' SH. AZMAT SAEED, J.--- This civil revision is directed against the appellate judgment and decree dated 12-6-1993 whereby the appeal filed by the petitioners against the judgment and decree, dated 14-1-1988 was dismissed.
2. Brief facts leading to the filing of this civil petition are that respondent No,1 Anjuman is managing the affairs of the Jamia Masjid while the other respondents are the office-bearers of respondent No,1 Anjuman. The said respondents instituted a suit for declaration against the petitioner claiming therein that the Anjuman was managing the affairs of the Jamia Masjid which had been in existence for several centuries and had been established during the days of "Mughals". It was contended that adjacent and attached to the Jamia Masjid was the property bearing Khasras Nos.5774 to 5778 which forms part of the Jamia Masjid and had been in the use of Imam of the Masjid namely Ghulam Muhammad who was the predecessor-in-interest of the present petitioners. It was the case of the respondents that after Ghulam Muhammad the said Imam Masjid passed away the said property continued in the possession of his descendants i,e, the petitioners. It was prayed that a decree for declaration be passed that the property in dispute i,e, Khasras Nos.5774 to 5778 was the property of the Jamia Masjid and by way of consequential relief it was prayed that decree for possession be also passed against the present petitioners. The suit was contested. On the divergent pleadings of the parties issues were framed and evidence both oral as well as documentary was led. The trial Court after hearing the parties decreed the suit in favour of the respondents. Aggrieved the petitioners filed an appeal which failed to find favour and was dismissed vide the impugned appellate judgment and decree.
3. The learned counsel for the parties have been heard and record appended with this petition has been perused.
4. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the respondents were the plaintiffs in the suit who were seeking declaration and possession and it is for the respondents/plaintiffs to prove title of the property in dispute which they have failed to do on the evidence on the record.
The learned counsel adds that there was sufficient evidence on the record to prove that the petitioners were in fact owners of the property in dispute and it is alleged that this fact is evident from the record produced in evidence of the Municipal Committee and the record pertaining to payment of tax. Adds that even otherwise the suit was barred by limitation. It is contended that this aspect of the matter had not been considered and adjudicated upon by the appellate Court.
5. The learned counsel for the respondents has controverted the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners. It is contended that the fact that the property forms part of the Jamia Masjid stands proved on the record and such finding having been affirmed in appeal cannot be upset by this Court in its revisional jurisdiction. The learned counsel further adds that the documents relied upon by the petitioners are not documents of title, hence, are irrelevant for the purposes of the adjudication of the lis in hand. Adds that the property being a Waqf property belonging to a mosque, the question of limitation and/or adverse possession does not arise.
6. There is no dispute between the parties that there exists a Jamia Masjid which dates back apparently to the Mughal period. It is also not disputed between the parties that the said Jamia Masjid is situated in Khasras Nos.5779 to 5784 and that the previous Khasra number thereon was Khasra No,29/min. It is also evident on the record that the property in dispute is a part of the composite structure of the Jamia Masjid and its Khasras numbers i,e, Nos.5774 to 5778 also bore the previous Khasra No,29/min. In the copy of the Musawi produced in evidence as Exh.P.4. The disputed Khasras numbers are shown as part of the Jamia Masjid. The document relied upon and produced by the petitioners including the attested copies of the Field Book merely show the name of the occupant and not the owner. In fact there is no column in the said documents identifying the owner. Similarly the documents produced in evidence by the respondents pertaining to the property tax i,e, Exh.D.19 to Exh.D.30 are also not documents of title. Relying on the aforesaid evidence along with oral evidence produced by the parties the trial Court returned a finding of fact that the property in dispute occupied by the petitioners forms part of the Jamia Masjid. The said finding of fact has been affirmed in appeal. There is a concurrent finding of fact which is neither perverse nor arbitrary. Such finding of fact is not tainted by any misreading or non-reading of evidence. The learned counsel for the petitioners is attempting to persuade this Court to reappraise the evidence on the record which is not possible in the revisional jurisdiction of this Court.
7. The learned counsel for the petitioners has drawn the attention of this Court to an alleged document of sale which is on record as Mark-1 to contend said property had been purchased from one Mansoor son of Rustam. It is contended that the said document pertains to the year 1825.
Suffice it to say that the said document was never proved in evidence and does not form part of the evidence and, B therefore, cannot be taken into account.Even otherwise there is nothing on the record to show that the said Mansoor son of Rustam was the owner of the property in dispute.
Similarly it is not possible to ascertain that the said document which is deficient in material particular in fact relates to the property in dispute.
8. Adverting to the alternative argument raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that even if it is held that the property forms part of the Jamia Masjid the suit was barred by limitation. One of the accepted modes for creation of a Waqf under the Islamic Law is through C immemorial use.
Even in the absence of an express dedication where land is being used from times immemorial for a religious purpose e.g. a mosque, such land shall be deemed to be a Waqf (Article 188 of Principles of Muhammadan Law by D.F. Mulla Edition 2006).
9. Section 10 of the Limitation Act reads as follows:-- "Notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained, no suit against a person in whom property has become vested in trust for any specific purpose, or against his legal representatives or assigns (not being assigns for valuable consideration), for the purpose of following in his or their hands such property or the proceeds thereof, or for an account of a such property or proceeds, shall be barred by any length of time.
[for the- purpose of this sections any property comprised in a Hindu, Muhammadan or Buddhist religious or charitable endowment shall be deemed to the property vested in trust for a specific purpose and the manager of any such property shall he deemed to be the trustee thereof].
' The aforesaid provision applies to suits relating to Waqf property as has been held by the Indian Supreme Court in case reported as Muhammad Shah v. Fasih-ud-Din Ansari and others PLD 1957 SC (Ind.) 111.
10. Thus, in a suit for declaration_ with or without consequential relief, that a property is Waqf property, filed against a person vested therewith in trust as a Mutwalli or otherwise or against his legal representatives as is in the instant case, question of limitation does not arise and such suit is not barred by any length of time. This is the import of section 10 of the Limitation Act. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case the suit filed by the respondents was not barred by limitation.
11. In view of the aforesaid, this revision petition is dismissed.