PLD 2006 Peshawar 156". However for the purpose of recapitulation it may be stated that the time prescribed for appeal or revision is comparatively shorter than the period of 90 days prescribed for revision petitions. During the short span of 30 days, the availability of certified copies may not be ensured and that is why the legislature had permitted the exclusion of period required for such copies. Whereas during the period of 90 days, there are remote chances that the copies may not be available. Even if the. Certified copies are supplied after, say, two months, of the judgment, still there shall be sufficient period of 30 days to file a . Revision petition. It appears that legislature was conscious of the fact that most of the revision petitions are moved for prolonging the litigation and therefore, certain checks 'and balances have been provided in the statute prescribing the maximum period for filing the revision petition and the minimum period for its disposal with further stipulation that the revision petition should be self contained which may be decided without the requisitioning of the record. So if a person does not file a revision petition within 90 days of the impugned order it displays his attitude of indifference towards the lis and therefore, he Cannot be extended extraordinary concession beyond the scope of legislative provision.
15. In the revision petitions under discussion, there are several cases where the copies were available within a month, or so, but the petitioners did not take the trouble of getting the same to avail the remedy within time and the stamp on the certified copies shall display that the date of delivery is several months after the preparation of the copies. This intentional delay cannot be ignored.
16. In some of the revision petitions the copies were delivered after the two months of the impugned order, or the date of submission of application for getting the certified copies, and still a further period of 90 days has been consumed merely on the presumption that time shall run only after the delivery of certified copies. This was a misconceived notion and no latitude can be extended to such misconceptions.
17. When the law prescribes a specific period of 90 days for an application for revision the time starts running from the impugned judgment or order. The aggrieved person may submit the application for certified copies but, on the delivery thereof, he should not wait for another period of 90 days but must file revision petition within the original period of 90 days from the impugned order/judgment.
18. There is a provision that Court shall supply the copy within a period of three days. This is a direction from the legislature to the Courts that in case an aggrieved person intends to file a revision petition, the delivery of certified copies should not be delayed. However, this provision does not vest the petitioner with an indefinite period to delay the submission of revision petition, if the copies are not furnished within the said period of three days. Since the consequential provision of failure to comply with the direction of three days is not stated in the statute therefore, the said phrase shall be treated as directory and not mandatory, whereas the failure to file the revision petition within prescribed period of 90 days attracts the dismissal thereof under section 3 of the Limitation Act read with section 29(2) thereof. The said provision is followed by consequence being penal in nature therefore the period of 90 days shall be mandatory and not directory in nature.
19. The question about the procedure to be followed by an aggrieved person, in case the copies are not furnished within prescribed period of 90 days, has been discussed in the judgment of "Abdul Waheed Khan and another v. Mst. Ruqia Bibi and 17 others" PLD 2006 Peshawar 156. The gist of the impugned order is disclosed by its verbal announcement, or the short order, and therefore, if detailed judgment is not available or the certified copy of the judgment/order or any other document could not be furnished by the copying agency expeditiously, the petitioner should file the revision petition within the stated period of 90 days by annexing uncertified copies of the available documents and by furnishing affidavits regarding non-supply of certified copies by the copying agency/Court and by annexing the copy of receipts issued by the Copying Agency on the application for getting the certified copies of the documents. The office of the revisional Courts shall accept the revision petition without such certified copies and may direct the petitioner to furnish the copies as and when available. This procedure on the one hand, shall ensure the compliance of law regarding the period of 90 days and, on the other hand, it shall help the revisional Courts to effectively exercise the supervisory jurisdiction over the Courts by inquiring into the causes of delayed delivery of certified copies. Thus not only the law should be followed in its letter and spirit but the system of administration of justice shall be gradually rectified.
20. Even otherwise the perusal of several files would show that after the filing of the revision petition the same is frequently returned for removal of objections and meeting the deficiencies. Such petitions are re-filed several times before their presentation to the Court for orders. If this procedure can be followed for other deficiencies, there is no reason why it should not be followed for filing the petition in time without the certified copies, if not available,
21. The matter has been further simplified in a judgment reported as 2004 M LD 918 (Lahore) wherein it was held that:-- "Petitioner under 5.115 (1) C.P.C. Was obliged to furnish copies of pleadings, documents and the orders of subordinate Court along with the revision petition---Word 'certified' is conspicuous by its absence in S.115 (1) C.P.C.-Inference from omission of word 'certified' in the statute is clearly to absolve the revision petitioner from filing such copies of the judgment etc. Along with the revision petition."
