' RANA BHAGWANDAS, J.--- This appeal with leave of the Court is directed against the Sindh High Court judgment, dated 24-5-2001.
2. Short question for consideration in this appeal is whether after the dismissal of F.R.A. Under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance,1979 (hereinafter referred to the Ordinance, 1979), High Court was competent to re-admit the appeal at the instance of the appellant upon showing sufficient cause.
The view taken in the impugned judgment appears to be that after the amendment introduced in the Ordinance, 1979 conferring the powers of appeal on the District Court, High Court would have no jurisdiction to deal with any application for restoration or re-admission of an appeal dismissed by it for non-prosecution.
3. After hearing Mr. Rizwan Ahmed Siddiqui, learned Advocate Supreme Court for the respondent and examination of the record as well as the impugned judgment, we do not feel persuaded to agree with the view taken by the learned Judge in Chambers of the High Court which on the face of the record appears to be hyper-technical and against the broad principles of law. Assuming for the sake of argument, that the provisions of C.P.C. 1908 would not be strictly attracted in appeals under the Ordinance, 1979, we are of the view that broad and equitable principles of C.P.C. Can always be invoked for ensuring complete and substantial justice to the parties. In the present case since the order of dismissal was passed by the High Court, we are firmly of the opinion that it would be appropriate for the High Court to entertain a prayer for recall and re-admission. High Court should not in such cases suffer from abdication of jurisdiction and rather exercise its jurisdiction for securing complete ends of justice and suppressing the mischief rather than technically knocking out a person.
4. In this view of the matter, we would allow this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court. Restoration application shall be deemed to be pending before the High Court and shall be disposed of on its own merits strictly in accordance with the law with utmost expedition in view of the anxiety expressed by respondent who has been litigating for the enforcement of his right for the last more than sixteen years. No order as to costs.