1. ' RAJA MUHAMMAD KHURSHID KHAN, L-This appeal by special leave calls in question the judgment passed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court on 6-2-1978. The learned Judge finding no good ground to interfere with the judgments and decrees passed by the learned District Judge and the Additional Sub-Judge, Mirpur on 19-11-1977 and 3-1-1977 respectively, dismissed the appeal.
2. ' The dispute arises out of the circumstances detailed below :--- ' Sajawal Khan, the husband of Mst. Gui Taj 'Begum plaintiff-appellant, claiming to be her 'mukhtar' executed a `wakalat nama' on her behalf in favour of the counsel of Mst. Gultaj Begum for instituting a pre-emption suit. The suit was accordingly filed in the Court of learned Additional Sub- Judge, Mirpur on the 19th of August 1975. A written objection having been taken by defendant- respondents Lal Hussain, Iqbal Hussain and Mehrab Khan vendees, challenging the validity of the Wakalatnama' for its being 'executed by a person not competent to execute the same, on additional issue : "Whether the suit for its being instituted without authority is liable to be dismissed."
3. ' I was framed by the learned Additional Sub-Judge. The party declined to produce evidence on the issue. The learned Sub-Judge thereafter, after bearing the arguments, dismissed the suit on the ground that Sajawal Khan failed to produce the 'mukhtar namas' (three in number) whose photostat copies 'were placed on record during the proceedings on 16-11-1976 and 22-12-1976 respectively, at the time of institution of the suit. This finding is not legally corrrect because the 'mukhtarnama' even if executed before the institution of the suit can be validly produced at a later stage during the proceedings. However as the finding of the learned Sub-Judge was upheld by the learned District Judge and the High Court on different grounds, it now looses all its importance.
4. ' The plaintiff Mst. Gultaj Begum, through her alleged 'mukhtar' Sajawal Khan, then went in appeal before the District Judge, Mirpur. It was maintained before the District Judge that the power of attorney (Exh. D. A.) executed by Mst. Gultaj Begum in favour of Sajawal Khan on 9-4-1956 vests authority in Sajawal Khan to file the suit on behalf of Mst. Gultaj Begum. This argument did not cut much ice with the Court and the appeal was disallowed on the ground that the power of attorney does not authorise Sajawal Kban to file the suit on behalf of the appellant.
5. ' Mst. Gultaj Begum when moved a second appeal before the High Court. It was argued thereat on her behalf that the 'mukhtarnama', executed by the lady on 15th of May 1975, gives a valid authority to Sajawal Khan, her husband, to file the pre-emption suit. The appeal in the High Court also failed on the ground that mukhtar nama in no way gives' an authority to Sajawal Khan to file the suit in question and for that reason judgments and decrees passed by the subordinate Courts call for no interference.
6. ' To assail this judgment a petition for leave to appeal was filed in this Court. In support of the petition, Ch. Muhannnad Taj the learned counsel for the appellant at the leave stage, maintained that the mukhtarnama executed on 15th of May 1975, by Mst. Gultaj Begum, if read as a whole, leaves no doubt that she had authorised her husband Sajawal Khan to file any suit-including a suit of pre-emption. Leave to appeal was granted to consider as to whether the said power of attorney vests in Sajawal Khan the authority to file a suit of pre-emption for the land in suit.
7. ' In needs to be stated here that as said elsewhere the appellant in the High Court and even before this Court, at the leave stage, had taken a stand inconsistent with the stand taken before the learned District Judge. Before the learned District Judge reliance was placed on the power of attorney (Exit. D. A.) executed by Mst. Gultaj Begum in 1956. But before this Court, at the leave stage and in the High Court, it was maintained that the power of attorney executed by Mst. Gultaj Begum on 15th May 1975, and not in the year 1956, gives a valid authority to Sajawal Khan to file the pre- emption suit. The learned counsel, during the arguments at the bar, has now shifted his stand taken before the High Court and before this Court, at the leave stage, and maintained that the power of attorney, executed by Mst. Gultaj Begum on 9-4-1956 (Exh. D. A.) empowers Sajawal Khan to institute the preemption suit.
8. ' It would thus appear that the appeal remained inconsistent in her stand. At one time before the learned District Judge, she maintained that Sajawal Khan was duly authorised to institute the suit on the basis of power of attorney (Exh. D. A.) executed in the year 1956. But before the High Court as well as in this Court, at the leave stage, the stand was shifted contrary to the stand taken before the District Judge that the power of attorney executed on the 15th of May 1975, and not in the year 1956, as contended before the District Judge gives competence to Sajawal Khan to file the suit on behalf of Mst. Gultaj Begum.
9. ' However, in support of the appeal it had been again submitted that the power of attorney (Exh. D.
10. A.) executed on 9-4-1956 validly authorises Sajawal Khan to institute the suit. These inconsistent stands gives an impression, of course, without prejudice to the contents of Exh. D. A. That even Mst.
