Abdul Hameed Dogar, J.--Petitioners seek leave to appeal against the judgment dated passed by Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad (hereinafter referred to as 'the Tribunal'), whereby Appeal No. 868 (R) (CS)/2005 filed by Respondent No. 1 was partly allowed to the extent that Respondent No. l's supersession in the Senior Selection Board meeting (hereinafter referred to as the SSW) held on 2.4.2003 and afterwards was converted into deferment with the result that consequent to his approval for promotion as Executive Engineer (BPS-20) with effect from 30.4.2005, he would be entitled to the restoration of his inter se seniority that existed prior to the SSB meeting held on 2.4.2003.
2. Briefly, stated the facts of the case are that on 5.9.1967 Respondent No. 1 had joined the petitioners-department as Junior Engineer (BS-17). Later on he was promoted as Superintending Engineer (BS-19) on 22.1:1987. On 2.4.2003 the department held a SSB meeting for the promotion to the post of Executive Engineer (BPS-20) but Respondent No. 1 was superseded whereas his junior Respondent No. 2 Muhammad Tariq Malik was promoted. Feeling aggrieved, Respondent No. 1 filed a departmental appeal on 27.5.2004, which was not responded. Thereafter, he filed Writ Petition No. 19648 of 2004 before the learned Lahore High Court, Lahore which was disposed of on 7.12.2004 directing the petitioners to take necessary action in the matter. Finally, Respondent No. 1 was promoted as Chief Engineer (BS-20) vide office order dated 30.4.2005 with immediate effect.
Feeling not satisfied, Respondent No. 1 filed departmental appeal for anti-dated promotion and re- fixation of his seniority which was rejected by the petitioners vide letter dated 24.5.2005.
Respondent No. 1 then challenged the same before the learned Tribunal on 20.6.2005.. The learned Tribunal vide impugned judgment partly allowed the same as stated above.
3. We have heard Mian Khurshid Alam Ramay, learned ASC for the petitioners and Mian Muhammad Hussain, learned ASC for Respondent No. 1 and have gone through the record and the proceedings of the case in minute particulars.
4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners mainly contended that the impugned Judgment is absolutely illegal, against law and facts and without jurisdiction. He further contended that the supersession of Respondent No. 1 could not be converted into deferment from 2.4.2003 as earlier deferment on 24.5.2001 and subsequent deferment has not been challenged at the relevant time, therefore, Respondent No. 1 could not claim anti-dated promotion and his supersession could not be converted into deferment. He further contended that Respondent No. 1 was considered for promotion as Chief Engineer (BS-20) for the first time in a meeting held on 24.5.2001 but he as superseded due to less threshold marks and non-availability of ACRs. Thereafter he was twice considered in the meetings held on 2.4.2003 and 21.4,2004 respectively but was also superseded due to weak record, pending of inquiry and other reasons. According to him, the earned Tribunal could not pass the order regarding ante-dated promotion.
5. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for Respondent No. 1 supported the judgment for the reasons enumerated therein with the submission that the impugned judgment being well- based hardly warrants any interference as all the points agitated before the Tribunal were dilated upon and decided in a comprehensive manner.
6. It is admitted fact that case of Respondent No. 1 for promotion to the post of Chief Engineer (BS- 20) was considered in a number of SSB meetings held in different times. First of all on 24.5.2001, his case was considered but he was superseded on the ground that his ACRs for the last five years were not available and that even he did not obtain qualified remarks of his ACRs being less than the threshold marks i.e. 70. Another SSB meeting was held on 1.12.2001 but the case of Respondent No. 1 could not be put up on the ground that ACR for the year subsequent to his supersession had not yet become available. On 2.4.2003, a meeting was held wherein the case of Respondent No. 1 was considered but again superseded due to weak 'record and a pending inquiry against him.
Regarding point of pending inquiry, the standing instructions of the Government are that a pending inquiry poses no bar to an official's consideration for promotion. In this case Respondent No. 1 was treated with discrimination in that an inquiry was also pending against Muhammad Tariq Malik Respondent No. 2 but he was declared fit subject to clearance in the inquiry. The question of pending inquiry had been rendered completely groundless by 21.4.2004 because Respondent No. 1 has already been'exonerated in this inquiry vide office order dated 6.12.2003. However, in this meeting, a number of his juniors including Muhammad Tariq Malik, Respondent No. 2, who was junior to him, were promoted. Finally, Respondent No. 1 was declared fit for promotion in the meeting held on 11.4.2005. Respondent No 1 requested for ante-dation of his promotion but vide office order dated 30.4.2005 issued by the petitioners Respondent No. 1 was promoted to BPS-20 with immediate effect. Under Clause 10(b) of the WAPDA's Promotion Policy an employee can be deferred for promotion if his ACR dossier is incomplete or disciplinary proceedings are pending against him, therefore, it can be safely held that supersession of Respondent No. 1 in the. meetings held on 2.4.2003 and 21.4.2004 was in violation of Clause 10(b) of the WAPDA's Promotion Policy. In this context, Respondent No. 1 could only be deferred for promotion and should not have been superseded.
7. For what has been discussed above, we are of the considered opinion that the impugned judgment is based on valid and sound reasons and is entirely in consonance with the law laid down by this Court. Neither, there is misreading, nor non-reading of material evidence, or misconstruction of facts and law. Moreover, the question of general public importance as contemplated under Article 212(3) of the Constitution is not involved in this case.
8. Accordingly, we do not find any reason to interfere with the impugned judgment, thus the petition being devoid of force is dismissed and leave to appeal refused.