22. The learned counsel for the petitioners in several cases referred to the precedents like PLD 1964 SC 97; 1991 SCM R 496; 1992 CLC 1394 and 2004 M LD 918 where it was held that the period of 90 days was not obligatory as it was based merely on an established practice whereas the revision petition can be entertained beyond the said period if there was sufficient cause and the Court considers it to be appropriate to interfere by invoking its revisional jurisdiction. These precedents are of two types: firstly, there are those decisions which were pronounced, or were related to the period, prior to the amendment of section 115, C.P.C. i,e, prior to 1992 where the time-frame was not prescribed by the legislature for entertaining the civil, revisions. In the case of " Musharraf Sultana v. Fazal Hussain 1992 CLC 1394 Lahore it was held:-- "It is a common ground that there is no limitation prescribed for filing of revision under C.P.C.
Though 90 days practice is observed as a rule in Courts and delay thereafter is required to be explained by the applicant. Limitation did not bar or affect exercise of inherent powers of the Court to make orders, which are necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court. Having regard to the nature of the case it is a fit case for exercise of inherent powers by the Court to avoid miscarriage of justice which otherwise was inevitable to follow.
' Similarly in Riasat Ali v. Muhammad Jaffar Khan 1991 SCM R 496 it was observed:-- "There is no period of limitation prescribed for presentation of revision petition in the Limitation Act.
The Lahore High Court has, for many years adopted at thumb rule of 90 days within which revision petitions should be filed, failing which the discretion may not be exercised in the petitioners favour on ground of unreasonable delay. However, revision petitions, even though filed beyond the period of 90 days can be entertained if the Court is satisfied as to the reasons for the delay. It should not be forgotten that the scope of the revisional powers, though hedged by conditions, is nevertheless vast and corresponds to a remedy of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction can be invoked by the Court suo motu and the court can also make such order in the case as it thinks fit."
' These precedents are not applicable to the cases in hand because after amendment of 1992 a period has already been prescribed.
23. However, the second category of the case-law deals with the discretionary powers of the revisional Court. Prior to the amendment of 1992 it was the revisional Court which could exercise the supervisory jurisdiction for the rectification of wrong committed by irregular exercise of jurisdiction.
However, after the year 1992 in addition to the said discretionary powers of the revisional Courts, the aggrieved party to litigation was also vested with a right to file a revision petition under certain restrictions. In the cases where the revision petition is entertained purely on the application by an aggrieved party, the restriction of time etc. Shall be applicable. Whereas for the exercise of discretionary jurisdiction of the revisional Court the said case-law is still applicable and in the case of gross miscarriage of justice the revisional Court can still exercise supervisory jurisdiction irrespective of time of 90 days. The extract from 1992 CLC 1394 Lahore and 1991 SCM R 496 (reproduced in, the preceding paragraph) would show the emphasis that such inherent and supervisory jurisdiction of the revisional power can be exercised to av,oid miscarriage of justice.
Hence the said precedents also suggest for the exercise of suo motu powers without the restriction of period of limitation. In the case of Mohammad Smaleh v. Messrs United Grain and others PLD 1964 SC 97 it was held:-- "Limitation Act provides no period of limitation for revision under section 115 C.P.C., therefore, Article 181 of Limitation Act shall not be a bar to revision by High Court suo motu."
' This dictum was followed in Sultan Khan and 3 others v. Sultan Khan 2004 M LD 918 (Lahore) by holding that:-- "High Court under such jurisdiction can take suo motu notice of any illegality or material irregularity committed by the lower Court, despite the fact the revision is barred by time."
So it can be concluded that for the purpose of suo motu revisional powers there is no time restriction.
24. In the list of revision petitions, collectively heard along with petitions in hand there were some other revision petitions where, either the findings of the original and appellate Courts were at variance or the learned trial Court had not framed the issues and decided the matter or where the suit was decided by general discussion and not on specific discussion on each issue, or where the appellate Court had decided an appeal without hearing any of the parties etc. Such petitions have been separated from the list of petitions under discussion and have been entertained in the exercise of suo motu revisional jurisdiction despite the fact that the petitions were filed beyond the prescribed period of 90 days. However, in the cases in hand there were concurrent findings of both the Courts and there were no gross miscarriage of justice and in some of the petitions the extraordinary delay of several months beyond the period of 90 days did not justify interference. So these petitions are being decided through this commons judgment.
25. In view of the reasoning contained herein, these revision petitions are dismissed being barred by time. No order as to cost.