11. Gultaj Begum in all probability, is not sure as to which of the documents executed by her empowers Sajawal Khan to file the suit. Of course this fact itself shall not prejudice her case if the mukhtarnama (Exh. D. A.) otherwise authorises Sajawal Khan to file the suit.
12. ' The learned counsel for the appellant maintained that the learned Judge in the High Court failed to appreciate the contents of mukhtarnama executed by Mst. Gultaj Begum on 9th of April 1956, (Exh. D. A.) which confers power on Sajawal Khan to institute the pre-emption suit. We are affraid, this argument is not well-founded. No reliance was placed, as is evident from the judgment of the High Court, on this mukhtarnama and only mukhtarnama executed on 15th May 1975, was relied upon to assail the judgment of the District Judge. How the learned Judge in these circumstances, was expected to. Pass a finding on a document, which was not relied upon or even argued before the Court. However, as said earlier, this fact in itself, creates no bar for the appellant, to support her cause on the basis of this document, if the document otherwise can be construed to have given a valid authority to Sajawal Khan to file the suit.
13. ' Let us now determine the point as to whether mukhtar nama (Exh. D. A.) executed by Mst. Gultaj Begum appellant on 9.4-1956, vests an authority in Sajawal Khan to file the suit of pre-emption?
14. The mukhtar nama (Exh. D. A.) reads :- {{URDU TEXT}} ' and submitted that these sentences show that Sajawal Khan was empowered to file any civil suit including the pre-emption suit in question. This argument in our view, is misconceived. To interpret a document as a whole is to be looked into. A. Power of attorney should be construed strictly and should be interpreted to give only such authority as it confers expressly or by necessary implication. The important rules for the construction of such a document is that regard must be had to the recitals which, as showing the object of the power. PLD 1978 SC (A J & K) 143, is a direct authority on the point. It has been observed in that case :- "A power of attorney under Order III, rule 2, Civil Procedure Code should be construed strictly. It gives only, such authority as it confers expressly or by necessary implication and it cannot empower beyond what it really conveys. One of the most important rules for the construction of power of attorney is that regard must be had to the recitals which, as showing the scope and object of the power, will control all general terms in the operative part of the instrument. Where authority is given to do a particular act, followed or preceded by the general words, general words are restricted to what is necessary for the proper performance of the particular act and general words in no way confer general powers but are limited to the purpose for which the authority is given and are construed as enlarging the special powers only when necessary for the purpose. 'It, therefore, follows that where special powers are followed by general words and vice versa, the- general words are to be construed as limited to what is necessary for the proper exercise. Of the special powers. This view is also expressed in AIR 1947 Nag. 17 (Full Bench case) wherein at page 19 it is observed: ' The ordinary rule is that powers of attorney must be strictly construed as giving only such authority as they confer expressly or by necessary implication ; (Bowstead on Agency, Edn. 9, p. 59, (1883) A C 170 and (1884) A C 561). The learned author stresses that general words do not confer general powers, but are limited to the purpose for which -the authority is given, and are construed as enlarging the special powers when necessary, and only when necessary, for that. Purpose. A power of attorney is subjected to strict interpretation because it delegates powers which are to be interpreted in strict terms and, in such a way, as would be necessary to carry into effect the authority that is expressly given. The power of attorney is not open to that liberal interpretation which is given to less formal instruments such as ordinary letters or instructions in commercial transactions.'
15. ' To the same effect is PLD 1969 Kar. 123, wherein at page 138 dealing with the issue it is observed :- " . . Such an instrument is a written authorisation by which the principal appoints another person as his agent and confers upon him the authority to perform specified acts on behalf of the principal.
16. The primary ,purpose of an instrument of this nature is to evidence the authority of the agent to third parties with whom the agents deal. The rule is now well established that the power-of- attorney must be strictly construed and strictly pursued. A power of attorney is held to confer only those powers which are specified therein and the agent may neither go beyond nor deviate from the terms of this instrument, that is, the act done should be legally identical with what is authorised to be done by the instrument."
17. The reading of the document on the whole conveys a clear sense that the general power of attorney (Exh. DA) was executed in respect of the immovable property relating to land and built-up houses in Tehsil Mirpur and unrestricted powers were given to Sajawal Khan in respect of this property) authorising him to launch all sort of proceedings including a civil suit relating to this property only. It in no way allows Sajawal Khan to travel beyond it and file the pre-emption suit. The power of attorney is couched in clear terms and admits of no doubt that Sajawal Khan was not authorised to file the pre-emption suit.
18. ' We reiterate our view expressed in the case cited above and hold that Sajawal Khan lacked authority to file the suit.
19. ' It had been further argued that under the provisions of Order III, rule 2, C. P. C. The Court should have given an opportunity to Sajawal Khan to rectify the mistake ; we are not impressed with this argument. The dispute was made subject of an issue and the parties declined to produce any evidence on it. Though we have doubts about the correctness of this proposition of law but even if the proposition is presumed to be correct, a fair opportunity had been afforded to the appellant to rectify the wrong, if possible, which was not availed of.
20. ' For the reasons stated above we see no force in this appeal which stands rejected with costs.