Pakistan Case Law← Search
PLJ 2007 SC 820

CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, through its Chairman & another vs Mrs.

CitationPLJ 2007 SC 820
CourtSupreme Court of Pakistan
Judge(s)Javaid Iqbal, Abdul Hameed Dogar, Shakirullah Jan
ResultPetitions dismissed.

Mian Shakirullah Jan, J:--These two petitions involving identical questions of law and fact have been filed by the CDA (Capital Development Authority) against a common judgment passed by Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi dated 20.12.2006 whereby writ petitions filed by the respondents/allottees of the commercial plots were,accepted and the orders of cancellation of allotment issued by the petitioners were set aside.

2. The petitioners in both the writ petitions were allotted one commercial plot each on certain terms and conditions, in respect of which respective agreements were also executed.

3. Since the respondents/allottees did not abide by the conditions of the allotment regarding construction over the plots within stipulated period with a consequential cancellation orders as provided under the regulation/law. The respondents have, challenged the cancellation orders in the High Court by invoking its Constitutional jurisdiction and after acceptance of the writ petitions, the petitioners have now approached this Court by filing the instant petitions.

4. The impugned order is a short one, and the writ petitions were mainly allowed on the ground that learned Legal Adviser for the................

"..................petitioner had conceded that the cancellation orders were passed by the Director CDA, who had no authority or power to do so.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently contended that concession so made by the Legal Adviser was not in consonance with the facts of the case as it was not the Director, who had passed the order impugned in the writ petitions but it was the. Chairman, a competent authority, passed the said orders and the Director had only conveyed the decision. While elaborating his view point, he had referred to some documents showing thereby that it was the Chairman who had cancelled the allotment of the plots through "verbal orders" and the letters, which, had been questioned in the writ petitions were only a communication to this effect.

6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents have strenuously argued that the entire record is indicative of the fact that it was the Director who had passed the impugned orders and not the Chairman and the Director had no authority or power to pass such an order. As such, cancellation orders are null and void and ineffective on the rights of the respondents and were rightly struck down by the High Court. Therefore, impugned order of the High Court does not call for any interference. In this respect, reliance was placed on the case reported as C.D.A. v. Zahid Iqbal (PLD 2004 S.C. 99).

7. We have gone through the impugned order, relevant record and also attended to rival contentions so raised before us. There is no cavil with the proposition that the order of cancellation of allotments had not been passed by the Chairman, as despite repealed asking, learned counsel for the petitioner was unable to point out any document showing that the cancellation orders were passed by the Chairman except referring to certain documents whereby a reference has been 'made to the verbal orders of the Chairman. Verbal order has no sanctity in law and such orders are alien to the process of the law and the Courts. All orders passed and acts performed, particularly, by the State/public functionaries and adversely affecting anyone must be in writing, as Section 24-A(1) of the General Clauses Act 1897 envisages that the powers shall be exercised reasonably, fairly and justly and sub-section (2) further make it necessary that the authority passing orders shall, so far as necessary or appropriate, give reasons for making the orders and unless the order is in writing, the reasons and fairness etc thereof cannot be ascertained/adjudged. It may be noted that petitioners in their comments before the High Court, in reply to para (b) of the grounds, it was mentioned that "allotment has been rightly cancelled by Member (A) and upheld by the Board." Contrary to this, today before us a stand has been taken by the learned counsel for the petitioners that allotment was cancelled by the Chairman, which is in conflict with that taken before the High Court whereby an attempt had been made to justify the existence of powers in the Member (A) to cancel the allotments, which is also not maintainable because it is the Powers of the Chairman, who can allot and cancel the plots and who cannot delegate such powers to other officers of the Authority as held in C.D.A. v. Zahid Iqbal ("supra). relevant para of which is reproduced herein below:-- "12. All matters connected with the allotment, sale etc. and cancellation etc. of plots including commercial plots fell within the list of functions to be performed by the Chairman. The obligations assigned to the Member (Administration), however, did not include the matters relating to sale etc. and cancellation etc. of plots

13. We have not been able to persuade ourselves to agree with the said submission of the learned counsel for the C.D.A. As has been noticed above in some detail, it is the Authority under Section 51 of the Ordinance XXIII of 1960 which had powers to make Regulations to deal with the matters relating to the Authority and in exercise of the said powers, the Authority had made the Conduct of Business Regulation of 1985 according to which Regulation the Estate Management Directorate fell to the share of the Chairman. The learned counsel could not show us any authority vesting in the Chairman either under the Ordinance or any Regulation to assign his functions either to the Members or to other officers in the Authority in derogation of the distribution of business commanded by a Regulation. In this view of the matter the above noticed Office Order dated 29.2.1988 issued by the Chairman allotting the business assigned to him to the Member (Administration) was an order without lawful authority."

8. Much emphasis has been placed by the learned counsel for the petitioners that concession made by the Legal Adviser before the High Court, as noted in the impugned order, cannot stand as it is not in line with the facts of the case and the relevant regulations/rules, as such. Legal Adviser was not authorized to make such concession. In our view, as held in the case cited above, stand taken by the Legal Adviser is quite in consonance with the facts of the case and the law and regulations on the subject as interpreted by this Court in the above cited judgment.

9. However, before parting with the judgment, it may be observed that judgment of the High Court, if not complied within the prescribed period, the same may be complied within a period of one month, as mentioned in the impugned judgment, from today. If they commit again such default, the petitioners may proceed against them strictly in accordance with law and not on their whims and the manner they want.

10. For what has been cited above, we see no force in these petitions, which are hereby dismissed.

For educational and research use only β€” not legal advice. Verify against the official report before relying on it. See our Disclaimer.
DisclaimerΒ·PrivacyΒ·TermsΒ·Search